men, he gave it a quieta est, by pretending that the soul is extinct in death, or at least is to venish into an eternal insensibility, as unconcerned as if it had never been. This, indeed, was effectually to confine every thing to this life, and to stifle all idea of future retribution or punishment. For as it is evident, the human body is no one day together the same, that is, composed of the same particles, so it will follow, that if matter is supposed to think, there can be no personal identity, nor can a man continue to be the same individual being. "Quanto absurdius, tanto melius." But, I can never reconcile. this doctrine. When I look at one point, for instance, only, at pain and affliction, the result of mere matter and motion, the necessary consequence of a material physical system, imposed for no end, and whose issues are death present, and death eternal, this is such pure evil, such fruitless and absurd misery, as I cannot for a moment admit. If all dies with us, how can I embrace the doctrine of a general Providence, which yet certainly does exist?

"The whole man," says Priestley, "becomes extinct at death. He is composed of one homogeneous substance; he is of one uniform Composition: the ancients believed the same

thing;

thing; they believed the soul to be material and mortal." Some of them, we allow, did so. But, the assertion, by being indiscriminate, is erroneous. The ancients did not all suppose, that mere matter can think. Upon this hypothesis, man, as a thinking, intelligent being, consists only in the structure and organization of the brain and nervous system; which being dissolved at death, the man becomes extinct, and as a thinking, intelligent being, has no existence. Dr. Priestley, indeed, attempts to remove the difficulties attending his hypothesis, by insisting upon the resurrection of the same man. But, is this a conceivable supposition, considering him only as material?

ས་

Human beings exist in two different states of life and perception. When any of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified, we may be said to exist or live in a state of sensation. When none of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and act, we may be said to exist or live in a state of reflection. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved by death, is any way necessary to the living being in this its state of reflection, after ideas are gained. For though from our present constitution and condition of:

VOL. IV.

B

being,

being, our external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds, are in architecture; yet, when these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, without any assistance from our senses; and without any at all that we know of, from that body, which will be dissolved by death. It does not appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting being, is in any degree necessary to thinking, to our intellectual enjoyments and sufferings. Further, there are instances of mortal diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers. Persons, even the moment before death, appear to be in the highest vigour of life. They discover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire, with the utmost force of affection, sense of shame or honour, and the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings even to the last gasp: and these surely prove even greater vigour of life, than bodily strength does. Now, what pretence is there for thinking, that a progressive disease, when arrived to such a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, shall destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which were not affected by it, during its whole progress quite

4

quite up to that degree? Death may in some sort, and in some respects, answer our birth; it may put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life, as our birth does. *

What shall we say to that valiant leader, fighting for his country, who, borne on a litter, and spent with mortal disease, still fought the battle, in the midst of which he expired, and whose last effort was to place his finger on his lips, as a signal to conceal his death? In this dying hour, did not the musclés acquire a tone from undiminished spirit; and did not the mind seem to depart in its vigour, and in a struggle to obtain the recent aim of its toils? Our organs of sense, and our limbs, are certainly instruments which living persons make use of, to perceive and move with. They are like a microscope to look through, or a staff to walk with. The eyes and the feet do not determine in these cases. In short, there is not any probability, that the alienation or dissolution of these instruments, is the destruction of the perceiving and moving agent.

Sometimes the infirmities of age affect the mind, destroy the memory, and wipe out all the sensible

B 2

sensible marks and characters of things; but, this no more argues any decay of the soul, than the distraction of a fever, or the sealing up of our senses with sleep. Setting aside these accidents, the soul is continually improving itself. And

can we think, when it has attained the greatest improvements and perfections it can in this body, it shall fall into nothing? Does not our present condition rather look like a state of trial and probation for a more perfect life? * Death in itself considered, is no argument against future existence. That we die, does no more prove that we shall not live after death, than the winter decays of nature are an argument against the return of the spring.

"The power of sensation, perception, and thought, as belonging to man," says Priestley, "have never been found but in conjunction with a certain organized system; and therefore, these powers necessarily exist in, and depend upon, such a system. Hence it is matter that is capable of thought and reflection." That they exist in, and depend on such a system, are, however, very different conclusions. If they be always found in such a system, they certainly exist in it; but, it does not follow, that they depend

* Sherlock..