On the authority to determine things not

ference to the testimony of God. The knowledge derived from such a source, is a notion, a prejudice; it is not conviction, for it does not rest upon evidence, and it has no relation to the moral character. Thus, in every point of view, the hypothesis of an authorized interpreter of Scripture, or of an "authority in matters "of faith," is subversive of religion. Give up this point to the Romanist, and nothing is left of Protestantism worth contending for. But the Bible, the Bible only is the religion of Protest

ants.

§ 5. A fourth method of evading the application of this grand principle of the Reformationcommanded the sufficiency of the Scripture-rule, (the one with which the Nonconformist controvertists

in Scripture.

have had chiefly to contend,) remains to be examined the argument is to this effect-That though the Bible is the only unerring standard, as well as the ultimate rule, yet, things left undetermined by Scripture, or things in their own nature indifferent, may be made binding by the authority of the Church; or that, in other words, "the Church hath authority to "decree rites and ceremonies." Upon this plea, submission is demanded to prescribed observances, confessedly resting upon no Scripture foundation. Because they involve nothing contrary to Scripture, therefore, it is argued, they are lawful; and being lawful, they may be de

creed to be necessary; and in contesting this point-the lawfulness or expedience of particular observances, (which, had they not been imposed, would long since have ceased to exist except among the forgotten materials of obsolete controversy,) the main argument, which relates to the authority of the imposer, has been too often lost sight of.

The clergymen who, by the Act of Uniformity, were ejected from the Establishment, were naturally led to give prominence to those specific objections which rendered it incompatible with their most sacred obligations to comply with that arbitrary decree; but nothing can be more erroneous than to represent those objections, however valid, as forming the reasons of Nonconformity. They were only the occasion of leading those excellent men to act up to their principles as Protestants, the operation of the Act of Uniformity being, in this respect, much the same as that of the publication of Indulgences, which led to the Reformation: it did not originate those principles, it only led to their discovery. The ground on which the Nonconformists refused compliance with the prescribed conditions of their retaining their stations in the Establishment, was, their conscientious objections to the things imposed; but there were reasons against the imposition itself, which lay deeper than those objections. Whether their

Illogical position,

that things may be made

indifferent

binding.

scruples were, or were not, intrinsically valid, is of little consequence. Our present business is not to canvass the theological opinions of either party, but to examine the principle on which the whole controversy hinges,-the existence of an authority competent to decree what Scripture has not commanded.

A preliminary remark is naturally suggested by the illogical character of the position, that because certain things are left indifferent, therefore they may be imposed; because they are not in themselves necessary, therefore the Church may make them necessary! Would it not have been more natural to conclude, that their indifferent nature presents the strongest reason against their being made obligatory? Were they, then, left indifferent on purpose to afford scope for the exercise of human authority? That were to ascribe to the Scripturerule a designed imperfection, which would leave us in uncertainty whether human authority had yet fulfilled its allotted part in completing the standard of religious duty. If it be necessary to determine certain points relating to religious duty, which Scripture has not determined, then, the Scripture-rule does not supply all the knowledge that is necessary for our guidance; it is not a perfect rule: but, if it be unnecessary to determine them, if they be strictly indifferent, on what pretence can the wanton interference

of arbitrary power in such matters be justified? "What charter," to use the words of Stillingfleet, "hath Christ given the Church, to bind

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66

up men more than himself hath done?"* Will

"He that came to take away the insupportable yoke of "Jewish ceremonies, certainly did never intend to gall the "necks of his disciples with another instead of it. The grand commission the Apostles were sent out with, was only to teach what Christ had commanded them. Not "the least intimation of any power given them to impose or "require any thing beyond what himself had spoken to them, "or they were directed to by the immediate guidance "of the Spirit of God. We never read of the Apostles' "making laws but of things supposed necessary. When the "council of Apostles met at Jerusalem for deciding a case "that disturbed the Church's peace, we see, they would lay

no other burden besides these 'necessary things,' (Acts xv. "28.) It was not enough with them, that the things would "be necessary when they had required them: but they "looked on an antecedent necessity, either absolute or for

the present state, which was the only ground of their im (6 posing those commands upon the Gentile Christians. There "were, after this, great diversities of practice, and varieties of "observations among Christians, but the Holy Ghost never

thought those things fit to be made matters of law, to which "all parties should conform; all that the Apostles required as "to these, was mutual forbearance and condescension to"wards each other in them. Without all controversy, the main "inlet of all the distractions, confusions, and divisions of the "Christian world, hath been by adding other conditions of "church-communion than Christ hath done. The unity of "the Church is a unity of love and affection, and not a bare "uniformity of practice or opinion."--Bishop STILLINGFLEET, Preface to Irenicum.

it be said, that though the things imposed naturally admit of the freedom of choice, yet that, respecting them, individual freedom is overruled by the duty of agreement, which requires the sacrifice of private opinion? That duty can respect only the manner of performing what is in some sense necessary to be done: for it cannot be necessary to agree about matters really needless. Besides, so far as agreement respecting things indifferent, is a moral duty, enforced by the desire of avoiding offence, or by a regard to the feelings and interests of others, it obviously supposes a voluntary surrender of individual liberty and inclination, as opposed alike to compulsion or to positive claims: but both the exercise and the moral purpose of the duty of conciliatory agreement are precluded by the interposition of authority, terminating all alternative by an absolute law. "The Apos

tle, who was strong in the faith,” it has been shrewdly remarked, "parted with something of "his liberty to please the weak; therefore the "weak must part with their consciences, where• Melius In- "in they have no liberty, to gratify the strong!"* Such is the reasoning of those who would exact submission to this Apocryphal authority in matters indifferent.

quirendum,

p. 233.

On the term indifferent.

But the word indifferent, is itself of equivocal import. If by being left indifferent, it is meant simply that the things alluded to, are not the