respect to them finally coincides and becomes one and the same with respect to himself. The interest of the creature, is, as it were, God's own interest, in proportion to the degree of their relation and union to God. Thus the interest of a man's family is looked upon as the same with his own interest; because of the relation they stand in to him; his propriety in them, and their strict union with him. But consider God's elect creatures with respect to their eternal duration, so they are infinitely dearer to God, than a man's family is to him. What has been said, shews that as all things are from God as their first cause and fountain; so all things tend to him, and in their progress come nearer and nearer to him through all eternity Which argues that he who is their first cause is their last end.

SECTION IV.

Some objections considered which may be made against the reasonableness of what has been said of God's making himself his last end.

OBJECTION 1. SOME may object against what has been said, as inconsistent with God's absolute independence and immutability, particularly the representation that has been made, as though God were inclined to a communication of his fulness and emanations of his own glory, as being his own most glorious and complete state. It may be thought that this does not well consist with God's being selfexistent from all eternity, absolutely perfect in himself, in the possession of infinite and independent good. And that in general, to suppose that God makes himself his end, in the creation of the world, seems to suppose that he aims at some interest or happiness of his own, not easily reconcileable with his being happy, perfectly and infinitely happy in him

self. If it could be supposed that God needed any thing; or that the goodness of his creatures could extend to him; or that they could be profitable to him; it might be fit, that God should make himself, and his own interest, his highest and last end in creating the world; and there would be some reason and ground for the preceding discourse. But seeing that God is above all need and all capacity of being added to and advanced, made better or happier in any respect; to what purpose should God make himself his end; or seek to advance himself in any respect by any of his works? How absurd is it to suppose that God should do such great things with a view to obtain what he is already most perfectly possessed of, and was so from all eternity; and therefore cannot now possibly need, nor with any color of reason be supposed to seek?

ANSWER 1. Many have wrong notions of God's happiness, as resulting from his absolute selfsufficience, independence, and immutability. Though it be true, that God's glory and happiness are in and of himself, are infinite and cannot be added to, unchangeable for the whole and every part of which he is perfectly independent of the creature ; yet it does not hence follow, nor is it true, that God has no real and proper delight, pleasure or happiness, in any of his acts or communications relative to the creature; or effects he produces in them; or in any thing he sees in the creature's qualifications, dispositions, actions and state. God may have a real and proper pleasure or happiness in seeing the happy state of the creature; yet this may not be dif ferent from his delight in himself; being a delight in his own infinite goodness; or the exercise of that glorious propensity of his nature to diffuse and communicate himself, and so gratifying this inclination of his own heart. This delight which God has in his creature's happiness, cannot properly be said to be what God receives from the creature. For it is only the effect of his own work in, and communications to the creature, in making it, and admitting it to a participation. of his fulness. As the sun receives nothing from the jewel

that receives its light, and shines only by a participation of its brightness.

With respect also to the creature's holiness: God may have a proper delight and joy in imparting this to the creature, as gratifying hereby his inclination, to communicate of his own excellent fulness. God may delight with true and great pleasure in beholding that beauty which is an image and communication of his own beauty, an expression and manifestation of his own loveliness. And this is so far from being an instance of his happiness not being in and from himself, that it is an evidence that he is happy in himself, or delights and has pleasure in his own beauty. If he did not take pleasure in the expression of his own beauty, it would rather be an evidence that he does not delight in his own beauty; that he hath not his happiness and enjoyment in his own beauty and perfection. So that if we suppose God has real pleasure and happiness in the holy love and praise of his saints, as the image and communication of his own holiness, it is not properly any pleasure distinct from the pleasure he has in himself; but is truly an instance of it.

And with respect to God's being glorified in this respect, that those perfections wherein his glory consists, are exercised and expressed in their proper and corresponding effects; as his wisdom in wise designs and wellcontrived works....his power in great effects....his justice in acts of righteousness ....his goodness in communicating happiness; and so his shewing forth the glory of his own nature, in its being exercised, exbibited, communicated, known, and esteemed; his having delight herein does not argue that his pleasure or happiness is not in hims. If, and his own glory; but the contrary. This is the necessary consequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation and effulgence of it.

Nor do any of these things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happiness. Though he has real pleasure in the creature's holiness and happiness; yet this is not properly any pleasure which he receives from the creature. For these things are what he gives the creature.

They are wholly and entirely from him.

Therefore they are

nothing that they give to God by which they add to him. His rejoicing therein, is rather a rejoicing in his own acts, and his own glory expressed in those acts, than a joy derived · from the creature. God's joy is dependent on nothing besides his own act, which he exerts with an absolute and independent power. And yet, in some sense it can be truly said that God has the more delight and pleasure for the holiness and happiness of his creatures. Because God would be less happy, if he was less good: Or if he had not that perfection of nature which consists in a propensity of nature to diffuse of his own fulness. And he would be less happy, if it were possible for him to be hindered in the exercise of his goodness, and his other perfections in their proper effects. But he has complete happiness, because he has these perfections, and cannot be hindered in exercising and displaying them in their proper effects. And this surely is not thus, because he is dependent; but because he is independent on any other that should hinder him.

From this view it appears, that nothing that has been said is in the least inconsistent with those expressions in the scripture that signify that man cannot be profitable to God; that he receives nothing of us by any of our wisdom and righteousness. For these expressions plainly mean no more than that God is absolutely independent of us; that we have nothing of our own, no stock from whence we can give to God; and that no part of his happiness originates from man.

From what has been said it appears, that the pleasure that God hath in those things which have been mentioned, is rather a pleasure in diffusing and communicating to the creature, than in receiving from the creature. Surely, it is no argument of indigence in God, that he is inclined to communicate of his infinite fulness. It is no argument of the emptiness or deficiency of a fountain, that it is inclined to overflow...Another thing signified by these expressions of scripture is, that nothing that is from the creature, adds to or alters God's happiness, as though it were changeable either by increase or diminution. Nor does any thing that has been

advanced in the least suppose or infer that it does, or is it in the least inconsistent with the eternity, and most absolute immutability of God's pleasure and happiness.....For though these communications of God, these exercises, operations, effects and expressions of his glorious perfections, which God rejoices in, are in time; yet his joy in them is without beginning or change. They were always equally present in the divine mind. He beheld them with equal clearness, certainty and fulness in every respect, as he doth now. They were always equally present; as with tim there is no variableness or succession. He ever beheld and enjoyed them perfectly in his own independent and immutable power and will. And his view of, and joy in them is eternally, absolutely perfect unchangeable and independent. It cannot be added to or dis minished by the power or will of any creature; nor is in the least dependent on any thing mutable or contingent.

2. If any are not satisfied with the preceding answer, but still insist on the objection: Let them consider whether they can devise any other scheme of God's las end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this ob jection in its full force, if there be any force in it. For if God had any last end in creating the world, then there was something, in some respect future, that he aimed at, and designed to bring to pass by creating the world: Something that was agreeable to his inclination or will: Let that be his own glory, or the happiness of his creatures, or what it will. Now if there be something that God secks as agreeable, or grateful to him, then in the accomplishment of it he is gratified. If the last end which he seeks in the creation of the world, be truly a thing grateful to him, (as certainly it is if it be truly his end and truly the object of his will) then it is what he takes a real delight and pleasure in. But then according to the argument of the objection, how he can have any thing future to desire or seek, who is already perfectly, eternally and immutably satisfied in himself? What can remain for him to take any delight in or to be further gratified by, whose eternal and unchangeable delight is in himself as his own complete object of enjoyment? Thus the objector will be press