down the fundamental principle of the protective theory; and, in support of it, he gave a rule for carrying it out, as follows: "First, for their neighbors there can no general rule be given save one, which ever holdeth; which is, that princes do keep due sentinel, that none of the neighbors do overgrow so, (by increase of territory, by embracing trade, or the like,) as they become more able to annoy," &c. Moloch himself, in grand council, could not have devised a more infallible mode of debasing the human race, stifling civilization, and paralyzing industry, than is here set forth. It is obvious that commercial restrictions are but preliminary acts of hostility, always looking to the more advantageous enjoyment of the "healthy exercise" recommended by this benevolent old' gentleman, and in so far they perpetuate in time of peace the commercial evils incident upon war. To prevent the growth of the trade of other countries, and to promote that of their own, have ever been the objects of statesmen looking to strength in time of war; and whenever the restrictions, imposed for these objects, have borne too heavily upon any class of their own citizens, they have been sugared over with the idea of "protection to home industry," and sought to be made palatable by appeals to national prejudices. These arts have been successful in modern times, in prolonging the existence of the absurd theory. General intelligence is now, however, so far advanced, that the public cannot be made to believe that the destruction of, or injury to the trade of another nation can be beneficial to its rival. Any considerable revulsion in trade or diminution in the production of necessaries, which manifests itself in one country, is now looked upon as a calamity to all; a shock given to commercial credit in one quarter vibrates through all channels of intercourse, until regions the most remote manifest its influence. Above all, war has, through the ascendency of the commercial interests, come to be regarded as the greatest of calamities, instead of a "healthful exercise," which was so necessary, according to the noble reasoner alluded to, if "just and honorable." As, however, there can be no war without two parties, the unjust and dishonorable cause of one party must be as necessary" to the existence of a health-promoting war, as the just and honorable cause of the other. With this progress of public opinion in relation to the policy of wars, resulting from the increasing influence of commerce and the decline of that of politicians, the protective theory came to rest for its support upon its supposed magical powers of making men more industrious and enterprising, and their industry more productive, than they would be without it. In 1830, the quantity of coal mined in the United States was 180,000 tons. In 1845 it was 2,500,000 tons, and the import 87,000 tons, paying a duty of $175 per ton, and $2 75 freight from Nova Scotia. An acre of Pennsylvania coal yields 45,000 tons; consequently, it requires 60 acres per ann. to supply the demand. Party leaders tell us, however, that without a duty, or with a low duty, that 60 acres per annum will be imported from abroad, at a rate less than it can be mined for; and that the miners will "abandon the business," the coal fields of Pennsylvania become valueless, and great numbers of persons be thrown out of employ. Where the coal is to come from, or how such quantities can be transported at any price, no one vouchsafes to explain. Where would the tonnage come from? Who would build it? Who would navigate it? and at what rate of freight? Nevertheless, numbers say that it is so; that is, they say so "politically-speaking," which may be taken in a Pickwickian sense-inasmuch as that, commercially speaking, and in a practical sense, the converse appears to be true. The miners are now demanding and receiving, under the new tariff, which charges 30 per cent. duty, one dollar per ton more than they got for it last year under the old tariff, which charged $1 75 per ton, and foreign coal is $1 00 cheaper. This great difference between common sense commercially, and misty theories politically, manifests itself daily more distinctly in all that relates to international affairs. In Great Britain the whole system of protection has been cast off and abandoned. During more than 150 years Great Britain pursued corn-law protection, to enhance the rents and profits of the landed-proprietors, who make the laws, at the expense of those who consume food. To popularize these enactments it has been asserted that they would make England independent of foreign nations for food; as if any man can be independent of his fellows, or any nation of its neighbors. This catch-word of "independence," is ever successful with the unthinking many, because it flatters national prejudice, and keeps alive. those antipathies engendered by former hostilities, which are ready to burst forth in renewed vigor on any new occasion that