became the common soul of the universe, and actuated and governed it in all its motions.

Thus I have gone upon the supposition of a third person, neither creator nor creature, but a disinterested person stepping in to judge of the concerns of both, and state what is most fit and proper between them. The thing supposed is impossible; but the case is nevertheless just the same as to what is most fit and suitable in itself. For it is most certainly proper for God to act, according to the greatest fitness, in his proceedings, and he knows what the greatest fitness is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct pere son to direct him. As therefore there is no third being, beside God and the created system, nor can be, so there is no need of any, seeing God himself is possessed of that perfect discernment and rectitude which have been supposed. It be longs to him as supreme arbiter, and to his infinite wisdom and rectitude, to state all rules and measures of proceedings. And seeing these attributes of God are infinite, and most absolutely perfect, they are not the less fit to order and dispose, because they are in him, who is a being concerned, and not a third person that is disinterested. For being interested unfits a person to be arbiter or judge, ho otherwise than as interest tends to blind and mislead his judgment, or incline him to act contrary to it. But that God should be in danger of either, is contrary to the supposition of his being possessed of discerning and justice absolutely perfect. And as there must be some supreme judge of fitness and propriety in the universality of things, as otherwise there could be no order nor regularity, it therefore belongs to God whose are all things, who is perfectly fit for this office, and who alone is so to state all things according to the most perfect fitness and rectitude, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person. We may therefore be sure it is and will be done.

I should think that these things might incline us to suppose that God has not forgot himself, in the ends which he proposed in the creation of the world; but that he has so stated these ends (however he is selfsufficient, immutable, and independent) as therein plainly to shew a supreme regard

to himself. Whether this can be, or whether God has done thus, must be considered afterwards, as also what may be objected against this view of things.: 9.

5. Whatsoever is good, amiable and valuable in itself, absolutely and originally, which facts and events shew that God aimed at in the creation of the world; must be supposed to be regarded, or aimed at by God ultimately, or as an ulti, mate end of creation. For we must suppose from the perfection of God's nature, that whatsoever is valuable and amiable in itself, simply and absolutely considered, God values simply for itself; it is agreeable to him absolutely on its own account, because God's judgment and esteem are according to truth. He values and loves things accordingly, as they are worthy to be valued and loved. But if God values a thing simply, and absolutely, for itself, and on its own account, then it is the ultimate object of his value; he does not value it merely for the sake of a further end to be attained by it. For to suppose that he values it only for some farther end, is in direct contradiction to the present supposition, which is, that he values it absolutely, and for itself. Hence it most clearly follows, that if that which God values ultimately and for itself, appears in fact and experience, to be what he seeks by any thing he does, he must regard it as an ultimate end. And therefore if he seeks it in creating the world, or any part of the world, it is an ultimate end of the work of creation. Having got thus far, we may now proceed a step further, and assert,

I

>> 6. Whatsoever thing is actually the effect or consequence of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely good and valuable in itself, that thing is an ultimate -end of God's creating the world. We see that it is a good that God aimed at by the creation of the world; because he - has actually attained it by that means. This is an evidence that he intended to attain, or aimed at it. For we may justly infer what God intends, by what he actually does; because he does nothing inadvertently, or without design. But whatever God intends to attain from a value for it; or in other words, whatever he aims at in his actions and works, that he

values; he seeks that thing in those acts and works. Bes cause, for an agent stos intend to attain something he values by means he uses, is the same thing as to seek it by those means. And this is the same as to make that thing his end in those means Now it being by the supposition what God values, ultimately, it must therefore by the preceding posi tion, be aimed at by God as an ultimate end of creating the worldwitansi Ponque Fana 57

Some farther observations concerning those things which reason leads us to suppose God aimed at the creation of the world, shewing particularly what things that are absolutely good, are actually the consequence of the creation of the world.

