cave of misery, who are led astray by the ignis faluus of religion, would have been contented and happy, had they continued in their natural and proper sphere: but, unfortunately, like all those who forsake nature, they must incessantly feel the keenest pangs of pain, they must become morose and gloomy, linger out their existence in the sharpest misery, and at last expire in sorrow and despair.

Oct. 5, 1823, Newton, near
Manchester.

EPICURUS.

COPY OF A LETTER SENT TO CHARLES BYAM WOLLASTON ESQ., VISITING MAGISTRATE FOR DORCHESTER GAOL.

SIR,

Dorchester Gaol, Oct. 23, 1823.

I PRESENT my compliments and express a hope, that in the absence of Mr. Wood, the Visiting Magistrates are prepared with a deputy Chaplain who is capable of explaining my errors, if I have errors. No man can lament the existence of error more than I do; and if there be a particle about me, I desire to have it explained and to be rid of it.

The thirtieth clause of the new regulation act for Gaols says: that, the Chaplain shall "catechise or instruct such Prisoners as may be willing to receive instruction." Now I do most sincerely desire to be " catechised and instructed,” and as I am a Prisoner for having published that the Christian religion has no good foundation, I do think that the Visiting Magistrates ought not to pay one shilling of salary to a Chaplain, until he has, by fair shewing and complete demonstration, convinced me of error: which, if he can do, I will soon make my peace with all those whom my conduct has offended.

I also think that it behoves such of the Visiting Magistrates, who are clergymen, to visit and instruct me, instead of doing me all the injury they can. If they were to make themselves more acquainted with me, they would not lock me up in one room continually, as if I carried some contagious disease about me. Their fears overcome their prudence; and whilst they claim to be acting with sound judgment, I construe their conduct towards me to be weakness or wickedness, because I feel that I do not deserve it.

I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,

RICHARD CARLILE.

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE COMPETENCY OF A COURT OF LAW TO TRY A CHARGE OF BLASPHEMOUS PUBLICATION,

Delivered by Mr. Trust on his Trial, in the Court of King's Bench, on the 30th instant.

THIS being wholly a Court of Law, it is requisite, that every charge shail have its foundation in the law of the country. It is the more essential in this particular case, as the record, which the Attorney General brings before the Court, is not founded on any evidence laid before a Jury of the country, but is, simply, the emanation of his own mind, and the work of an individual notoriously not disinterested, and as notoriously not independent. He is the mere creature, and tool of higher powers. He does not, therefore, come into Court as an injured citizen to complain of a wrong sustained by himself or by any other person, or a wrong done by me to any person, but he comes with a complaint which he cannot define, upon a subject that he can know nothing at all about, and for a purpose, the moral utility of which he cannot show. He places this Court of Law in a dilemma, by bringing before it such a record as I have described; for that which is incomprehensible is not a matter of law, nor a matter to be investigated in a Court of Law.

That the record or information before the Court relates to a matter wholly incomprehensible, I am prepared to shew upon the following grounds:

1st. That it sets forth in words three subjects which cannot be defined or understood, and consequently, cannot be fit subjects to lay before a Jury in a Court of Law, whilst the highest degree of human intelligence in or out of this Court is ignorant of their meaning, bearing, or physical relations, and law cannot be but in understanding, in application and relation to physical objects, common to the lowest degree of human intelligence; such as property of every description.

The words or subjects in question are thus set forth :Holy Scriptures"-" Christian Religion," and "Displeasure of Almighty God."

The words Holy Scriptures define nothing but a piece of writing or a collected number of pieces, and as those pieces of writing, are not claimed to be the property of any individual to the exclusive claim of others, there can be no

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injury inflicted on that head, and consequently nothing for a Court of Law to investigate.

On another head, or the ground of criticism, it may be clearly shewn, that no observations made upon a piece, or a collected number of pieces, of writing, can change their character and intrinsic worth and consequently, that no injury can be shewn to have been done to any man or to any body of men, and that there is nothing cognizable by law. If those pieces of writing are moral, good will be done by calling the public attention to them: if immoral, good will be done by exposing them; and a Court of Law is instituted for no other purpose than to take cognizance of wrong doings. View this part of the subject in the record in whatever way you will, it cannot be shewn that a wrong is done cognizable by law; and, therefore, there is no matter which in law or reason ought to be submitted to the judgment of a Jury.

I am charged with being an immoral character for having published a book, whilst there is not the slightest charge of immorality made upon the book itself! It is called a scandalous, impious, blasphemous, and profane libel, but these are words which mean nothing at all as connected with ·law. They are words which do not relate to morals, nor can they be shewn to define any thing immoral, and law defines a human means to protect morality and to discourage immorality: it is therefore clear, that, as my book is not charged to be false or immoral, its publication cannot be an offence against law. There is no charge on this head on the record that can be lawfully submitted to a Jury for their judgment, or to which I can be lawfully called upon

to answer.

