of knowledge. His purposes must also be eternal and immutable, as we haveseen. In the order of time, therefore, his purposes and his foreknowledge must be coeval, that is, they must be co-eternal.

But in the order of nature God's knowledge of what he could do, and what could be done, must have preceded his purposes: that is, he could not, so to speak, in the order of nature, have formed his purpose and made up his mind what to do until he had considered what could be done and what was best to be done. Until all possible ends and ways and means were weighed and understood, it was of course impossible to make a selection and settle upon the end with all the necessary means, and also settle upon the ways and means of overruling any evil, natural or moral, that might be seen to be unavoidably incidental to any system. Thus it appears that, in the order of nature fore-knowledge of what could be done, and what he could do, must have preceded the purpose to do. The purpose resulted from the prescience or fore-knowledge. He knew what he could do before he decided what he would do. But on the other hand the purpose to do must, in the order of nature, have preceded the knowledge of what he should do, or of what would be done or would come to pass as a result of his purpose. Viewed relatively to what he could do, and what could be done, the Divine prescience must in the order of nature have preceded the Divine purposes. But viewed relatively to what he would do and what would be done and would come to pass, the Divine purposes must in the order of nature, have preceded the Divine prescience. But I again, as fore-knowledge was necessarily eternal with God, his purposes must also have been eternal, and therefore in the order of time, neither his prescience could have preceded his purposes, nor his purposes have preceded his prescience. They must have been cotemporaneous and co-eternal.

say

X. God's purposes are not inconsistent with, but demand the use of means both on his part, and on our part, to accomplish

them.

The great end upon which he has set his heart necessarily depends upon the use of means, both moral and physical, to accomplish it. The highest well-being of the whole universe is his end. This end can be secured only by securing conformity to the laws of matter and of mind. Mind is influen

ced by motives, and hence moral and physical government are naturally necessary means of securing the great end proposed by the Divine mind.

Hence also results the necessity of a vast and complicated system of means and influences, such as we see spread around us on every hand. The history of the universe is but the history of creation and of the means which God is using to secure his end with their natural and incidental results. It has already been shown that the bible teaches that the purposes of God include and respect both means and ends. I will only add that God's purposes do not render any event, dependent upon the acts of a moral agent, necessarily certain, or certain with a certainty of necessity. Although, as was before said, all events are certain with some kind of certainty, and would be and must be, if they are ever to come to pass, whether God purposes them, or whether he fore-knows them or not; yet no event, depending upon the will of a free agent, is, or can be certain with a certainty of necessity. The agent could by natural possibility do otherwise than he will do and than God purposes to suffer him to do or wills that he shall do. God's purposes, let it be understood, are not a system of fatality. They leave every moral agent entirely free to choose and act freely. God knows infallibly how every, creature will act and has made all his arrangements accordingly, to overrule the wicked actions of moral agents on the one hand and to produce or induce the holy actions of others on the other hand. But be it remembered, that neither the Divine fore-knowledge nor the Divine purpose in any instance sets aside the free agency of the creature. He in every instance acts as freely and as responsibly as if God neither knew nor purposed any thing respecting his conduct or his destiny.

God's purposes extend to all events in some sense, as has been shown. They extend as really to the most common events of life as to the most rare. But in respect to the every day transactions of life, men are not wont to stumble and cavil and say, Why, if I am to live, I shall live whatever I may do to destroy my health and life; and if I am to die, I can not live, do what I will. No, in these events they will not throw off responsibility and cast themselves upon the purposes of God, but on the contrary they are as much engaged to secure the end they have in view as if God neither knew or purposed any thing about it.

Why then should they do as they often do in regard to the salvation of their souls, cast off responsibility, settle down in listless inactivity as if the purposes of God in respect to salvation were but a system of iron fatality from which there is no escape? Surely "madness is in their hearts while they live." But let them understand that in thus doing they sin against the Lord, and be sure their sin will find them out.

LECTURE LXXV.

PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS.

In discussing this subject, I will,

I. CALL ATTENTION TO THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF CERTAINTY THAT MAY BE PREDICATED OF DIFFERENT THINGS.

II. STATE WHAT IS NOT INTENDED BY THE PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS, AS I HOLD THE DOCTRINE.

IT.

III.

SHOW WHAT IS INTENDED BY IT.

IV. NOTICE THE OBJECTIONS TO THIS DOCTRINE.

V. PRESENT THE PRINCIPLE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF

I. I am to notice the different kinds of certainty.

Every thing must be certain with some kind of certainty. There is a way in which all things and events either have been, are, or will be. All events that ever did or will occur, were and are as really certain before as after their occurrence. To an omniscient mind their real certainty might and must have been known as really before as after their occurrence. All future events, for example, will be in some way, and there is now no real uncertainty in fact, nor can there be any real uncertainty in the knowledge of God respecting them. They are really as certain before they come to pass as they will ever be, and they are as truly and perfectly known as certain by God as they ever will be. They are as truly present to the Divine fore-knowledge as they ever will be. Whatever of contingency and uncertainty there may be respecting them in some respects, yet in point of fact, all events are certain, and there is no real uncertainty in respect to any event that ever did or will occur This would be equally true whether God or any other being knew how they would be or not. The fore-knowledge of God does not make them certain. He knows them to be certain simply because they are so. Omniscience is the necessary knowledge of all ob jects of knowledge, past, present and future. But omniscience does not create objects of knowledge. It does not render events certain, but only knows how they certainly will be because it is certain, not only that they will be, but how and

when they will be. All the free actions of moral agents are as really certain before they occur, as they ever will be. And God must as truly know how they will be before they occur, as he does after they have occurred.

1. The first kind of certainty that I shall notice is that of absolute necessity; that is, a certainty depending on no conditions whatever. This is the highest kind of certainty. It belongs to the absolute and the infinite, to the existence of space, duration, and to the existence of God, and in short to every thing that is self-existent, infinite, and immutable in a natural sense; that is, to every thing infinite that does not imply voluntariness. The natural attributes of God are certain by this kind of certainty, but his moral attributes, consisting as they do in a voluntary state of mind, though infinite and eternal, do not belong to this class.

2. A second kind of certainty is that of physical, but conditional necessity. To this class belong all those events that come to pass under the operation of physical law. These belong properly to the chain of cause and effect. The cause existing, the effect must exist. The event is rendered certain and necessary by the existence of its cause. Its certainty is conditionated upon its cause. The cause existing, the event must follow by a law of necessity, and the events would not occur of course, did not their causes exist. The causes being what they are, the events must be what they are. This class of events are as really certain as the foregoing class. In speaking of one of them as certain in a higher sense than the other, it is not intended that one class is any more certain than the other, but only that the certainty is of a different kind. For example, the first class are certain by a kind of certainty that does not and never did depend on the will of any being whatever. There never was any possibility that these things should be otherwise than they are. This, it will be seen, must be true of space and duration, and of the existence and the natural attributes of God.

But all other things except the self-existent, the naturally immmutable, and eternal, are certain only as they are conditionated directly or indirectly upon the will of some being. For example, all the events of the physical universe were rendered certain by creation and the establishing and upholding of those physical and necessary laws that cause these events. These are, therefore, certain by a conditioned though physical necessity. There is no freedom or liberty