of a man deceased as his woman' or 'wife.' That this was actually the usage is obvious from numerous examples. Thus Gen. 38. 8, And Judah said unto Onan, Go in unto thy brother's wife, and marry her.' Deut. 25. 5, The wife of the dead shall not marry without unto a stranger.' Ruth 4. 5, ( Buy it of Ruth, the wife of the dead.' 2 Sam. 12. 10, Thou hast taken the wife of Uriah.' Matt. 22. 25, 'The first died and left his wife.' Acts 5. 7, 'Ananias' wife, not knowing that her husband was dead,' &c.

to be recollected, that according to the
original idiom, widow-wife' is ar
equally proper rendering. We cannot
doubt, therefore, that while the term
wife' in this connexion is really used
with such an extension of its import as
to embrace the idea of widow,' it would
at the same time have been entirely
contrary to the prevailing idiom of the
language to have employed that term.
The truth is, if we mistake not, the
term wife' in the different specifica.
tions of the law before us, is so used as
to express the continuity of the relation,
without any regard to the fact of the
husband's death. Whether he were
living or dead, it mattered not; the
prohibition continued in full force; and
that not only from the common usage
of speech, but from the nature of the
propinquity already established between
the barred parties. We do do not mean
by this that the relation so continued
after the death of either of the parties,
as to make it unlawful for the survivor
to marry again; for in this particular,
a dispensation was kindly granted, and
the words of the apostle, Rom. 7. 2, 3,
apply in all their force; For the wo-
man which hath an husband is bound
by the law to her husband as long as
he liveth; but if the husband be dead,
she is loosed from the law of her hus-
band-so that she is no adulteress,
|
though she be married to another man.'
But we do not perceive that this annuls
the relationships previously existing
between those who are brought together
by affinity, nor is there any fairness in
quoting the apostle's words to such a
purpose, as his drift was entirely differ-
ent. Take for instance the case of the

Such was the common usage among the Hebrews, the Greeks, and the Romans; and such is that of the French, the Germans, the Spanish, and the Italians, as well as of the English. In none of the versions of the Scriptures in these languages, is the word widow introduced in such cases. The Hebrew has indeed the word salmonah, signifying widow, but it is never used, as with us, in such a connexion as 'the widow of such an one',' the widow of | a father, brother, son,' &c. Instead of this, the fixed phraseology in such cases is always' wife.' Its use is most prevalent in cases where the writer's object is to make the state of widowhood, as a state of desolation and weakness, peculiarly prominent. Thus Ex. 22. 22, 'Ye shall not afflict any widow or child.' Deut. 14. 29, 'The stranger, the fatherless, and the widow shall come and eat and be satisfied.' Job. 24. 3, 'They take the widow's ox for a pledge.' Such is the more common usus loquendi. Indeed, it is remarkable, that in several instances the word MLN woman or wife, is subjoined to be almonah, widow, equivalent to 'widow-woman' or 'widow-step-mother, the father's wife. What wife' in our language. Both terms are in these cases generally translated in our version, though occasionally the latter is omitted. Thus, 1 Kings 7. 14, 'He was a widow's son ( consummated marriage with her. (MAN MWN bën ishah almonah, son of a widow-wife) the language of the law she then be of the tribe of Naphtali.' But wherever came one flesh' with him. As soon the phrase "widow-woman' occurs, it is as this became a fact, the propinquity

originally constituted the propinquity between her and her step-son, that rendered it unlawful for him to marry her? Plainly the fact, that the father had

In

cattle. That code, as a code, has be come to us antiquated, and if we receive certain of its moral precepts, it is not because we admit the authority of the Levitical law; but because of their own intrinsic equity or wisdom.

Again, it is affirmed, that if these

became complete. How could the death of the father undo this pre-existent fact, and cause the constituted relation between the step-mother and the step-son to cease? So as to a sister; she does not lose the propinquity which she has in common with me, either at my father's death, or at her marriage; be-enactments are binding upon us at this cause her propinquity is founded on a pre-existent fact, which can never cease to be a fact. How then can we resist the inference, that the sister of a wife continues to be a sister, after the death of the wife, just as she was before, and consequently is never to be approached in the nuptial relation? Does the maxim admit of controversy, that any person, with whom, at any time, it would have been incest to cohabit, will forever remain forbidden? The question seems unequivocally determined by the principle of affinity arising out of the nature of the marriage union.

Are these Laws still binding upon Chris

tians at the present Day?

This of course is a question of the utmost moment, in the present connexion. It is comparatively a matter of little consequence to ascertain whether the marriage in question was forbidden to the Jews, provided the statute respecting it was among those portions of the law which have been abolished under the gospel. This latter position is of course most strenuously maintained by those who hold to the lawfulness of the marriage in question. By them it is contended that these laws are purely ceremonial, forming a part of that code which is abrogated by Christ. They occur, it is said, in the midst of enactments which are confessedly Levitical, and accompanied by no notes of discrimination which mark them out as having a moral and permanent authority. For aught that appears, they are no more binding on us than the precepts relative to wearing linsey-woolsey garments, or sowing diverse seeds in the same field or raising a mixed breed of

day, it must be because the connexions forbidden involve an essential immorality. But in this case, God never would have sanctioned them under any cir cumstances. Yet we perceive as a matter of fact, that the first marriages in the family of Adam must necessarily have been between brother and sister, so far at least as regards Cain and Abel, and probably Adam's other children. It was, moreover, an express statute, that in case that a brother died childless, the surviving brother was not only permitted, but required to marry his widow. If such connexions then are intrinsically wrong, how could they have been allowed in the instances cited?

