Soul is before difproved. In point of efficiency we grant that he is as the Soul of Souls, effecting more than Souls do for their Bodics, but not in point of Conftitution. He is much more than the Soul of the world,but is not formally its Soul. But, 2. Those men that will think fo, must acknowledge, that as they take the Horfe and the Rider to be both parts of God, and the Child and the Father, and the Subject and the Prince, and the Malefactor and the Judge, and the flagitious wretch and the best of men; fo it is no other membership than what confifteth with the difference of moral good and evil, of wife and foolish, of Governours and Subjects, of Rewards and Punishments, of Happiness and Mifery, which are the things that I am seeking after. But fo few lay this claim to Deity, that I need no further mind them.

0.3. My Parents were not the first cause of my being what

I am.

As each Individual cannot be the firft Cause of it felf, fo neither can their Parents; for they do not fo much as know my frame and nature, nor the order and temperature of my parts; nor how or when they were fet together; nor their ufe, or the reafon of their location. And certainly he that made me, knew what he did, and why he did it in each par ticular. My Parents could not choose my sex, nor fhape, nor ftrength, nor qualifications.

0.4. The world which I fee, and live in, did not make it felf.

As Men, and Beafts, and Trees, and Stones did not make themselves, fo neither did they joyn as concaufes or afliftants in the making of the whole; nor did any one of them make the reft: nor did any of the more fimple fubftances, called Elements, make themselves; neither the paflive Elements, or the active, the Earth, the Water, the Air or the Fire: For we know, paft doubt, that nothing hath no power or action; and before they were, they were not, and therefore could not make themselves. Nor can they be the first caufe of mixt bodies, because there is that exceeding wisdom moft apparent in the generation, production, nature and operations of thefe Bodies,

which these Elements have not.

0.5. The vifible world is not an uncaused independent Being. For all the generated parts we fee, do oriri & inserire; they have a beginning, progrefs, decay and end. And the inanimate

C 3

parts

God never wrought
Miracle to convince
Atheism, because his
ordinary works con-
Effay 16. p. 87.

vince it. Lord Bacon

Anaxagoras docuit a murderer, and of him that is murdered,of a Nero and a Saint,
Mentem, confufis pri-
no rebus acceffiffe, yea, of Cefar and of his Dog. And how then cometh there fo
much enmity between them, and fo great difparity? why is
Omniaque compegiffe
fimul & ordinafle. one wife, and another foolish or bruitifh, and one the Ruler
Laert, in max. ex ofthe other? The Soul of a Bird or Horfe feemeth to be
Timone.
lodged in as good a kind of matter as Mans; or at least, the
Ovid's defcription of Soul of a Nero in as good a matter as the Soul of Paul; or at
the Creation of the
world, is amos as if leaft, the Soul of one that turneth to villany from virtue, hath
be bid taken it out of the fame matter which it had before. And certainly it is not
Mofes, Metaph. 1. 1. matter that principally individuateth, but forms. Nor is the
difference between good men and bad, and between Men, and
Serpents or Beafts, fo much in Matter as in the Soul.

Moreover Nature teacheth all men to feek felicity, and fear infelicity and calamity: which they need not do, nor could not do, if they were all parts of God: God cannot be miferable, but Man can, as to his Soul as well as his Body, and the mifery of his Body is little to that of the Soul even in this life. God cannot be evil, but the Soul may be vitiated and evil, as experience teacheth. God may not be punished or afflicted,but a wicked man may be punished and afflicted,even *The Pythagoreans in his mind or Soul; and a Magiftrate will not think, when So Balbus in Cicer. he hangeth a thief, that he either punished bare flesh, or that de Nat. Deor. 1. 2, he punished God.

and Plato.

and many more.
Moreover God can wrong no man, but one man may
But Cicero in other wrong another. God need not fear doing any thing amifs,
pisces Speakerb of
God, not as the Soul but the Soul of man muft fear it. No part of God can be fo
of the world formally unhappy as to choose to be a Toad, or a wicked or miferable
and conftitutively, but man. God hath no Body, but fo have thefe Souls; elfe when
only efficiently, call- men eat a plant, or bird, or any flesh, they eat part of the
ing him, The Parent
of the Univerfe, the Body of God.

Maker of all things, Moreover I find, that it is Bodies only that are Quanti-
. So that it feems tative or Extenfive, and fo divifible into parts: many parts
that he took not God, of one Body may be animated by one Soul, but not by many
pro for nå mundi, but
as we do, for More parts of that one Soul, (except the Soul be material it felf.)
than the Soul of it, But why (may fome object) may 1 net hold, that all the Orbs
even the first Efficient. being one world, or one Body of one informing Soul, which is God;
And lib. de Univerf. and so that really those which you call individuals, are but parts of
he fuppofeth the Eter- this one animated world. Anfw. This is confuted by what is
ted that God who is faid. Whether the world be animated by one *univerfal Soul,
the Soul of the world, we are not now enquiring. But that God is not this informing

nal God to have crea

Soul

Soul is before difproved. In point of efficiency we grant that he is as the Soul of Souls, effecting more than Souls do for their Bodies, but not in point of Conftitution. He is much more than the Soul of the world,but is not formally its Soul. But, 2. Those men that will think fo, muft acknowledge, that as they take the Horfe and the Rider to be both parts of God, and the Child and the Father, and the Subject and the Prince, and the Malefactor and the Judge, and the flagitious wretch and the best of men; fo it is no other membership than what confifteth with the difference of moral good and evil, of wife and foolish, of Governours and Subjects, of Rewards and Punishments, of Happiness and Mifery, which are the things that I am seeking after. But fo few lay this claim to Deity, that I need no further mind them.

