LECTURE II. ON THE PROTESTANT RULE OF FAITH. 'Try all things, and hold fast that which is good." I own, my brethren, that I feel considerably rejoiced and comforted at seeing the good-will with which you have commenced your attendance upon this course of lectures; and still more, to see such a full and gratifying attendance here this evening. For, I must own, that I had feared lest the necessarily abstract nature of the subject, which I treated in my opening discourse, added, perhaps, to the circumstance that, from previous fatigue, I had not, in my estimation, done justice to the interesting view which I wished to propose to you, might, perhaps, have deterred many from continuing their attendance upon what promised such comparatively slight interest. Nothing, indeed, my brethren, is easier than to throw considerable interest over any subject, by condensing its facts into a small space, and crowding together the most striking views that it will bear. But, although I may, upon another occasion, be compelled to follow that course, it is always an unsatisfactory one: because, thereby, injustice is done to two important parties-the cause in hand, and those who are anxious to hear its demonstration. To the cause, this simple reason, that, although, in every question, there must be some more leading and more important points, yet are the connecting links likewise of essential importance; and though, by sweeping away that intermediate matter, you may place the object in a more striking and moving point of view, yet do you essentially weaken it, by depriving it of that support and consistency which the connexion between it and other parts of the system, through those less important elements, alone can give. And injustice is, likewise, done to those who come to learn: for, it may, perchance, be, that their difficulties, if they differ from us, do not so much lie in the leading and important features of the case, as in some comparatively insignificant circumstance, some trifling objec for tion, which, from their particular cast of mind, appears to possess much greater force than we can understand; and so they may depart with the impression, that we have only acted. the part of skilful advocates, putting forward some few favourable points, while we passed over the weaker portions of our case. And hence it is that I shall have, more than once, to claim you indulgence-but I feel that, in simply asking it, the boon is granted-for entering into more minute particulars, and, comparatively more secondary matter, than may appear to some of sufficient value to occupy your attention. Even this evening, it will be impossible for me to grapple so closely with the matter in hand as I intend, hereafter; and if, upon seeing me place in the way so many preliminary observations, and removing, to a certain distance, the closer and more immediate examination of the important points which I have proposed for discussion, any one should be tempted to think that it is my wish to escape from it, I only entreat of him to continue his attendance; and I will promise him, that, in due time, and when such observations shall have been laid down as I consider absolutely necessary, for the full understanding of the question, he shall see every point met in the fairest, the fullest, and the most impartial manner. Now, therefore, to connect what I have to say this evening, with what I have premised, I shall take the liberty of giving you, in a few sentences, what I proposed to you at our last meeting. I there endeavoured to establish a very important distinction between the grounds on which a man justifies himself to his conscience and conviction, in his adherence to any particular religion, and the essential foundation whereupon rests its creed-the principle, if I may so say, of its very existence. I observed, that many professed the Protestant religion, merely because they were born in it; because they have always heard it spoken of as certain and true, or because they are accustomed to hear every other religion rejected and rebutted, as absolutely untenable; and I pointed out the clear distinction between this reasoning and the grounds on which that religion must justify itself. I observed, that a person might be a Protestant, on most of these motives-and the great majority of Protestants are so on many of them-and yet, that not one of these touched upon, or led to, the fundamental principle which Protestantism proposes as it basis-the individual examination, and discovery of its doctrines in the Word of God; whereas, on the contrary, it was impossible for any man to be brought up to the Catholic religion, or to adhere to it, upon any princi ple whatever, without, in the act of entering it, embracing, and identifying with his conscience and conviction, the fundamental principle of Catholicity. For, no one is, or can be, a Catholic, but by his entire submission to the authority of his church. The consequence I wished to draw from these reflections was of an important character, namely, that in all discussions upon this important topic, we have nothing to do with the motives which many give, why they are attached to, and love their religion; but only with the grounds whereupon they believe, whereupon they found their faith, and justify their particular profession; and this, therefore, leads us to the examination, of what is the vital, fundamental principle of the Protestant, and what of the Catholic religion: so that the discussion of these two points will form the subject of the course on which I have entered. This evening, I shall confine myself, exclusively, to treating of that principle which is held, by Protestants, as the essential and fundamental principle of their faith. And having, thus, occasion to speak so largely of the Word of God, and wishing to complete that section of my subject, I will explain what is the doctrine of Catholics regarding it: but will proceed no further with their belief, reserving to myself to open it more largely and completely at our next meeting. There is nothing easier than to give the popular and ordinary statement of the difference between Catholics and those who dissent from them regarding THE RULE OF FAITH. It is very easy to say, that Catholics admit the authority of the church; and that Protestants allow of no rule but the written Word of God. It is easy to make such a statement; but, if any one will take the pains to analyze it, he