As to the word Holy, used as an adjective to those scriptures upon which my publication is confessedly in part a comment, it means nothing, and cannot be defined in any way cognizable by the human senses, and consequently it cannot add any thing to those Scriptures, or prove that to comment upon them, more than upon any other common piece of writing, is an act cognizable by law.

The word Holy, used as an adjunct to the word Scriptures, does not alter the character or import of those writings, nor is the morality or immorality of any piece of writing dependent upon such a title being given to it, any more than the title of Holiness given to a man called the Pope makes him a jot the more or less a moral or an immoral man, or than the title of your Lordship makes any

the least difference in the private character of the man who is distinguished by it.

This, then, sufficiently shews, that the word libel, which means a little book, call it what you please by the addition of adjectives, cannot be an unlawful critique upon other writings, since it cannot change the character of those writings, and if it do disturb the public esteem for any piece of writing, it proves but one thing-that the public esteem was not well founded: and the act which has produced such an effect is wholly moral, wholly praiseworthy, and must therefore be wholly lawful.

A book is nothing more than the human voice, the human power of speech reduced to signs upon paper; and if it were unlawful for one book to disturb the conclusions men draw or the sentiments they entertain of another book, it would be equally unlawful for one man to offer the slightest contradiction to the sayings of another man. What would be the effect of such a law, if generally enforced? A partial enforcement of any law is admitted on all hands to be the definition of injustice. What, I repeat, would be the effect of such a law if generally enforced? Is it not clear, that it strikes at, not only the very foundation of morals and buman improvement, but at the very foundation of human society itself; for, under such a law, no two human beings could live together in conference and mutual support. This plain fact proves, that the record before the Court has not the slightest relation to any kind of law. A Jury are sworn for no other purpose than to receive evidence of an offence against law, and to decide according to the evidence: yet, here, in this case, there can be no evidence to lay before the Jury. It also proves, that free discussion is the foundation, not only of human society but of morals also, and indeed of every thing intellectual that can be a benefit to society. It clearly defines, that free discussion is the foundation of all moral law in the first instance; and all morality, all improvement, all social happiness in the second instance. As human speech distinguishes man from the brute, so also does it follow that the distinction can only be increased by free discussion. If, in the first instance, it be proper for a man to speak; it is proper in the second, that he should speak freely and truly without controul. Free discussion means nothing more than human speech in action; and, if free to act, a man would no more wilfully do himself or others an injury by words than by bodily actions and to restrain his speech in the first instance, is like making the

earth a common bedlam, and Kings, Priests, and Judges its keepers; just as a man, who cannot regulate his actions so as to distinguish right from wrong, is restrained from acting and called a bedlamite.

The inference which I draw from this argument is, that, the calling my publication by bad names, and that on which it is a comment by a good name, is no legal criterion of the character of either the one book or the other, and that the one has no claim to be protected from comment by being called Holy, nor the other from commenting by being called Unholy. The law knows nothing of these words, nor of these books; and, the Attorney General has no legal footing in this Court, on this part of his record.

Another reason why the record should not be submitted to a Jury is, that if so submitted, it neither calls upon me, nor affords me an opportunity of giving an answer to what is said against me before the Jury. A Jury is sworn to take cognizance of matters of fact deposed by sworn witnesses, and to take cognizance of nothing else. In the case before the Court, there is no matter of fact to try, there is no breach of law. The only matter of fact is, have I, or have I not, published this book? I am proud to acknowledge that I have sold as many copies as I could find customers to purchase. The publication of this book is no injury to any man, no breach of law, no law has declared it to be either the one or the other. But if the Jury were to find a verdict upon every thing that the law requires them to find; that is, upon all the evidence that is laid before them, they could only find that I did sell the book, as no evidence of any other kind can be laid before them; and it is well known, that in cases where Jurymen have respected their oaths, where they have refused to return a verdict contrary to the evidence laid before them, where their verdict has been"Guilty of publishing this book, or this pamphlet, or this paper; or this writing," the whole process becomes a nullity, and though the Court may record the verdict, it cannot proceed further upon it. It cannot make that verdict a proof of a breach of law. It cannot punish. This has been frequently the case under the anomalous proceedings for what are called libels: two of which are the cases of the King against Lambert and others, proprietors and printers of the Morning Chronicle, at the close of the last century, and lately the King against James Mann, tried at York in

the summer of 1820.

If the record charged my publication with being false