assumes that God could have had no good and sufficient reasons for the election. It has been settled that good is the end upon which God set his heart; that is, the highest wellbeing of himself and the universe of creatures. This end must be accomplished by means. If God is infinitely wise and good he must have chosen the best practicable means. But he has chosen the best means for that end, and there can be no partiality in that.

In support of the assumption that election implies partiality and the exercise of an arbitrary sovereignty in God, it has been affirmed that there might have been divers systems of means for securing the same end in every respect equal to each other; that is, that no reason existed for preferring any one, to many others--that, therefore, in choosing the present, God must have been partial or must have exercised an arbitrary sovereignty. To this I answer:

(1.) There is no ground for the assumption that there are or can be divers systems of means of precisely equal value in all respects in such a sense that there could have been no good reason for preferring one to the other.

(2.) I reply that if there were divers such systems, chosing the one, and not any other, would not imply preference. Choice of any one in such case must have proceeded upon the following ground, to wit, the value of the end demanded that one should be chosen. There being no difference between the various systems of means God chooses one without reference to the other and makes no choice respecting it, any more than if it did not exist. He must choose one-he has no reason for preference and consequently he can not prefer one to the other. His benevolence leads him to choose one because the end demands it. He therefore takes any one of many exact equals, indifferently without preferring it to any of the others. This implies no partiality in God in any bad sense of the term. For upon the supposition, he was shut up to the necessity of choosing one among many exact equals. If he is partial in choosing the one he does, he would have been equally so had he chosen any other. If this is partiality, it is a partiality arising out of the necessity of the case and can not imply any thing objectionable in God.

That there is no preference in this case is plain because there is no ground or reason for preference whatever, according to the supposition. But there can be no choice or preference when there is absolutely no reason for the choice or preference. We have seen on a former occasion that the

reason that determines choice, or the reason in view of which, or in obedience to which, or for the sake of which, the mind chooses, and the object or end chosen, are identical. When there is absolutely no reason for a choice, there is absolutely no object of choice, nothing to choose, and of course there can be no choice. Choice must have an object; that is, choice must terminate upon something. If choice exists, something must be chosen. If there are divers systems of means between which there is no possible ground of preference, there can absolutely be no such thing as preferring one to the other for this would be the same as to choose without any object of choice, or without choosing any thing which is a contradiction.

If it be said that there may be absolutely no difference in the systems of means so far as the accomplishment of the end is concerned, but that one may be preferred or preferable to another on some other account, I ask on what other account? According to the supposition, it is only valued or regarded as an object of choice at all, because of its relation to the end. God can absolutely choose it only as a means a condition or an end, for all choice must respect these. The inquiry now respects means. Now if as a means there is absolutely no difference between diverse systems in their relation to the end, and the value of the end is the sole reason for choosing them, it follows that to prefer one to another is a natural impossibility. But one must be chosen for the sake of the end, it matters not which: any one is taken indifferently so far as others are concerned. This is no partiality and no exercise of arbitrary sovereignty in any objectionable sense. But as I said, there is no ground for the assumption that there are various systems of means for accomplishing the great end of benevolence in all respects equal. There must have been a best way, a best system, and if God is infinitely wise and good, he must have chosen that for that reason; and this is as far as possible from partiality. Neither we nor any other creature may be able now to discover any good reasons for preferring the present to any other system, or for electing those who are elected in preference to any other. Nevertheless such reasons must have been apparent to the Divine mind. or no such election could have taken place.

2. Election was not an exercise of arbitrary sovereignty. By arbitrary sovereignty is intended the choosing and acting from mere will, without consulting moral obligation or the public good. God has been shown to be infinitely wise and

good. It is, therefore, impossible that he should choose or act arbitrarily in any case whatever. He must have good and sufficient reasons for every choice and every act. Some seem to have represented God, in the purpose or act of election, as electing some and not others merely because he could or would, or in other words to exhibit his own sovereignty, without any other reason than because so he would have it. But it is impossible for God to act arbitrarily, or from any but a good and sufficient reason; that is, it is impossible for him to do so and continue to be benevolent. We have said that God has one and but one end in view; that is, he does and says and suffers all for one and the same reason, namely, to promote the highest good of being. He has but one ultimate end, and all his volitions are only efforts to secure that end. The highest well being of the universe including his own, is the end on which his supreme and ultimate choice terminates. All his volitions are designed to secure this end and in all things he is and must be directed by his infinite intelligence in respect not only to his ultimate end, but also in the choice and use of the means of accomplishing this end. It is impossible that this should not be true, if he is good. In election then he can not possibly have exercised any arbitrary sovereignty, but must have had the best of reasons for the election. His intelligence must have had good reasons for the choice of some and not of others to salvation, and have affirmed his obligation in view of those reasons to elect just as and whom he did. So good must the reasons have been, that, to have done otherwise would have been sin in him; that is, to have done otherwise would not have been wise and good.

