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both the young man, and the virgin, the suckling also, with the man of grey hairs." And it appears by the history of that destruction, that at that time was a remarkable fulfilment of that in Deut. xxviii. 53....57, concerning parents' eating their children in the siege; and the tender and delicate woman eating her newborn child. And here it must be remembered, that these very destructions of that city and land are spoken of in those places forementioned, as clear evidences of God's wrath, to all nations which shall behold them. And if so, they were evidences of God's wrath towards infants; who, equally with the rest, were the subjects of the destruction. If a particular kind or rank of persons, which made a very considerable part of the inhabitants, were from time to time partakers of the overthrow, without any distinction made in divine providence, and yet this was no evidence at all of God's displeasure with any of them; then a being the subjects of such a calamity could not be an evidence of God's wrath against any of the inhabitants, to the reason of all nations, or any nation, or so much as one person.

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PART II.

Containing observations on particular parts of the Holy Scripture, which prove the Doctrine of Original Sin.

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CHAPTER I.

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Observations relating to things contained in the three first Chapters of Genesis, with reference to the Doctrine of Original Sin.

SECTION I.

Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our first Parents were created with Righteousness, or moral rectitude of Heart?

THE doctrine of Original Righteousness, or the crea tion of our first parents with holy principles and dispositions, has a close connexion, in several respects, with the doctrine of Original Sin. Dr Taylor was sensible of this; and accordingly he strenuously opposes this doctrine, in his book against Original sin. And therefore in handling the subject, I would in the first place remove this author's main objection. against this doctrine, and then shew how the doctrine may be inferred from the account which Moses gives us, in the three first chapters of Genesis.

Dr. Taylor's grand objection against this doctrine, which he abundantly insists on, is this: That it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of virtue, that it should be concreated with any person; because, if so, it must be by an act of God's absolute power, without our knowledge or concurrence; and that moral virtue, in its véry nature implieth the choice and consent of the moral agent, without which it cannot be virtue and holiness: That a necessary holiness is no holiness. So p. 180, where he observes, "That Adam must exist, he must be created, yea he must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous." See also p. 250, 251. In p. 161. S. he says, "To say, that God not only endowed Adam with a capacity of being righteous, but more- | over that righteousness and true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature, at the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness." And in like manner Dr. Turnbull in many places insists upon it, that it is necessary to the very being of virtue, that it be owing to our own choice, and diligent culture.

With respect to this, I would observe, that it consists in a notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature of things, and the common notions of mankind; and also inconsistent with Dr. Taylor's own notions of virtue. Therefore if it be truly so, that to affirm that to be virtue or holiness, which is not the fruit of preceding thought, reflection and choice, is to affirm a contradiction, I shall shew plainly, that for him to affirm otherwise, is a contradiction to himself.

In the first place, I think it a contradiction to the nature of things, as judged of by the common sense of mankind. It is agreeable to the sense of the minds of men in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but the good choice itself, from whence that effect proceeds; yea, and not only so, but also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the general no. tion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles

whence they proceed; and so that the act of choosing that which is good, is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes, that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice; and that therefore it is not necessary that there should first be thought, reflection and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before 1 the existence of a good disposition of heart, what signi fies that choice? There can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere selflove, ambition, or some animal appetite; and therefore a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it.

The following things in Mr. Hutcheson's inquiry con cerning moral good and evil, are evidently agreeable to the nature of things, and the voice of human sense and reason, Section II. p. 132, 133. "Every action which we apprehend as either morally good or evil, is always supposed to flow from some affections towards sensitive natures. And whatev. er we call virtue or vice, is either some such affection, or some action consequent upon it. All the actions counted religious in any country, are supposed by those who count them so, to flow from some affections towards the Deity; and whatever we call social virtue, we still suppose to flow from affections towards our fellow creatures. Prudence, if it is only employed in promoting private interest, is never imagined to be a virtue." In these things Dr. Turnbull expressly agrees with Mr. Hutcheson, who is his admired author.*

If a virtuous disposition or affection is before acts that proceed from it, then they are before those virtuous acts of choice which proceed from it. And therefore there is no necessity that all virtuous dispositions or affections should be the effect of choice: And so no such supposed necessity can be a good objection against such a disposition's being natural, or from a kind of instinct, implanted in the mind in its creation. A

Moral Philosophy p. 112.115, p. 142, et alibi passim.

greeable to what Mr. Hutcheson says, (Ibid. Section III. p. 196, 197.) “I know not, says he, for what reason some will not allow that to be virtue, which flows from instinct or pasBut how do they help themselves? They say, virtue arises from reason. What is reason, but the sagacity we have in prosecuting any end? The ultimate end proposed by common moralists, is the happiness of the agent himself. And this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another instinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue, as the instinct towards private happiness? If it be said, that actions from instinct are not the effect of prudence and choice, this objection will hold full as strongly against the actions which flow from selflove."

And if we consider what Dr. Taylor declares as his own notion of the essence of virtue, we shall find, what he so confidently and often affirms, of its being essential to all virtue. that it should follow choice, and proceed from it, is no less repugnant to that, than it is to the nature of things, and the general notions of mankind. For it is his notion, as well as Mr. Hutcheson's, that the essence of virtue lies in good affec tion, and particularly in benevolence or love; as he very fully declares in these words in his Key,*« That the word that signifies goodness and mercy should also signify moral rectitude in general, will not seem strange, if we consider that love is the fulfilling of the law. Goodness, according to the sense of scripture, and the nature of things, includes all moral rectitude, which, I reckon, may every part of it, where it is true and genuine, be resolved into this single principle." If it be so indeed, then certainly no act whatsoever can have moral rec titude, but what proceeds from this principle. And consequently no act of volition or choice can have any moral rectitude, that takes place before this principle exists. And yet he most confidently affirms, that thought, reflection and choice must go before virtue, and that all virtue or righteousness must be the fruit of preceding choice. This brings his

* Marginal Note annexed to § 358.

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