Quoniam ea natu- Though better principles fhould acquaint men with the ra effet hominis, ut nature and neceflity of Government, yet thefe are fo obvious ei cum genere humano quafi civile jus in- to all the world, that for their own prefervation, together tercederet, qui id with fome natural fenfe of juftice, the most barbarous Naticonfervaret, eum ons, that are nearcft unto bruits, are for fome Civil Governjuftum, qui migra- ment, (befides Oeconomical Government, which none but ret injuftum fore.mad-men ever question'd). Chryfip. in Cato, in 1. 12. By this Government, the Liberty, Eftates and Lives of offenders are destroyed, for the ends of the Government, viz. för Justice and the common good. That this is fo, de facto, is fo undeniable, that even those Heathens (the fuppofed relics of the Pythagoreans) who will not kill a harmless beaft, will yet kill thofe men who deferve to die. And if Government had not the power over the Liberties, Eftates and Lives of offenders, it could not preferve the Liberties, Eftates and Lives of the innocent. Eft unum jus que . 13. The combination of the Power, Wisdom and Goodness devinta eft homi- of the Individuals, and the Eminency of thefe in the Governours, num focietas, & quod is the cause of the order,ftrength and Jafety of theje humane focieties. lex conftituit una: All the parts are in the combination to contribute to the Que lex refta ratio good of the whole, and that according to the nature oft imperandi atque of the parts; it is not a heap of ftones, nor a forest of prohibendi. Cicer.de Leg. 1. p. 225. trees, nor a heard of cattle, which we are fpeaking of, but an affociation of men; which must be promoted and bleffed by the worth and duty of the individuals: and this confifteth in the perfections and right exercise of their Power, Intellects and Wills. But as the place of the Governour requireth more of the exercife of thefe, than is requifite in any individual elfe, fo doth it therefore require, that these be in him in greater eminency and excellency than in others; viz. that in himself he excel in wisdom and goodness; and by his intereft in the people that he excel in power or ftrength. Take away power, and Societies are indefenfible, expofed to the will of enemies, and unable to exccute their Laws upon their own offenders, and fo to attain the ends of their affociation and government. Take away wisdom, and they are a rout of Ideots or madmen, and government can be none at all. Take away goodnefs, and they are as a company of Devils, or confederacy of Robbers or pernicious enemies, who can neither truft one another, nor promote the common good, but are fit to destroy and be deftroyed. . 14. By 14. By all this it is manifest, that MAN is not only a liv- Si veritatem de ani. ing Wight, having Power, Intellect, and Will, and Dominion ma cognoverimus, over inferiour things, as their Owner, Ruler and End, but also erit introductorium valde magnum nobis is a fociable Wight, or fitted for fociety where Government is ad omnem veritatem, exercifed, by Power, Wisdom and Goodness, which are his per- & ad omnes partes fections. Philofophiæ infign:s dat occafiones. The I have looked thus long at the things that are feen, as mift. fup.s. de Anim. neareft me, and most difcernable, before I proceed to the Caufe, which is unseen. 1. CHAP. IV. of Man, and other things, as produced Was not always what I am. It is not yet fixty years fince I was no man: I had Read Galen's admia late beginning, and though I now enquire not of rations of the Creator, what duration my foul is, my prefent compofition is not 1. de ufu part. præfrom eternity: the fame I fee of others, that are born men, cipue 1. 3. cap. 10. who were lately none: and fo of all things that are here generated. memoriæ,mentis,co 2. I did not make my felf, at least as an independent uncaufed Animorum nulla in being. terris origo eft. Nil I could not as I am, make my felf what I am: for fo my enim eft in animis felf as the cause should be before my self as the effect, which is noftris miftum & a contradiction, unless the word felf] be used equivocally. ex terra natum, huconcretum, aut quod When I was not I acted not. If it be faid by any, that the midum,igneum, &c. Soul did fabricate a Body to it felf, and fo one part of me made His enim naturis nithe other, I answer, 1. My Soul did not make the matter of hil ineft quod vim that Body: for if it did, it made it of fomething or of no- gitationis habeat,&c. thing; if of fomething, either it made that fomething or not; Nec invenietur unif not, then it made not the firft matter of the Body. If it made quam unde ad homiit of nothing, it must be Omnipotent; but it is confcious of nem venire poffint, impotency. 