, LECTURE LXVII. SANCTIFICATION. FARTHER OBJECTIONS ANSWERED. 2. It is objected to the foregoing argument that the passages adduced to prove Paul's entire sanctification do not sustain the position that he had attained a state of entire, in the sense of permanent sanctification. To this objection I reply, (1.) That an examination of all the passages will, if I mistake not, show that he speaks of his holiness or sanctification as a state and as an abiding state, as distinguished from a temporary obedience. To me it is quite manifest that Paul intended that his converts to whom he addressed his epistles, should understand him as professing to have experienced what he enjoined upon them. How could an inspired apostle write the following passage in his letter to the Thessalonians if he did not know by experience what the state was of which he was speaking, and the truth of the promise or declaration which he appended to his prayer. I Thes. 5: 23, 24: "And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that calleth you, who also will do it." How could he write, believing it himself, without knowing what he said. by having experienced his preserving grace. (2.) I was aware when I wrote of the sanctification of Paul, and am now that the evidence of his permanent sanctification is not such as to render it perfectly certain that he in no instance committed sin of heart or life. Being aware of this, I said then, and I here repeat the remark, that the question of his being entirely, in the sense of permanently sanctified, is not the great question at issue, nor is it essential to the argument in support of the practical attainability of this state. It is only one of the arguments in its support; but in my apprehension, the argument is complete without it. (3.) The testimony in Paul's case appears to me to be satisfactory in the absence of all counter evidence. [1.] It covers at least a large part if not the whole of his apostolic life. [2.] He had frequent occasion to speak of his own attainments by way of encouragement, to those to whom he wrote to aspire after the attainments which he recommended to them, and also as an illustration of the provision and meaning of the gospel which he preached. [3.] He in no instance speaks as if he were guilty of sin during the period of his apostleship. He publishes in the face of saints and sinners, of friends and enemies, those unqualified assertions and professions which I have quoted, and more than all, he appeals to God for the truth of what he says, and in no instance confesses sin. [4.] His language in several instances as we have seen, seems clearly to imply that his holiness was permanent or continual and not intermittent. [5.] The evidence is such as plainly to throw the burden of proof upon the objector. Such language as plainly implies that his holiness was continual and was rather a permanent state than an act or a temporary series of acts, must manifestly change the onus, and throw it upon the objector to prove the contrary, or to show that no such thing is fairly inferable from his language. It is not pretended that the permanency of his sanctification is demonstrated by the passages that have been quoted. Nor is demonstration to be expected in a case of this kind. It were to be sure very marvellous if so humble and so simple-hearted a man as Paul the apostle should make so many unqualified professions of entire holiness of heart and life without intimating that he at any time sinned during this period, if he in fact knew that he had done so at least in some instances. One can hardly avoid the conviction in view of his repeated professions, that if at any time he had fallen into sin, candor would have required him to confess it. [6.] The rules of evidence and proof when applied to this case, will clearly show where the burden of proof rests. These rules are more rigid in criminal cases than in civil. When a man is accused of a crime his innocence is assumed until he is proven to be guilty. It is however admitted that in the case under consideration, the assumption is reversed, and that, since all men are known to be sinners unless they have been sanctified by grace, the assumption is that every man is a sinner unless he is proven to be otherwise. He therefore who asserts that any human being is sinless, must prove it, and the burden of proof is upon him. But here it is important to remark that in making out his proof he is not held to making out the same kind and degree of proof as would be the case if he had asserted that a man was guilty of a crime against a human government. He is not in this case arraying a commonwealth against an individual and leaving it for the commonwealth by certain individuals of their number to sit in judgment in a case in which they are in a sense a party. When a man is arrayed before a court and jury of his county and accused of a crime against the commonwealth, the commonwealth is a party on the record and the judge and jury are a part of that commonwealth. In this case the rules of proof are properly rigid and inflexible; the commonwealth must fully establish by the most convincing testimony the very crime of which they complain. But even in this case and when the charge is of a capital crime and one punishable with death, the complainant is not held to make out a demonstration, but only to present such a kind and degree of evidence as will leave no ground for reasonable doubt in regard to the guilt of the accused. The kind and degree of evidence are demanded that might be reasonably expected in case the accused is guilty and nothing more. This throws the burden of proof upon the accused. The case is made out unless the accused can impeach, or explain, or contradict the evidence on the other side. He is called upon to reply to the evidence against him, and in case he fails to meet and in some way to shake its credibility he stands convicted. I know it is said