may offer. For this reason England, until 1828, pursued a strictly prohibitory policy in relation to the introduction of foreign food, as well as manufactures. The operation of the law was supposed to be that, with a strict monopoly of the "home-market," prices would range at a level fixed by home-competition, and therefore it would always be so high as to yield a profit to the farmer; that the encouragement thus given to agriculturists would induce a free outlay of capital, and that every possible acre would be pressed into cultivation, yielding its produce for the supply of the markets; that although the food thus produced might be dear, that dearness would stimulate production so as to make England "independent of foreign nations for food." The opponents of this theory contended that the high prices, ensured to agriculturists, tended rather to relax that successful enterprise which is ever attendant upon necessity; that the enormous tax imposed upon consumers of food for the benefit of its producers, diminished the comforts of laborers, paralyzed trade, and retarded the national prosperity; that the great commercial and industrial rivalry which exists between nations in modern times, eminently demands the exercise of that invention, which is proverbially the daughter of necessity; that the constant activity of all the faculties is indispensable to secure success; and whenever the government, throwing its shield around any occupation, protects it against competition, it removes the necessity for exertion, deadens the faculties, and destroys invention. Notwithstanding a long persistance in the former course, the wants of England have exceeded her means, and she has cast aside protection, frankly acknowledging its inutility, nay hurtfulness, and her future dependance upon foreign nations for food. The result is matter of history, and the causes that led to it are self-evident; so much so, that those who in this country still cling politically to that theory, as applied to this country, which England has tested and abandoned, as the policy of the British Empire, acknowledge the fallacy of supposing that protection can enhance production. As a remarkable instance of this, we quote from the New-York Courier, one of the most practical and able of the federal press, the opening paragraph of its leading article of Dec. 1st: "The final overthrow of the corn law policy in England is turning attention in that country to such improvements in agriculture, as will enable the cultivator to indemnify himself by larger crops at lower prices for the higher prices which it was the design, and partially the result, of the corn laws to secure to him. "What is thus effected in England by this change of policy, should be in some degree brought about by the same cause in our own country, in order that we may be in a position to avail ourselves of the market which is thus newly opened. 66 The difference of motive to such improvements for the two countries is indeed ́ great-nothing less than, in one case, the difference between raising what is necessary to the maintenance of life, and in the other, raising for sale a larger or smaller surplus over consumption; but in both cases there is motive enough." We have italicised a few lines which embrace the principle of protection in its length and breadth, and regard the sentence as an involuntary homage to the immutability of sound principles. The few lines we have quoted are singularly comprehensive in their meaning. They admit that up to this time the influence of protection has been to induce the production of small crops only to sell at high prices; that is, to demand from consumers a great deal of money for small quantities of food. This is for the interest of the producer of food; and the intervention of government was called for, to prevent consumers from getting more for less money from abroad. The moment the government intervention is abandoned, the producer is obliged to arouse himself and seek to retain the trade, by giving more for less money than even foreigners can afford. A natural consequence is, that the people of England obtain more enjoyments. It follows necessarily that where small quantities are produced, although the proprietor may, by charging high prices, get as much money as for a larger quantity at low prices, yet the laborers, and all engaged in handling and transportation, get much less; and this is one of the greatest evils of the protective system, viz., that it enhances the profits of capital, and diminishes both the employment of the poor and the amount of their earnings. This is a result precisely the reverse of what has been alleged to be the effect of protection; but a little reflection will convince every one, nevertheless, that such is the case. The above extract states truly, that the cultivator will seek to "indemnify himself by larger crops." This is true in every species of production. The unprotected cultivator and manufacturer