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LECTURE XVI.

TRANSUBSTANTIATION.

PART III.

"The cup of benediction which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not the partaking of the body of the Lord?"-1 Cor. x. 16.

WISHING, my brethren, to bring to a conclusion, this evening, the important topic which has occupied us for two successive Sundays, it will be necessary for me to step back for a few moments to bring you to the point at which I left my argument; as the observations which must follow are necessarily the sequel to those which preceded them, and form, indeed, but part of the train of argument which I laid down for myself at the commencement of my last discourse. In stating the position which the Catholic holds, when treating the arguments for his doctrine of the Eucharist, drawn from the words of Institution, I observed that the burthen of proving necessarily lies on those, who maintain that we must depart from the strict and literal meaning of our Saviour's word's, and that, contrary to their natural and obvious import, these words must be taken in a symbolical and figurative sense. I, therefore, laid down the line of argument which I conceived to be strongest on the side of our opponents; and it led us into a two-fold investigation: first, whether the expressions in question can possibly be interpreted in their figurative signification; and secondly, whether any reasons exist to justify this less ordinary course, and to force us to a preference of this figurative interpretation.

With regard to the first: adhering strictly to the principle of biblical interpretation which I first laid down, I went in detail through the various passages of Scripture advanced to prove, that the words of Institution may be interpreted figuratively, without going contrary to ordinary forms of speech

in the New Testament, and more particularly in our Saviour's discourses. I canvassed them, to show you that it was impossible to establish any such parallelism between our words and the examples quoted, as could give the right to interpret our text by them. This formed the first portion of the inquiry, and occupied your attention during our last Sunday meeting. The second portion of my task remains; to see what the reasons or motives may be for preferring that figurative and harsh interpretation, even at the expense, if I may say so, of propriety; to investigate whether there be not reasons so strong, as to oblige us to choose any expedient rather than interpret our Saviour's words in their simple and obvious meaning. I believe I noticed, that this is the argument very generally advanced by writers on this subject, that we must interpret our Saviour's words figuratively, because, otherwise, we are driven into such an ocean of absurdities, that it is impossible to reconcile the doctrine with sound philosophy, or common sense. While on this subject, I may observe, that it is not very easy, even at the outset, and before examining its difficulties, to admit this form of argument. Independently of all that I shall say a little later, regarding these supposed difficulties, the question may be placed in this point of view; -are we to take the Bible simply as it is, and allow it alone to be its own interpreter?-or are we to bring in other extraneous elements to modify that interpretation? If there are certain rules for interpreting the Bible, and if all those rules in any instance converge to show us that certain words will not, and cannot, bear any interpretation but one, I ask, if there can be any means or instrument of interpretation, of sufficient strength to overpower them all? If we admit such a case, do we not reduce to a nullity the entire system of biblical interpretation?

I find, however, that, with reflecting men, or, at least, with those who are considered able divines, on the Protestant side of the question, it has become much more usual than it used to be, to acknowledge that this is not the method in which the text should be examined. They are disposed to allow, that we have no right to consider the apparent impracticability, or impossibility of the doctrine, but must let it stand or fall fairly and solely by the authority of Scripture; and, however the circumstances may be repugnant to our feelings or reason, if proved on grounds of sound interpretation, admit it as taught by God himself. To establish this concession, I will content myself with a single authority, that of one who has been not merely the most persevering, but also (for the

expression is not too harsh) one of the most virulent of our adversaries; and who, particularly on this subject of the Eucharist, has taken extraordinary pains to overthrow our belief. Mr. Faber writes in these words, on the subject now under consideration ::

"While arguing upon this subject, or incidentally mentioning it, some persons, I regret to say, have been too copious, in the use of those unseemly words, "absurdity and impossibility." To such language, the least objection is its reprehensible want of good manners. A much more serious objection is the tone of presumptuous loftiness which pervades it, and is wholly unbecoming a creature of very narrow faculties. Certainly, God will do nothing that is absurd, and can do nothing impossible. But it does not, therefore, follow, that our view of things should be always perfectly correct, and free from misapprehension. Contradictions we can easily fancy, where, in truth, there are none. Hence, therefore, before we consider any doctrine a contradiction, we must be sure we perfectly understand the nature of the matter propounded in that doctrine: for otherwise, the contradiction may not be in the matter itself, but in our mode of conceiving it. In regard to myself,-as my consciously finite intellect claims not to be an universal measure of congruities and possibilities, I deem it to be both more wise and more decorous, to refrain from assailing the doctrine of Transubstantiation, on the ground of its alleged absurdity, or contradictoriness, or impossibility. By such a mode of attack, we, in reality, quit the field of rational and satisfactory argumenta

tion.