2. My foul did not make it felf, for then it mult be before it felf, which is impoffible. And if I made neither form nor matter, I did not make my felf. If it be faid, that my Soul is an eternal uncaused being, and fo did fabricate this Body as a dwelling for it felf: I aufwer, 1. As to the supposed fabrication C nifi à Deo. Cicero. 7 invicem mutantur. Quis eft cam vecor, fabrication, it is confcious it felf of no fuch thing. And if my qui cum fu pexerit Soul made my body, either it was as a caufa fubminiftra vel in cœlum, Deo effe non fentiat? & ea injirumentalis, by the direction and power of a fupequæ tantâ mente fi- riour caufe, or elfe of and by it felf as the prime caufe. unt, ut vix quifquam If the firft, then it is a caufed and dependent being it felf, and arte ullâ, ordinem fo leadeth us to a higher caufe. If the fecond be affirmed, and rerum, atque vicillitudinem perfequi fo my Soul an eternal, uncaufed, independent being, then, poffit, cafu fieri pu- 1. That which is without beginning, caufe and dependency, ter. Cicer. de Refp. muft needs be felf-sufficient, and be the higheft excellency; Arufp. it must have an infinitenefs, and need no help from any other: Placet Stoicis corBut my Soul is confcious of imperfection in knowledge, its igruptibilem effe Mun- norance is its burden and difhonour, it knoweth not fo much dum, quippe geni- as is here afferted of it felf, it knoweth no fuch perfections or tum eorum ratione operations, it knoweth little comparatively of the Universe, telliguntur, Cujus & or of any particular thing in it. If it were an eternal, unpartes funt corrupti caufed, independent Being, it need not all the helps of evibiles & totum, partes dence and argument in this difpute. Moreover it is conautem mundi corru- fcious of imperfection in Goodness, and defilement of Evil: ptibles funt, in fe it is defective in governing this flesh, which could never be Eft igitur corrupti. able to make me a finner or culpable, if it were animated bilis Mundus. Ae with an uncaufed independent being. Moreover I am conquicquid mutari in fcious of impotency in every thing that I go about: a thoudeterius poteft, cor- fand difficulties pofe and ftall me! a thousand things I would ruptibile eft. Mundus autem huic mu do and cannot, and as many I would have and cannot: wheretationi & corruptio. as an uncaufed independent mind, fhould neceffarily have an ni obnoxius eft. La uncaused independent power, and wisdom, and goodness, and fo fhould at leaft partake of infiniteness in all. Mundum autem fieri And if my Soul did thus fabricate my Body, then what (dicunt Stoici) cum needed it pre-exiftent Matter to make it of? And why did ex igne fubftantia per it not make it fooner, feeing it hath fuch an inclination to it?" actem verfa in hu- Can an independent Mind be ignorant what it was, and what craffior ipfius pars ef- it did it felf from all eternity, before it entred into this flesh? fecta fuerit terra: And why doth it not amend the infirmities of this Body? porro fubtilior in aë- or why did it not make it felfa Body more excellent, more te.n cefferit, eademq; comely, more found, more clean, and more durable? Could it choose no better? can it not heal and perfect this? can it not prevent the diffolution of it? Seeing I find it fo much in love with it, and fo unwilling to be feparated from it, if it were an independent mind, and caufed it at the firft, it would not be unwillingly taken from it, and leave it to rottennefs and duft? ert. in Zenone. mořem fuerit; deinde magis ac magis extenuata in ignem cvalerit, Id. ibid. And And if my Soul did thus independently make my Body, did all other Souls do fo by their Bodies, or not? If they did not, then they had a fuperiour Caufe; if they did, then it feems that every Worm, and Fly, and Toad hath a Soul, that is an eternal, uncaused, independent being. But why then have they no knowledge, no reafon, no fpecch? why did they not choose a more honourable dwelling? why do they all stoop to the service of man, if they are equally excellent? And then it would follow that there are as many eternal independent beings, as there are Souls or living Wights in all the world. And fo inftead of one true perfect God, there would be innumerable demi-gods, which all had the perfection of independencies, and none of them had a perfection of being and fufficiency which would put us upon the further enquiries, whether they do all their bufinefs independently, or by a general council and confent, and how they all do to agree, and not fall into perpetual