must produce larger quantities. If the English farmers raise two thousand bushels where they now produce fifteen hundred, and sell it for the same money, they must, out of the amount they receive, pay to laborers all the expense of harvesting, handling, sacking, transporting, &c., &c., the extra five hundred bushels. There will be one-third more work in such case for laborers than now. The greater demand for laborers will produce its usual result in advancing their wages, and their general condition will be vastly improved at the expense of the overgrown profits of a landed aristocracy. The same reasoning applies to all manufactures in this country, where the tendency of the protective system has been to produce small quantities at high prices. To manufacture large quantities, at low prices, involves a greater demand for raw material, at enhanced rates, more employment to operatives, and, as a consequence, higher wages, and an improved condition, all which only tends to modify the dividends of capital. As an illustration of the operation of the tariff, we will take from the printed reports of eight leading Lowell factories the number of yards of cotton cloth made per week, the number of pounds cotton consumed, and the number of hands employed, January 1, 1842, and January 1, 1846, as follows: From this return it appears that the weight of cloth has been reduced from 3.25 yards per lb. of cotton, to 3.14 yards per lb., and the number of hands required to produce 1,499,000 yards in 1846, is 567 less than was required to make 1,340,000 in 1842. The saving effected by the diminution of the amount paid for labor, is $3,695 per week, or $192,140 per annum. They make 159,000 yards more cloth per week, which, at 8 cents, is worth $624,000 per annum less the increased quantity of cotton, which is worth $312,000. They receive, therefore, $312,000 net more for cloth, and pay $192,140 less for labor, than in 1842. These two items make $504,140 per annum, which, on the aggregate capital, $8,900,000 of the eight mills, is 5 per cent. per annum, and they divide from 20 to 30 per cent. It is observable, that the increased speed of improved machinery produces this increase of cloth with less manual labor. In other employments, as iron, coal, &c., the extra labor cannot be dispensed with, and any enhanced production necessarily requires more manual labor in handling and transporting, more canal boats, more coasting tonnage, more rail cars, more carts, &c., and it is through increased production, at low prices, that labor only can obtain its share of profit. In a speech of the Hon. Daniel Webster, made in 1820, he remarked: 66 Manufacturing capital comes, in the end, to be owned but by few. It does not, therefore, encourage industry, like capital employed in some other pursuits. The case of the establishment mentioned in the report was in point to this argument. Half a million of dollars gives employment to two hundred and sixty-five persons, and those principally women and children. Now, what employment of that sum, in almost any other pursuit, could fail to demand and require more human labor? If vested in agriculture, the sum would command good and productive land sufficient to employ, he might almost say, all the cotton-spinners in the United States." This all must feel, as no doubt he himself felt, to be true. But we would now call attention to the reasoning contained in a speech of the same gentleman, in Philadelphia, at a public meeting, held December 2d, 1846: "Gentlemen, on the Tariff I have spoken so often, and so much, that I am sure that no gentleman wishes me to utter the word again. There are some things, however, worth while to remember. Of all countries in the world, England for centuries was the most tenacious in adhering to her protective principles, both in matters of commerce and manufacture. "She has of late years relaxed, and found her position could afford somewhat of free trade. She is skilful-she has vast machinery-she has a dense population-a cheaply working, because badly fed and badly clothed population. She can run her career, therefore, in free trade: we cannot, unless willing to become badly fed and badly clothed also." Is not bad food and bad clothing the legitimate result of the "tenacious adherence to protective principles for centuries," producing small quantities at high prices, as the Courier states? England, by protection, has accumulated large capital, skill and "vast machinery," but her people are "badly fed" and "badly clothed." That this is the result of "protection" is selfevident; and Mr. Webster, in 1820, after giving a glowing description of the miseries of the manufacturing population of England, and the happiness of agricultural life in New-England, remarked: "He knew that he was speaking upon what might be thought the remote effect of these great establishments, (manufactories.) Yet not so remote, perhaps, as we may imagine. If the system (protective) be established