full in. Thus in p. 186. P. "It was sin (says he) which subjected us to death by the law, JUSTLY threatening sin with death. Which law was given us, that sin might appear; might be set forth IN ITS PROPER COLORS; when we saw it subjected us to death by a law perfectly holy, just and good; that sin by the commandment, by the law, might be represented what it really is, an exceeding great and deadly evil." So in note on Rom. v. 20, p. 299. "The law or ministration of death, as it subjects to death for every transgression, is still of use to shew the natural and proper demerit of sin." Ibid. p. 292. "The language of the law, dying thou shalt die, is to be understood of the demerit of the transgression, that which it deserves." Ibid. p. 298. "The law was added, saith Mr. Locke, on the place, because the Israelites, the posterity of Abraham, were transgressors as well as other men, to shew them their sins, and the punishment and death, which in strict justice they incurred by them. And this appears to be a true comment on Rom. vii. 13....Sin, by virtue of the law, subjected you to death for this end, that sin, working death in us, by that which is holy, just, and good, perfectly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness....Consequently every sin is in strict justice deserving of wrath and punishment; and the law in its rigor was given to the Jews, to set home this awful truth upon their consciences, to shew them the evil and pernicious nature of sin; and that, being conscious they had broke the law of God, this might convince them of the great need they had of the favor of the lawgiver, and oblige them, by faith in his goodness, to fly to his mer ey, for pardon and salvation."

If the law be holy, just, and good, a constitution perfectly agreeable to God's holiness, justice, and goodness; then he might have put it exactly in execution, agreeably to all these his perfections. Our author himself says, p. 133. S. "How that constitution, which establishes a law, the making of which is inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God, and the executing of it inconsistent with his holiness, can be a righteous constitution, I confess, is quite beyond my comprehension."

Now the reader is left to judge, whether it be not most plainly and fully agreeable to Dr. Taylor's own doctrine, that there never was any one person from the beginning of the world, who came to act in the world as a moral agent, and that it is not to be hoped there ever will be any, but what is a sinner or transgressor of the law of God; and that therefore this proves to be the issue and event of things, with respect to all mankind in all ages, that, by the natural and proper demerit of their own sinfulness, and in the judgment of the law of God, which is perfectly consonant to truth, and exhibits things in their true colors, they are the proper subjects of the curse of God, eternal death, and everlasting ruin; which must be the actual consequence, unless the grace or favor of the lawgiver interpose, and mercy prevail for their pardon and salvation. The reader has seen also how agreeable this is to the doctrine of the holy scripture.

And if so, and what has been observed concerning the interposition of divine grace be remembered, namely, that this alters not the nature of things as they are in themselves, and that it does not in the least affect the state of the controversy we are upon, concerning the true nature and tendency of the state that mankind come into the world in, whether grace prevents the fatal effect or no; I say, if these things are considered, I trust, none will deny, that the proposition that was laid down, is fully proved, as agreeable to the word of God, and Dr. Taylor's own words; viz. that mankind are all naturally in such a state, as is attended, without fail, with this consequence or issue, that they universally are the subjects of that guilt and sinfulness, which is, in effect, their utter and eternal ruin, being cast wholly out of the favor of God, and subjected to his everlasting wrath and curse.

SECTION II

It follows from the Proposition proved in the foregoing Section, that all Mankind are under the influence of a prevailing effectual Tendecy in their Nature, to that Sin and Wickedness, which implies their utter and eternal ruin.

THE proposition laid down being proved, the consequence of it remains to be made out, viz. that the mind of man has a natural tendency or propensity to that event, which has been shewn universally and infallibly to take place (if this be not sufficiently evident of itself, without proof) and that this is a corrupt or depraved propensity.

I shall here consider the former part of this consequence, namely, whether such an universal, constant, infallible event is truly a proof of the being of any tendency or propensity to that event; leaving the evil and corrupt nature of such a propensity to be considered afterwards.