that this case of Paul is one where a universal proposition is affirmed, and that therefore the case is not. made out until it is proved that he arrived at a point in his religious experience after which he did not sin at all. It is admitted that in a sense this proposition is universal, but the inquiry is, when is this so proved as to change the onus? Must it be shown by direct and positive evidence, and such as can have no other possible construction, that he arrived at this state, or is it sufficient to change the burden of proof, to show that the most fair and natural interpretation of the evidence conducts to the conclusion in support of which the evidence is produced? The latter is undoubtedly the correct rule. If the former were the rule it were useless to talk or think of a defence, or of making good a charge in one case in many. If the affirmant must absolutely demonstrate his position before the onus is in any case changed, why then defence or reply is out of the question; and further it is in no case of any use to bring a charge except where the evidence amounts to a demonstration. If the proof amounts to a demonstration, it is impossible that the demonstrated proposition should not be true, and therefore all answer is out of the question. Therefore in almost no case do courts of law and equity demand this kind and degree of evidence, but on the contrary, even in cases of the highest importance, they require no more than sufficient evidence in kind and degree to warrant the reasonable conclusion that the alleged proposition is true, and then they hold the onus to be changed and call for the defence. When the evidence is such as to produce or as should produce conviction in the absence of counter evidence they hold the case to be made out and throw the onus upon the respondent. Numerous examples might be cited from theological writers to show what are regarded as correct rules of evidence, and of proof upon theological subjects. For example, in the controversy upon the subject of baptism, the immersing Baptists lay down the universal proposition that baptizo means only to immerse. In support of this proposition they attempt to show from classic usage and from various sources, that immersion is its primary signification and that it properly means immersion. This is allowed by theological writers to be sufficient to change the onus and to call upon the Pedo-Baptists to rebut this testimony by showing that immersion is not the only sense at least in which the inspired writers use the term baptizo. The whole course of this controversy shows that theological writers never pretended to hold the immersing baptists to a proving of their universal proposition in extenso; for if they had, this controversy must long since have terminated. Indeed it were impossible for them to prove positively their proposition because it would amount to proving a negative. It would require them to prove that baptizo never means any thing else than immersion, to make out which, they must bring forward every instance of its use and show that it means nothing else in any instance. Instead of this, it is at least practically held to be sufficient for them to prove that the word is used to signify immersion by numerous writers. This sufficiently establishes their position in the absence of counter evidence. The PedoPaptists are then called upon to reply, and shew that immer sion is not its universal and only signification. This case and the one under consideration are parallel in the material point. They are both cases where the a priori assumption is against them. The assumption is that all words have more than one signification. But it is held sufficient for the Baptists to make out a general signification in proof of the assertion of a universal signification. Their making out that baptizo generally means immerse, is held to be sufficient in the absence of counter testimony. The burden of proof is then changed and the respondent is called upon to produce examples, or an example of contrary usage. So in the case under consideration, it is sufficient to prove that Paul lived at least habitually, without sin. That is that he in general terms is said to have lived without sin. This changes the onus, and the assumption then is that he lived altogether without sin unless the contrary be shown. Or more strictly it is sufficient to show that Paul lived a considerable period during the latter part of his life without sin. This throws the burden of proof upon him who would deny that he continued in this state until death. However I have repeatedly said, I care not to contend for the sanctification of Paul, or of any other man, in support of the practical attainability of this state. If such cases had been frequent in the early ages of christianity, they would not in all probability have been recorded unless it was done after their death. It is the fact of practical attainability and not of actual allainment for which I contend. 3. Another objection to the doctrine we have been considering has been stated as follows: The promises of entire sanctification are conditioned upon faith. We have no right to expect the fulfillment of the promises to us, until we believe them. To believe and appropriate them is to believe that they will be fulfilled to us. But of this we have no evidence until after we have believed that they will be fulfilled to us, which is the condition of their fulfillment Therefore we have no reason to expect their fulfillment to us. To this objection I reply, (1.) That it applies equally to all the promises made to the saints, and if this objection is good and a bar to rational hope in respect to the promises of entire sanctification it is equally so in respect to all the promises. (2.) The objection represents the gospel and its promises as a mere farce. If this objection has any weight, the matter stands thus: God has promised us certain things upon |