and adhered to, which he could not believe until he should see it, the effects will not be tardy in their arrival. Two generations, in his opinion, would change the whole face of New-England society." He now advises the course which he then predicted would result in misery to the many, and which he now admits is the consequence to England, for centuries of adherence to the same system. He states that England, by protection, having reduced the people to the utmost misery, may now pursue free trade! Is it not better to adopt it before such miseries are produced? In Boswell's Life of Johnson, may be found this anecdote: "No, Sir, you are not to talk such paradox: let me have no more on't. It cannot entertain, far less can it instruct. Lord Monboddo, one of your Scotch judges, talked a great deal of such nonsense. I suffered him, but I will not suffer you." Boswell.-"But, Sir, does not Rousseau talk such nonsense?" Johnson.-"True, Sir, but Rousseau knows he is talking nonsense, and laughs at the world for staring at him.” Boswell.-"How so, Sir." Johnson." Why, Sir, a man who talks nonsense so well, must know that he is talking nonsense. But I am afraid Monboddo does not know that he is talking nonsense." Boswell.-"Is it wrong, then, Sir, to affect singularity, in order to make people stare?" Johnson.-"Yes, if you do it by propagating error." The great fact that increased quantities, at lower prices, necessarily flow from the absence of that protection which ensures high prices to a restricted supply, is peculiarly manifest in the state of the shipping interest of the United States. It is a remarkable fact, that the whole tonnage of the U. S. employed, in 1845, in the foreign commerce of 26 states, of 814,810 square miles' area, and 20,000,000 people, is scarcely so large as was that employed in the trade of the 13 old states, of 474,000 miles area and 6,000,000 people in 1810. That is to say, the tonnage of the U. S. registered in the foreign trade in 1810, was 984,269 tons, and in 1846, 937,019 tons. Thirty-five years of progress as a nation has diminished our maritime commerce 47,250 tons! and now, when Europe requires large quantities of produce, and U. S. farmers have as great supplies to send, the trade is strangled for want of shipping. The cost of transportation absorbs the proceeds of the sales, and the farmer is no better off than before. The causes of this strange result are very evident to those who have considered the course of our foreign policy. Protection has diminished the quantities to be sold, and therefore the demand for means of transportation. From 1789 to 1809, we enjoyed an almost uninterrupted commerce, under duties and charges so low as scarcely to be felt. The peculiar facilities of the colonies for ship-building had long made the manufacturing of ships profitable, in spite of the opposition of the mother country; and the building of ships for sale, in England, was a large branch of trade. When the close of the revolutionary war threw the commerce of the world open to the trade of the 13 old states, there being no "protective" burdens upon industry at home, Congress not having learned to meddle with private pursuits, under the pretence of "protecting home industry," the enterprise of the United States carried commerce to a great magnitude. New-England and the Atlantic states were agricultural in their pursuits, and Europe afforded advantageous markets, inasmuch as that the return of goods in payment for farm produce was not, for protective purposes, prohibited. Large exports of agricultural produce required a great deal of tonnage to transport it. Shipwrights, timber merchants, riggers, cordage makers, hemp growers, stevedores, and all connected with commerce, were in great requisition. Why? Because the farmers had large quantities of produce to be transported to Europe. In one year, 1789, the exports to France alone, were as follows: .24,680.... .140,959 Rice, tierces,.. This was the produce of the Atlantic states. The Connecticut and Hudson rivers alone furnished these quantities of grain and flour; and so large a quantity has not been furnished since the war, by the 26 states having the mighty Mississippi and its tributaries on the west and south, with the long lake coast on the north united by the Erie Canal and the Hudson, to supply it. In those days the agricultural interests prospered, because they had open markets for the sale of the products of their industry; and the prosperity of the shipping interest placed at their command a sufficiency of tonnage to transport them at low freights. In those years flour was seldom less than $8 per bbl., and never under $6; as a consequence, the farms on the Hudson, the Connecticut and the Delaware were valuable property, and their owners acquired fortunes, which have not only ceased to accumulate, but have dwindled before the swelling dividends of corporate factories, since commerce has been sacrificed for manufactures. |