3. Election was not based on a foreseen difference in the moral character of the elect and the non-elect previous to regeneration. The bible every where affirms that previous to regeneration all men have precisely the same character and possess one common heart or disposition, that this character is that of total moral depravity. God did not choose some to salvation because he foresaw that they would be less depraved and guilty previous to regeneration than the non-elect. Paul was one of the elect, yet he affirms himself to have been the chief of sinners. We often see (and this has been common in every age,) the most outwardly abandoned and profligate converted and saved.

The reason of election is not found in the fact that God foresaw that some would be more readily converted than oth

ers.

We often see those who are converted hold out for a long time in great obstinacy and rebellion, while God brings to bear upon them a great variety of means and influences, and takes much more apparent pains to convert them than he does to convert many others who are, as well as those who are not, converted. There is reason to believe that if the same means were used with those that are not converted that are used with those who are, many who are not converted would be. It may not be wise in God to use the same means for the non elect that he does for the elect, and if he should, they might, or might not be saved by them. God often uses means that to us seem more powerful to convert the non-elect than are used to convert many of the elect. The fact is he must have some reason aside from their characters for stubbornness or otherwise, for electing them to salvation.

VI. What must have been the reasons for election?

1. We have seen that God is infinitely wise and good. It follows that he must have had some reason. for to choose without a reason is impossible, as in that case there would be, as we have just seen, no object of choice.

2. From the wisdom and goodness of God, it follows that he must have chosen some good end, and must have had some plan, or system of means, to secure it. The end we know, is the good of being. The means we know from reason and revelation include election in the sense explained. It follows that the fundamental reason for election was the highest good of the universe. That is, the best system of means for securing the great end of benevolence included election. All choice must respect ends or conditions and means. God has,and can have but one ultimate end. All other choices or volitions must respect means. The choice or election of certain persons to eternal salvation &c., must have been founded in the reason that the great end of benevolence demanded it.

3. It is very easy to see that under a moral government, it might be impossible to so administer law as to secure the perpetual and universal obedience of all.

It is also easy to see that under a remedial system, or system of grace, it might be impossible to secure the repentance and salvation of all. God must have foreseen all possible and actual results. He must have foreseen how many and whom he could save by the wisest and best possible arrangement, all things considered. The perfect wisdom and benevolence of God being granted, it follows that we are bound to regard the present system of means as the best, all things

considered, that he could adopt for the promotion of the great end of his government, or the great end of benevolence. The fact that the wisest and best system of government would secure the salvation of those who are elected, was doubtless a condition of their being elected. As God does every thing for the same ultimate reason, it follows that the intrinsic value of their salvation was his ultimate end, and that their salvation might and must have great relative value in promoting the highest good of the universe at large and the glory of God; so that the intrinsic value of their own salvation and the good to be promoted by it, must have been the reasons for election. If it be asked why some were elected instead of others, it is a sufficient answer to say that if we can see no good reasons, yet since it is so, we are bound to believe that there were good and sufficient reaons in the mind of God.

VII. When the election was made.

1. Not when the elect are converted. It has been said that God is omniscient and has known all things from eternity as really and as perfectly as he ever will. It has also been shown that God is unchangeable, and consequently has no new plans, designs, or choices. He must have had all the reasons he ever will have for election, from eternity, because he always has had all the knowledge of all events that he ever will have; consequently he always or from eternity chose in respect to all events just as he always will. There never can be any reason for change in the Divine mind, for he never will have any new views of any subject. The choice which constitutes election, then, must be an eternal choice. 2. Thus the scriptures represent it.

Eph. 1: 4. According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love.

2: 16. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them.

2 Tim. 1: 9. Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began.

Rev. 17: 8. The beast that thou sawest was, and is not, and shall ascend out of the bottomless pit, and go into perdition: and they that dwell on the earth shall wonder, (whose names were not written in the book of life from the founda