will find it fraught with considerable difficulties. In the first place, what is the meaning of the Word of God, or the Scriptures, being the only rule of faith? Does it mean, that it is to be the rule for the church, or for its individual members? Does it mean, that the public instrument or symbols of the faith are based upon the Word of God; or, as ancient philosophers used to say, that each man is a microcosm, or, a little world, that so, likewise, he is a little church, with the power of examining and deciding upon matters of religion? Does it mean, that, in order to apply this rule, there is an individual light promised, or granted, by God, so that he is under the guidance and the infallible authority of the Holy Ghost, or, that abandoned to those lights which he may possess, from his own learning or acquirements, his peculiar measure of mind and understanding is to be his rule and guide in the Word of God? But, to show that these difficulties are not imaginary, let us examine the Articles of the Church of England, and we shall find its rule of faith there laid down, which all the clergy must subscribe to, and teach, as their belief. In the Sixth Article it is said, that "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation; so that whatever is not read therein, nór may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation." In this passage there is not one word about the individual right of any one to judge for himself-it is, only, that no one is to be charged with the belief of any doctrine, no one can be required to give his adhesion to any article, which is not contained in the Word of God. But it is evident, here, that the rule is placed in other hands; that the rule is more to prevent some one, not named, from exacting belief beyond a certain point; it is a limitation of the power to require submission to the teaching of some authority. That this authority is the Church there can be no doubt, if we compare the Twentieth Article. There it is said, that, "The Church hath power to ordain rites and ceremonies, and authority, in controversies of faith; and yet it is not lawful for the Church to ordain any thing contrary to God's Word written; neither may it so expound any passage of Scripture, as to be repugnant to another."* This article further increases the complexity and confusion of the rule of faith, as laid down by the Established Church. It says, in the first place, that the Church has authority in *The reader will observe, that I overlook the important inquiry, whether this article, as far as "and yet," is genuine or not. Dr. Burnet acknowledges that it is not found in the original manuscripts containing the subscriptions: and is absent from the copy of those approved by Parliament. The bishop supposes it to have been added between the subscription and the engrossing; and fancies the engrossed copy to have perished at Lambeth. (Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles, Lond. 1695, p. 10.) But this conjecture, as well as other arguments in favour of the clause, are ably confuted by Collins, in his, "Priestcraft in perfection." Lond. 1710. To his arguments we may add, that in the "Articles of Religion agreed upon by the Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland, in 1615," London, 1629, the clause on authority in controversies of faith is omitted, though the articles are verbatim the same, with additions. In the "Copie of the proceedings of some worthy and learned Divines, appointed, by the Lords, to meet at the Bishop of Lincolne's in Westminster, touching innnovations in the doctrines and discipline of the Church of England," Lond. 1641, we read, p. 1. "Innovations in Doctrine, quære, Whether, in the Twentieth Article, these words are not inserted, 'Habet Ecclesiæ authoritatem in controversiis fidei.'" matters of faith: and then, that the Church cannot prescribe any thing contrary to the Scripture. But, if it be thus determined in these solemn documents, that the Church shall not enforce decrees, nor define systems, contrary to the Word of God, the very proposition recognizes the necessity of a superior authority to control its decisions. For, if we should say, that, in this country, the judges of the land have authority in matters of law, but shall not be allowed to decree any thing contrary to the statutes; I ask you, is it not necessarily implied in the very enunciation of that proposition, that an authority some where exists, capable of judging whether those magistrates have contravened that rule, and of preventing their continuing so to act. When, therefore, it is affirmed, that the Church has authority in matters of faith, yet a rule is given whereby the justice of its decisions is to be determined, and no exemption from error is allowed to it, it is no less implied that, besides the Church, there is some superior authority to prevent its acting contrary to the code that has been put into his hands. Now, what authority is this, and where does it reside? Is it each one that has to judge for himself, whether the Church be contradicting the express doctrines of Scripture, and, consequently, is each person thus constituted judge over the decision of his church? If so, this is the most anomalous form of society that ever was imagined. For, if each individual, singly in himself, has greater authority than the whole collectively for the church is a congregation formed of its members the authority vested in that whole is void and nugatory. Wherever there is a limitation of jurisdiction, there must be superior control: and if the Church is not to be obeyed when it teaches anything contrary to Scripture, there are only two alternatives-either that limitation supposes an impossibility of its so doing, or it implies the possible case of the Church being lawfully disobeyed. The first would be the Catholic doctrine, and at open variance with the grounds whereon the Protestant Churches justify their original separation. The Catholic, too, will say that the Church cannot require anything to be believed that is contrary to God's written word; but then the word which I pronounced emphatically is taken by us literally: the Church cannot teach any such doctrine, because God's word is pledged that she shall The superior control exists in the guidance of the Holy Spirit. But if the Church, not being infallible, may teach things contrary to Scripture, who shall judge it, and decide not. VOL. I.--3 |