"The doctrine of Transubstantiation, like the doctrine of the Trinity, is a question, not of abstract reasoning, but of pure evidence. We believe the revelation of God to be essential and unerring truth. Our business most plainly is, not to discuss the abstract absurdity, and the imagined contradictoriness, of Transubstantiation, but to inquire, according to the best means we possess, whether it be indeed a doctrine of Holy Scripture. If sufficient evidence shall determine such to be the case, we may be sure that the doctrine is neither absurd nor contradictory. I shall ever contend, that the doctrine of Transubstantiation, like the doctrine of the Trinity, is a question of pure evidence."*

These observations are extremely sensible; and the comparison which the author makes with another mystery, as I

VOL. II.

* Difficulties of Romanism," Lond. 1826, p. 54.
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shall show you later, sufficiently demonstrates it to be correct. However, I do not, of course, mean to shelter myself behind his authority, or that of any other writer; I will not content myself with saying, that sensible and acute, yes, excessively acute reasoners against us, admit that any fancied difficulties or contradictions are not to be weighed against our interpretation; and thence conclude, that having, I trust satisfactorily, examined the allegations on the other side, and proved them insufficient, we cannot, according to the obvious rule of interpretation, depart from the literal sense. I have no such intention, my brethren. On the contrary, I mean to meet these difficulties, but without departing one step from the ground which I have chosen from the beginning. I laid it down as my method and rule of interpretation, that the true meaning of words or texts, is that meaning which the speaker must have known would be affixed to his words by those whom he addressed, and that we are to put ourselves in their situation, and know what means they had for explaining his words, then interpret according to those means alone. For we are not to suppose that our Saviour spoke sentences, which those who heard him had no means of understanding, but which we alone were afterwards to understand. If, therefore, we wish to ascertain what were their means of interpreting the words in question, we must invest ourselves with the feelings of the apostles, and make our inquiry in their position.

It is said, then, that we must depart from the literal sense of our Saviour's words, because that literal sense involves an impossibility or contradiction. The simple inquiry to be made is, therefore, could the apostles have reasoned in this manner; or could our Saviour have meant them so to reason? Could they have made the possibility or impossibility of any thing he uttered, be the criterion of its true interpretation? And if he did not intend that for a criterion, which, as you will see, must, if used, have led them astray, it is evident, that by it we must not interpret the text. I beg you to observe, in the first place, that the investigation into possibility or impossibility, when spoken with reference to the Almighty, is philosophically of a much deeper character than we can suppose, not merely ordinary, but positively illiterate and uneducated men, to have been qualified to fathom. What is possible or impossible to God? What is contradictory to his power? Who shall venture to define it, further than what may be the obvious, the first, and simplest principle of contradiction, the existence and simultaneous non-existence of a thing? But who will pretend to say, that any ordinary

mind would be able to measure this perplexed subject, and to reason thus," the Almighty may, indeed, for instance, change water into wine, but that he cannot change bread into his body." Who that looks on these two propositions, with the eye of an uneducated man, could say that, in his mind, there was such a broad distinction between them, that while he saw one effected by the power of a being believed by him to be omnipotent, he still held the other to be of a class so widely different, as to venture to pronounce it absolutely impossible? Suppose, again, that such person had seen our Saviour, or any one else, take into his hands a certain portion of bread, seven or five loaves, and with these very identical loaves, as the Gospel narrative tells us, feeding and satisfying three or five thousand individuals, so that baskets full should remain of the fragments, not creating more substance, but making that which existed suffice for the effects of a much larger quantity, and then were told that the same powerful being could not make a body, or other food, be at the same time in two places; would he, think you, at once be able directly and boldly to pronounce in his mind, that although he had seen the one, although there could be no doubt that the agent was endowed with such superior power to effect it, yet the other belongs philosophically to such a different class of phenomena, that his power was not equal to effecting it? I will not say, that an uneducated man, but, I will assert, the most refined reasoner, or the most profound thinker, if he admitted one of these facts as having been true and proved, could not pretend to say that the other belonged to a different sphere of philosophical laws he could not reject the one from its contradictions, in spite of the demonstration that the other had been.

Now, such as I have described, were the minds of the apostles, those of illiterate uncultivated men. They had been accustomed to see Christ perform the most extraordinary works-they had seen him walking on the water, his body consequently deprived, for a time, of the usual properties of matter, of that gravity which, according to the laws of nature, should have caused it to sink. They had seen him, by his simple word, command the elements, and even raise the dead to life; they had also witnessed those two miracles to which I have alluded, that of transmuting one substance into another, and that of multiplying a body, or extending it to an immense degree. Can we, then, believe, that with such minds as these, and with such evidences, the apostles were likely to have words addressed to them by our Saviour, which they were to interpret rightly, only by the reasoning of our

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