FROM what was last observed it seems to be the most proper and just way of proceeding, as we would see what light reason will give us respecting the particular end or ends God had (ultimately in view in the creation of the world; to consider what thing or things, are actually the effect or consequence of the creation of the world, that are simply and originally valuable in themselves. And this is what I would directly proceed to, without entering on any tedious metaphysical inquiries wherein fitness, amiableness, or valuableness' consists ; or what that is in the nature of some things, which is properly the foundation of a worthiness of being loved and esteemed on their own account. In this I must at present refer what I say to the sense and dictates of the reader's mind, on sedate and calm reflection.

I proceed to observé, znzovú valet de la de tape z mála # 1. It seems a thing in itself fit, proper and desirable, that the glorious attributes of God, which consist in a sufficiency to certain acts and effects, should be exerted in the production

of such effects, as might manifest the infinite power, wisdom, righteousness, goodness, &c. which are in God. If the world had not been created, these attributes never would have had any exercise. The power of God, which is a sufficiency in him to produce great effects, must for ever have been dormant and useless as to any effect. The divine wisdom and prudence would have had no exercise in any wise contrivance, any prudent proceeding or disposal of things; for there would have been no objects of contrivance or disposal. The same might be observed of God's justice, goodness and truth. Indeed God might have known as perfectly that he possessed these attributes, if they had never been exerted or expressed in any effect. But then if the attributes which consist in a sufficiency for correspondent effects, are in themselves excellent, the exercises of them must likewise be excellent. If it be an excellent thing that there should be a sufficiency for a certain kind of action or operation, the excellency of such a sufficiency must consist in its relation to this kind of operation or effect; but that could not be, unless the operation itself were excellent. A sufficiency for any act or work is no farther valuable, than the work or effect is valuable.* As God therefore esteems these attributes themselves valuable, and delights in them; so it is natural to suppose that he delights in their proper exercise and expression. For the same reason that he esteems his own sufficiency wisely to contrive and dispose effects, he also will esteem the wise contrivance and disposition itself. And for the same reason as he delights in his own disposition, to do justly, and to dispose of things ac

* As we must conceive of things, the end and perfection of these attributes does as it were consist in their exercise: "The end of wisdom (says Mr. G. Tennent, in his Sermon at the opening of the Presbyterian church of Philadelphia) is design; the end of power is action; the end of goodness is doing good. To suppose these perfections not to be exerted, would be to represent them as insignificant. Of what use would God's wisdom be, if it had nothing to design or direct? To what purpose his almightiness, if it never brought any thing to pass? And of what avail his goodness, if it never did any good ?"

cording to truth and just proportion; so he must delight in such a righteous dispossl itself.

2. It seems to be a thing in itself fit and desirable, that the glorious perfections of God should be known, and the operations and expressions of them seen by other beings besides himself. If it be fit, that God's power and wisdom, &c. should be exercised and expressed in some effects, and not lie eternally dormant, then it seems proper that these exercis es should appear, and not be totally hidden and unknown. For if they are, it will be just the same as to the above purpose, as if they were not. God as perfectly knew himself and his perfections, had as perfect an idea of the exercises and effects they were sufficient for, antecedently to any such actual op erations of them, as since. If therefore it be nevertheless a thing in itself valuable, and worthy to be desired, that these glorious perfections be actually expressed and, exhibited in their correspondent effects; then it seems also, that the knowledge of these perfections, and the expressions and discoveries that are made of them, is a thing valuable in itself absolutely considered; and that it is desirable that this knowledge should exist. As God's perfections are things in themselves excellent, so the expression of them in their proper acts and fruits is excellent; and the knowledge of these excellent perfections, and of these glorious expressions of them, is an excellent thing, the existence of which is in itself valuable and desirable. It is a thing infinitely good in itself that God's glory should be known by a glorious society of created beings. And that there should be in them an increasing knowledge of God to all eternity, is an existence, a reality infinitely worthy to be, and worthy to be valued and regarded by him, to whom it belongs to order that to be, which, of all things possible, is fittest and best. If existence is more worthy than defect and nonentity, and if any created existence is in itself worthy to be, then knowledge or understanding is a thing worthy to be; and if any knowledge, then the most excellent sort of knowledge, viz. that of God and his glory. The existence of the created universe consists as much in it as in any thing: Yea this knowledge, is one of the highest, most real and sub