:

To this it is replied, on the other hand, that there is nothing of a ceremonial nature in the law regulating marriage connexions. The institution of marriage was intended, not for the Jews but for the whole world. As such, the laws by which its Author has seen fit to qualify, guard, and govern it, are binding alike upon all nations and in all times. These laws are contained in the chapters before us; and if they are not now obligatory, then it follows that we have nothing in the compass of the whole Bible regulating the subject of marriage alliances-nothing to forbid a man marrying his own mother, sister, or daughter! They occur, indeed, in the midst of a multitude of enactments, peculiar to the Levitical economy. But this is no more than holds good of a vast variety of other moral precepts, the universally binding nature of which no one questions. The moral law is indeed summarily comprised in the decalogue, yet the letter and spirit of

this divine code are illustrated and con-
firmed by subsequent explanatory pre-
cepts, which are intermingled often in
the same chapter, and sometimes in the
same paragraph with the purely ritual
or ecclesiastical laws. One has only
to turn his eye over the three or four
connected chapters in this book, to find
the repeated occurrence of such pre-
cepts as the following:- Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God with all thine
heart, and with all thy soul, and with
all thy might.'-'Thou shalt fear the
Lord thy God; him shalt thou serve,
and to him shalt thou cleave, and swear
by his name.'-Thou shalt do that
which is right and good in the sight of
the Lord.'' Thou shalt worship no
other God.'' Ye shall keep my Sab-
bath, and reverence my sanctuary.'-
'Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy
heart.'' Thou shalt love thy neighbor
as thyself.”—' Ye shall not afflict any
widow or fatherless child.'' Thou
shalt not arrest judgment, thou shalt
not respect persons, neither take a gift.'
C That which is altogether just shalt
thou follow.'' Thou shalt have a per-
fect and just weight, a perfect and just
measure shalt thou have.'-' Thou shalt
keep the commandments of the Lord
thy God, to walk in his ways and to

fear him.'

but it left many questions undecided respecting the parties who might lawfully enter wedlock. It was extremely important to be made known whether the ordinance was left free, without any restraint or limits, or whether there were any prohibitions on the score of degrees of kindred. There must be a law somewhere in the Mosaic code to ascertain who may and who may not be united in marriage. Where shall that law be found, if not in the chapters before us; and if found there, what reason can be urged for its having become ob solete? Are we to be driven to the alternative of admitting that we are left without a single passage or paragraphı in the whole compass of revelation bearing upon the degrees of relationship within which marriage may or may not be contracted?

Again, the connexions forbidden in these statutes are those which are pronounced abominable in the depraved Canaanites and Egyptians. But what could have rendered incest a crime among these abandoned heathen? They had not the written law, and where there is no law there is no transgression. If the prohibitory code was peculiar only to the Jews, what binding power could it have upon the Gentiles, who were strangers to the Jews? What was the law which, in this matter, they had transgressed? There surely must have been some flagrant infraction of the mandates of heaven, to draw down such dire denunciations, and such wasting judgments as are spoken of in this connexion. Vv. 24, 25, 'Defile not ye yourselves in any of these things: for in all these the nations are defiled which I cast out before you and the land is defiled: therefore I do visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land itself vom

No one can imagine for a moment that these precepts are ceremonial and binding on the Jews only. Many of them are expressly cited and applied in the New Testament. But if they were not, still their authority remains unabated. The books of the Old Testament are received by all Christians as inspired volumes, and they hesitate not to accept its moral and ethical code as equally binding with that of the New. As every other command of the decalogue is recognized and fortified by pariteth out her inhabitants.' What can ticular precepts here and there interspersed, the same may be expected, a priori, in regard to the seventh. That command preserved the honor of the marriage union after it was formed;

account for the severity of this judg ment but the fact, that in perpetrating these enormities, they were transgress. ing a moral code-a law which, as it was in force before the existence of the

omit it altogether, it was of course his duty to comply. It was forbidden to the Hebrews to.labor on the Sabbath, but in many cases, labor on that day was a duty. These are cases of positive commands. But further than this, it

them to do so. It is a sin to kill a hu man being, yet God commanded the Hebrews to extirpate the Canaanites. We all admit that bigamy is a sin, but

Mosaic dispensation, so it is equally in force after it, even in our own land and all future time. That there has been no repeal of the law under the New Testament, is plain from the two instances which are mentioned but to be condemned. When John reproved Herod | is sinful to take the property of others for taking his brother's Philip's wife, without their consent, but if God comand lost his life for his fidelity, his demanded the Israelites to take the pronunciation was but an echo of the di-perty of the Egyptians, it was right for rect language of the word of God as here recorded; and the horror expressed by Paul at a man's taking his father's wife, an offence not so much as nained among the Gentiles, goes une-if any man will produce a command of quivocally to prove that he knew nothing of any abrogation of the law of incest. As to the objection brought from the case of marriages in Adam's family, and from that of the brother's widow who was childless, we adopt the reply given by Prof. Hodge (Bib. Rep. July, 1842). 'It is obvious the argument proves too much. If the command that one brother should take the child. less widow of another brother as his wife, proves that it is not wrong for a man to marry his sister-in-law, then the command to the immediate sons of Adam to marry their sisters, proves that it is right now for brothers to marry their sisters. This objection is founded upon the confusion of two very different things. There are things which are inherently and essentially wrong, and can in no possible case be right; as hatred of God and malevolence towards

men.