If any should say, they do not think that its being a thing universal and infallible in event, that mankind commit some sin, is a proof of a prevailing tendency to sin; because they do not only sin, but also do good, and perhaps more good than evil; let them remember, that the question at present is not, how much sin there is a tendency to; but, whether there be a prevailing propensity to that issue, which it is allowed all men do actually come to, that all fail of keeping the law perfectly; whether there be not a tendency to such imperfection of obedience, as always without fail comes to pass; to that degree of sinfulness, at least, which all fall into; and so to that utter ruin, which that sinfulness implies and infers. Whether an effectual propensity to this be worth the name of depravity, because of the good that may be supposed to balance it, shall be considered by and by. If it were so, that all mankind, in all nations and ages, were at least one day in their lives deprived of the use of their reason, and run raving mad; or that all, even every individual person, once cut their own

throats, or put out their own eyes; it might be an evidence of some tendency in the nature or natural state of mankind to such an event; though they might exercise reason many more days than they were distracted, and were kind to, and tender of themselves oftener than they mortally and cruelly wounded themselves.

To determine whether the unfailing constancy of the above named event be an evidence of tendency, let it be considered, what can be meant by tendency, but a prevailing liableness or exposedness to such or such an event. Wherein consists the notion of any such thing, but some stated prevalence or preponderation in the nature or state of causes or occasions, that is followed by, and so proves to be effectual to, a stated prevalence or commonness of any particular kind of effect? Or, something in the permanent state of things, concerned in bringing a certain sort of event to pass, which is a foundation for the constancy, or strongly prevailing probability of such an event? If we mean this by tendency (as I know not what else can be meant by it, but this, or something like this) then it is manifest, that where we see a stated prevalence of any kind of effect or event, there is a tendency to that effect in the nature and state of its causes. A common and steady effect shews, that there is somewhere a preponderation, a prevailing exposedness or liableness in the state of things, to what comes so steadily to pass. The natural dictate of reason shews, that where there is an effect, there is a cause, and a cause sufficient for the effect; because, if it were not sufficient, it would not be effectual; and that therefore, where there is a stated prevalence of the effect, there is a stated prevalence in the cause: A steady effect argues a steady cause. We obtain a notion of such a thing as tendency, no other way than by observation; and we can observe nothing but events; and it is the commonness or constancy of events that gives us a notion of tendency in all cases. Thus we judge of tendencies in the natural world. the tendencies or propensities of nature in bles, animals, rational and irrational creatures. A notion of a stated tendency, or fixed propensity, is not obtained by observ

VOL. VI.

T

Thus we judge of minerals, vegeta

ing only a single event. A stated preponderation in the cause or occasion, is argued only by a stated prevalence of the effect. If a die be once thrown, and it falls on a particular side, we do not argue from hence, that that side is the heaviest ; but if it be thrown without skill or care, many thousands or millions of times going, and constantly falls on the same side, we have not the least doubt in our minds, but that there is something of propensity in the case, by superior weight of that side, or in some other respect. How ridiculous would he make himself, who should earnestly dispute against any tendency in the state of things to cold in the winter, or heat in the summer; or should stand to it, that although it often happened that water quenched fire, yet there was no tendency in it to such an effect.

In the case we are upon, the human nature, as existing in such an immense diversity of persons and circumstances, and never failing in any one instance, of coming to that issue, viz. that sinfulness, which implies extreme misery and eternal ruin, is as the die often cast. For it alters not the case in the least, as to the evidence of tendency, whether the subject of the constant event be an individual, or a nature and kind. Thus, if there be a succession of trees of the same sort, proceeding one from another, from the beginning of the world, growing in all countries, soils, and climates, and otherwise in (as it were) an infinite variety of circumstances, all bearing ill fruit; it as much proves the nature and tendency of the kind, as if it were only one individual tree, that had remained from the beginning of the world, had often been transplanted into different soils, &c. and had continued to bear only bad fruit. So, if there were a particular family, which, from generation to generation, and through every remove to innumerable different countries, and places of abode, all died of a consumption, or all run distracted, or all murdered themselves, it would be as much an evidence of the tendency of something in the nature or constitution of that race, as it would be of the tendency of something in the nature or state of an individual, if some one person had lived all that time, and some remarkable event had often appeared in him, which he had been the