1.3. My Parents were not the first cause of my being what I am.

As each Individual cannot be the firft Cause of it self, fo neither can their Parents; for they do not fo much as know my frame and nature, nor the order and temperature of my parts; nor how or when they were fet together; nor their ufe, or the reason of their location. And certainly he that made me, knew what he did, and why he did it in each particular. My Parents could not choose my fex, nor fhape, nor ftrength, nor qualifications.

0.4. The world which I fee, and live in, did not make it felf.

As Men, and Beafts, and Trees, and Stones did not make themselves, so neither did they joyn as concauses or aflistants in the making of the whole; nor did any one of them make the rest: nor did any of the more fimple fubftances, called Elements, make themselves; neither the paflive Elements, or the active, the Earth, the Water, the Air or the Fire: For we know, paft doubt, that nothing hath no power or action; and God never wrought before they were, they were not, and therefore could not make Miracle to convince themselves. Nor can they be the firft caufe of mixt bodies, be- Atheism, because his cause there is that exceeding wisdom moft apparent in the ge- ordinary works conneration, production, nature and operations of thefe Bodies, Effay 16. p. 87.

which thefe Elements have not.

1.5. The vifible world is not an uncaufed independent Being. For all the generated parts we see, do oriri & interire; they have a beginning, progrefs, decay and end. And the inanimate

C 3

parts

vince it. Lord Bacon

parts having less of natural excellency than the living, cannot infinitely exceed them, in the excellency of Deity as uncaused and independent. And we fee that they are all dependent in their operations. They fhew in the order of their beings and action, that incomprehenfible wisdom, which is not in themselves: the Earth, the Sea, the Air and Winds, are all ordered exactly by a Wisdom and a Will, which they themfelves are void of. Befides, they are many and various; but their order and agreement fheweth, that it is fome One univerfal Wisdom and Will which ruleth them all and if they are dependent in operation, they are certainly dependent in being. And had they that excellency to be uncaufed and independent, they would have had therewith all other perfections, which we see they want; and they would not have been many but one in that perfection.

§. 6. The first univerfal Matter is not an uncaufed independent being.

If fuch there be, its inactivity and paffivenefs fheweth it to want the excellency of independency: and the ordination of it into its several beings, and the difpofals of it there, is done by a principle of infinite power, activity and wisdom: The Platonifts fimile on which having this dependence in its ordination and use, is, As the fubftance it must be dependent alfo in its being.

and fhadow may be at .7. If it were doubtful whether the world were eternal, and one time, though one be the cause of the whether it were the Body of God as the informing Soul, yet it would other; fo here. be past doubt that it is not uncaufed or independent, but caufed by God.

ad fin. 23.

That the world is not eternal we want not natural evi(Vid.) Raymond. dence: for, faith Lullius, then there would be two Eternals, Lullium Arte magna the Caufe and its Effects; and then all things would be caufed de rabul.cap.2,3,4,5 by natural neceffity, and not by free will, and confequently And Alex. Gill on the always alike: and then there hath been Evil eternally, and Ciced, pag. 88, 89, both the caufed Good and the Evil would in all other aggra&c. & pag. 96, &c. vations be anfwerable to Eternity, and the Evil would be as Lege etiam Difputationem Zacharie foon, as great, as durable as the good. The fame world which Scholaft. Epifc. Mi- is finite in good and evil, and other refpects, would be intilen. cum Ammonio finite in Eternity; and the evil would have an infiniteness in contra mundi æterni- point of Eternity, and this neceffitated by the eternity of the tatem, in Bib. Pa. world: And feeing no individuals are eternal, the fuppofed Græcolat. To. 1. pag. eternity of the world must be but of fome common matter,

330, &c.

or

or only intentional and not real. The corporeal part having quantity, is finite as to extenfion, and therefore cannot be infinite in duration. In Eternity then there is no time, no prius & pofterius; but in the world there is. Much more is faid by many; but this is not my present task, I fhall say more of it afterward.

But if it were doubtful whether the world were not eternally the Body of God, yet would it be undoubted ftill that be caused it. And that there were the difference of a cause and an effect, in order of nature, though not in duration. As if a Tree or a mans body were fuppofed eternal, yet the root and fpirits of the Tree, and the principal parts and fpirits in mans body would be the caufal parts on which the reft depend.

0.8. It remaineth therefore most certain, that fomething is a first Caufe to all things elfe, and that he is the Creator of all things.

For if the world be not uncaused and independent, it hath a Caufe; and if it have a Cause it hath a Creator: For when there was nothing but himself, he muft make all things of Himself, or of Nothing not of Himself, for He is not Material, and they are not parts of God (who is indivifible:) He that thinks otherwise, should not kill a Flea or a Toad, nor blame any man that beateth, or robbeth, or wrongeth him, nor eat any creature; because he doth kill, and blame, and eat a part of God, who is unblameable, and can injure none, and is to be more reverenced.

effc tam

apertum,

.9. If there were any doubt whether the Sun, or Fire, or paf- Quid enim poteft five matter had a first Caufe, there can be no doubt at all concerning tamque perfpicuum, MAN, which is the thing which I am enquiring into at the cum coelum fufpexiprefent. mus,cœleftiaque conFor every one feeth that Man hath his beginning, and con- templati fumus,quàm feffeth that it is but as yesterday fince he was not; and there- effe aliquod numen, præftantiffimæ menfore hath a Caufe which must be uncaufed, or have a Cause it tis, quo hæc reganfelf: if the latter, then that Cause again is uncaused, or hath tur: Cicer.l.a. de Nat Caufe it felf. And fo we muft needs come at laft to fome uncaufed cause.

a

1. 10. If any fecond Caufe had made Man or the World, yet if it did it but as a caused Cause, it self would lead us up to an uncaufed Caufe, which is the first Cause of all, which we are Seeking after.

For

Deor.