The prohibitions of such things arise out of the very nature of God, and are as immutable as that nature. But there are other things which are wrong only in virtue of a divine prohibition; and this prohibition may be founded either on temporary considerations, or such as are permanent. But in either case, whenever the prohibition is removed or the opposite commanded, the guilt of the action ceases. It was a sin in any Israelite not to circumcise his child on the eighth day; but if God commanded any one to defer the rite or

God to marry two wives, no one will
deny his right to do so.
deny his right to do so. It is a sin for
a brother to marry his sister, but if re-
quired by a divine command, it is a sin
no longer. Thus, also, if any one can
produce a divine command to marry his
sister-in-law, the lawfulness of the mar-
riage will be readily admitted. All
these commands belong to the same
class; they all express the will of God
as to the duties of men in the
permanent
relations of society, and are therefore
of permanent obligation; yet any one
or all of them may be set aside by him
in whose hands are all his creatures,
and whose nature and relations, and the
resulting duties, may be modified at
will. That an Israelite, therefore, un-
der peculiar circumstances and for spe-
cified reasons was commanded to marry
his brother's wife, no more proves that
the general law on this subject is not
binding, than the command to Abraham
to sacrifice Isaac proves that the com-
mand, thou shalt not kill, is not moral
and permanent. That the Levitical
law of marriage is still binding upon
us, we think is proved by what has
already been said. It is the expression
of the will of God in reference to rela-
tionships which still exist among men.
It tells us what is the duty of near rela-
tives. It tells us that brothers and sisters
must not intermarry, not because they
were Jews, but because of their rela-
tionship. It extends the prohibition to

question, therefore, is, Are these marriages to be or not to be considered as prohibited by just inference from the letter of his laws?

all who are near of kin, because they | tions is nearness of relationship. The are near of kin. It is as much a law for us therefore as any other expression of the will of God. The binding authority of this law is recognized in the New Testament, just as the continued In my opinion they are not. obligation of the original law of mar- My reasons for deuying and protestriage is recognized. We find no expressing against the conclusions are the fol assertion that marriage must be between lowing: one man and one woman, but the expression of the will of God at the creation, is held to bind all ages and nations. Thus, though there is no express declaration that near relatives must not marry, it is plain from the language of the apostle to the Corinthians, that he considered the original revelation on this subject as still our rule of duty.'

'1. Moses does not appear to have framed or given his marriage-laws with any view to our deducing, or acting upon conclusions which we might think fit to deduce from them: for if this was his view, he has made several repetitions in them which are really very useless. What reason had he, for example, after forbidding marriage with a father's sister, to forbid it also with a mother's, if this second prohibition was

Do these Laws include Degrees not ex-included in the first, and if he meant,

pressly Specified?

The consideration of this question we may introduce in the words of Michaelis, subjoining his own opinion on it.

There arises the question, Whether Moses only prohibits the marriages which he expressly mentions, or others beside not mentioned, where the degree of relationship is the same? This question, which is of so great importance in the marriage-laws of Christian nations, and which from an imperfect | knowledge of oriental customs has been the subject of so much controversy, properly regards the following marriages, viz.:

without saying a word on the subject, to be understood as speaking, not of particular marriages, but of degrees?

2. Moses has given his marriage. laws in two different places of the Pentateuch, viz.: in both the 18th and 20th chapters of Leviticus; but in the latter of these passages we find only the very same cases specified which had been specified in the former. Now had they been meant merely as examples of degrees of relationship, it would have been more rational to have varied them ; and if it had been said, for instance, on the first occasion, Thou shalt not marry thy father's sister, to have introduced, on the second, the converse case, and said, Thou shalt not marry thy brother's daughter. This, however, is not done by Moses, who in the second enactment just specifies the father's sister as before, and seems, therefore, to have intended that he should be understood as having in his view no other marriages than those which he expressly names; unless we choose to interpret his laws in a manner to his own meaning and design.'

1. With a brother's daughter. 2. With a sister's daughter. 3. With a maternal uncle's widow. 4. With a brother's son's widow. 5. With a sister's son's widow. 6. With a deceased wife's sister These marriages we may, perhaps, for brevity's sake, be allowed to denominate the six marriages, or the consequential marriages. They are as near as those which are prohibited. Moses never mentions them in his marriage It can scarcely be maintained that statutes, yet the ground of his prohibi- there is any thing conclusive in either