wars; how the foul of an ideot, or a wicked man, or of a Toad or Serpent, came to be fo self-denying as to be contented with that part, when the Soul of Ariftotle, and Seneca, and Paul were fo much better provided for.. And if all this were fo, who made the things innimate, that have no fouls of their own to make them? For my part I made them not.And my Soul is conscious that it is a dependent being, that cannot illuminate it felf, nor know what it would know,nor be what it would be, nor do what it would do, nor can fupport its body or it felf an hour. It looketh dependently to fomething higher for help, and protection, and fupply, and mercy, and is past all doubt that it is no God. If it be faid that all Souls are but one, even parts of the univerfal Soul of the World, and that individuation is by Matter only, and that fo though my Soul be not the whole donius aiunt MunChryfippus & Possifirft caufe and being, it is a part of it: I answer, 1. I note by dum regi & admithe way, that this hypothefis acknowledgeth that which I niftrari" fecundum am fearching after, viz. that there is a God: and it afferteth mentem & providenhigher things of man than I am proving, viz. That he hath tiam, Mente per omnes illius partes not only an immortal Soul, but a Soul that is part of God pertingente; ficut & himself. 2. And according to this, the Soul of every Helio- in noftra anima congabalus, Sardanapalus, Ideot or Toad, fhould be part of God. tingit, fed per has 3. And then all fouls fhould be alike, if all be God; the Soul of magis, per illas mi nus, Laert, in Zen. Anaxagoras docuit a murderer, and of him that is murdered,of a Nero and a Saint, Mentem, confufis pri- yea, of Cæfar and of his Dog. And how then cometh there fo no rebus acceffiffe, much enmity between them, and fo great difparity? why is omniaque compegiffe fimul & ordinafle. one wife, and another foolish or bruitifh, and one the Ruler Laert. in nax. ex ofthe other? The Soul of a Bird or Horfe feemeth to be Timone. lodged in as good a kind of matter as Mans; or at leaft, the Ovid's defcription of Soul of a Nero in as good a matter as the Soul of Paul; or at the Creation of the world, is a moj as if leaft, the Soul of one that turneth to villany from virtue, hath be bid taken it out of the fame matter which it had before. And certainly it is not Mofes, Metaph. 1. 1. matter that principally individuateth, but forms. Nor is the difference between good men and bad, and between Men, and Serpents or Beafts, fo much in Matter as in the Soul. Moreover Nature teacheth all men to feek felicity, and fear infelicity and calamity: which they need not do, nor could not do, if they were all parts of God: God cannot be miferable, but Man can, as to his Soul as well as his Body, and the misery of his Body is little to that of the Soul even in this life. God cannot be evil, but the Soul may be vitiated and evil, as experience teacheth. God may not be punished or afflicted,but a wicked man may be punished and afflicted,even *The Pythagoreans in his mind or Soul, and a Magiftrate will not think, when and Plato. So Balbus in Cicer. he hangeth a thief, that he either punished bare flesh, or that de Nat. Deor. 1. 2. he punished God. and many more. Moreover God can wrong no man, but one man may But Cicero in other wrong another. God need not fear doing any thing amifs, pisces Speaketh of God, not as the Soxl but the Soul of man muft fear it. No part of God can be fo of the world formally unhappy as to choose to be a Toad, or a wicked or miferable and conftitutively, but man. God hath no Body, but fo have thefe Souls; elfe when only efficiently, call- men cat a plant, or bird, or any flesh, they eat part of the ing him, The Parent of the Universe, the Body of God. Maker of all things, Moreover I find, that it is Bodies only that are Quanti. So that it feems tative or Extenfive, and fo divifible into parts: many parts that he took not God, of one Body may be animated by one Soul, but not by many pro for nå mundi, but as we do, for More parts of that one Soul, (except the Soul be material it felf.) than the Soul of it, But why (may fome object) may I net hold, that all the Orbs even the first Efficient. being one world, or one Body of one informing Soul, which is God; And lib. de Univerf. and so that really those which you call individuals, are but parts of he fuppofeth the Eter- this one animated world. Anfw. This is confuted by what is ted that God who is faid. Whether the world be animated by one *univerfal Soul, the Soul of the world, we are not now enquiring. But that God is not this informing nal God to have crea❤ Soul |