PART II. The terms in common ufe under which we distinguish the fubjects of defire and averfion, are chiefly Pleasure and Pain, Beauty and Deformity, Excellence and Defect, Virtue and Vice, Prof perity and Adverfity; or, in a form more comprehensive, and arifing from the distribution of these, Happiness and Misery, Under one or other of these titles we fhall probably find every conftituent of good or of evil; and, in following the track of ordinary experience or reafon, arrive at a final decifion of what is best for mankind, and establish a principle of estimation and choice, upon which to determine every queftion of right or propriety relating to the affairs of men. SECTION SECTION II. Of Pleafure and Pain, or Things agreeable and disagreeable in general. UNDER this title will occur to be mentioned pleasures and PART II. pains of mere sense, of affection and paffion, of active exertion CHAP. I. and conduct. Pleasure and pain, for the most part, are co-relative terms: Where any circumstance is pleasant, the privation of it is painful; and, conversely, where any circumstance is painful, exemption from it is pleasant. Upon this account, when we have specified the one, it will not always be neceffary to mention the other. In the actual arrangements of nature, throughout the animal kingdom, things falutary are pleasant, and things pernicious are painful. Pleasure is made an inducement to the performance of those functions, which are required to preservation or well being; and pain is employed as a warning to avoid the occafions of deftruction or harm. SECT. II. When PART II. When a certain end is obtained in the use of a pleasure, it is obferved that the inducement to any farther exertion in that particular instance is withdrawn; and attempts to prolong or continue the gratification, as they might be pernicious, fo they are attended not only with fatiety, but even with disgust and pain. As in this wife and beneficent inftitution of nature, to preferve her works, there are pleasures attending all the ordinary and falutary functions of animal life, there are pains, alfo, which attend whatever is pernicious to the animal frame; and the final cause or purpose is evidently the fame in both; that is, by inviting to what is falutary, by deterring from what is pernicious, to excite the languid animal to what is useful; and to rouse the fuffering animal to fuch efforts as may be effectual to remove the occafion of harm; and, in either way, to confult his safety. For this purpose, although the occafions of pain, like the occafions of pleasure, may be temporary, yet, as it is necessary that the pain fhould continue until the cause of harm be removed, or even that the pain fhould increase while the cause of harm is increafing, or the danger to animal life is augmented; there appears to be a fufficient reafon why fufferings, incident to the animal frame, fhould in many inftances be of longer duration, and greater intensity, than the correfponding enjoyments or pleasures which are destined to recommend the ordinary functions of life. It appears, therefore, with refpect to animals in general, that the purpose of nature in the diftribution of fenfation, is to provide for the fafety of the individual, and the fucceffion of the fpecies, at the fame time that an establishment is made for enjoy ment, fo far as is consistent with these ends. In this diftribu- PART IL CHAP. I. tion, there is a prefent restraint from what would be painful in SECT. II. the future; and a prefent direction to what may contribute to future enjoyment, as well as fafety: And there is a fufficient reward for the performance of functions which enter into the course of a regular and well ordered life. The individual, in general, is kindly amused and gratified in the act of preserving himself and continuing his fpecies, and the gratification or amusement, in the case of most animals, is fitted to occupy a confiderable part in the duration of life. pur Man is fufceptible of animal pleasure and pain, in a manner which argues the purpose of nature refpecting him, to be nearly the fame as with respect to other beings endowed with life. He alfo is destined to do what is neceffary for his preservation: but the mere gratifications of appetite which ferve to obtain this pose, are not fitted to occupy an equal portion of his time; and more is left, in his cafe, to the operation of principles in which he stands distinguished from other parts of the animal kingdom. When his preservation is fecured, the life he preferves still requires to be otherwife occupied. Like the other animals, he enjoys his food, the fupply of his wants, and the gratification of various appetites. But no one ever thought of prolonging the gratifications of hunger, for instance, so as to pass a life of enjoyment at table, as fome animals appear to do in the use of food, at their stall or their pasture. If man were not too proud for fuch a choice, nature has not qualified him to persist in it. The pleasures of sense are merely occafional and temporary. They are, in their nature also, mixed and alloyed with pain. Animals are to be deterred VOL. II. B from PART. II. CHAP. I. SECT. II. from what is hurtful, as well as allured to what is falutary; and man himself, with all his knowledge of the end in view, must be prompted, in the detail of his actions, by the admonitions of pain as well as pleasure. The feeling, which prepares the animal sense to be gratified in the fupply of a want, is more or lefs a feeling of pain; and enjoyment is a mere relief from this feeling. Attempts to prolong the gratification beyond its natural period, bring a new species of pain, in the effect of fatiety. Still more, excess of any kind is productive of fuffering and harm: So that this fource of enjoyment is ever impure, either in respect to the pain that precedes it, or in respect to the disgust and harm that may follow from the unguarded pursuit of enjoyment. Whilst men, therefore, may admire the order of nature in this particular, and comply with it as an article of good sense and propriety, few, who are engaged in the fpecific pursuits of human life, look upon the pleasures of mere sense as matters of principal regard. Most men become comparatively indifferent to their perfonal accommodations, in proportion as they are engaged in business, either private or public; or in the view of objects that ftrongly affect them, in behalf of their own honour and interest, or in the cause of their family, their friend, or their country. To the other animals, as well as to man, mere exercife is grateful; and the efforts they are led to make for the preservation of life are, on this account, in part, constituent of their ordinary pleasures. The ends, to which their active pursuits are directed, are fubjects of hope; and give joy in the profpect, as well as in the attainment or ufe. And, although the correfponding apprehenfions, 3 |