infallible, while yours is liable to a thousand errors and mistakes, in which you have often been detected even by yourself-possessed of all knowledge too, while you "are of yesterday, and know nothing?" Should it not be rather according to his mind ? Should the inferior mind dispose and direct things?

If there were but one such mind the demand would not be quite so unreasonable. But should it be according to thy mind, when upon the same principle it should be according to the mind of others, your fellow-creatures, as wise and good as you, as much entitled and as well qualified to govern as you, whose minds nevertheless are in opposition to yours, so that it could not be according to theirs and yours also? Many of your views and wishes are at war with theirs. The gratification of your desires would often be incompatible with the gratification of theirs. Now should one creature rule all other creatures, and the creator too? Is it not better to let the supreme mind direct for all? when, moreover, this creature, who would rule all others, does not and cannot rule his own spirit? Methinks he who aspires to command and control others, should begin with commanding and controling himself.

But what still more unfits him to order things, is that his mind not only is at variance with other minds, but does not agree with itself. Sometimes it inclines to one thing, and again it inclines to the opposite. Nothing, not even the inconstant wind, is

so changeable as this mind, which would have things to be according to it. Should such a changeable mind rule, rather than he who is "in one mind,”. and whom none can turn-" the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning?"

But not only does this mind disagree with itselt at different times, but often at the very same moment it is at war with itself; forming plans and cherishing inclinations which are opposite to each other; so that it could not accomplish one of its purposes without defeating another; and could not gratify itselt in one respect without denying itself in another. Should it be according to a mind, according to which it could not be? We often have a mind to an end, when we have no mind to the means necessary to secure that end. Who has not a mind to be saved? But many have no mind to the way of being saved. Self-gratification is the thing men plead for, which implies that they have no mind to self-denial; and yet, if they would be saved, they must deny themselves. In order to have things according to their mind hereafter, they must consent that they should not be according to their mind now. Things cannot be according to their mind in time and in eterni v both. How merciful it is in God not to let things be to our mind in this present brief life!

Should it be according to thy mind, when thou dost not always know thy own mind? In such a

case would you not have another to choose for you? Should one who has to hesitate and debate matters with himself, before he decides, have the direction of affairs in his hands? How long it sometimes takes you to make up your mind! What shall be done in the mean time? Must the course of nature and Providence be arrested, and the whole current of events stand still, till you have concluded what is best to be done?

Have you not sometimes had things according to your mind, and afterwards regretted that they were so? And would you run the risk of similar regrets hereafter? Have you not sometimes also had things contrary to your mind, and subsequently rejoiced that they were so? Have you never found crosses to be blessings in disguise? May not the present cross cover a blessing? And will you complain of a blessing, in whatever garb it may come?

Let God be heard before he is condemned. We concede this privilege to men. We consent to hear their reasons, before we censure their acts. God has appointed a day for the explanation of all things; and he may reveal the reasons of his conduct towards us even before the day of the revelation of his righteous judgment. It is uncertain whether we shall justify men, after we have heard their reasons; but do you not believe that if you knew the reasons of all God's proceedings in Providence, you would approve and sanction them all, and that your inind

would be in accordance with his? Why then not acquiesce in it now? Other beings, better and greater than you, do so... They decline having things according to their mind. And should not you? Eli said, "It is the Lord; let him do what seemeth him good." And even Christ would not have it according to his mind. "Not as I will, but as thou wilt,” was his conclusion, when the bitterest of all cups was at his lips.

Are you one of those who love God? Surely then it ought to satisfy you, when God assures you that under his government "all things work together for good to them that love him." Will you not let him choose what the things shall be, when he pledges himself that the result of them all shall be your good? Is it certain, if the things to befall you were chosen by you, that they would all conduce to your good? He says that he will withhold no good thing from them that walk uprightly. Is not this guarantee enough? "How shall he not," says one of his inspired apostles, with Christ "also freely give us all things?" "All things are yours." And will you complain that death is in the catalogue? or that. tribulation and distress are among the things, in all which "we are more than conquerors through him that loved us?"

How many examples of inconsistency one may give, without going beyond the pale of the church, into the wide domain of the world! We Christians consecrate ourselves to God for his use, and glory. Who is a Christian that has not done this? and what Christian has not done it often, and perhaps recorded the solemn act of self-consecration? Well, having done it repeatedly, and not by constraint, but willingly; and having thus not only acknowledged God's right to use us, and to glorify himself in and by us, but asked him to do it, we afterwards complain that he does it. We object to the use to which he puts us, though we never stipulated any particular use to which he should put us, but left him free to use us as should seem good to him. Yet now, when we see what he is going to do with us, though, in consenting that he should do with us according to his pleasure, we consented to that very thing, we demur, and would dictate what use he should make of us, and how glorify himself by us! Do I not justly denomi nate this inconsistency? May not God do what he will with his own, when it is his own on so many accounts, and by so perfect a right-his own, not only by creation, by preservation, and by purchase, but by our consent and covenant with him, and oft expressed desire that it should be his; and when