This seems to be the place, in which it is proper to introduce a distinction, which is usually made, of the knowledge of God into the knowledge of simple intelligence, or natural and indefinite knowledge, scientia simplicis intelligentiæ; and the knowledge of vision, scientia visionis, which is also called free and definite. The former is the knowledge of things possible, and is called indefinite, because God has defined or determined nothing concerning them. God knows all possible causes, and all their possible effects. The latter is the knowledge of future things, of things which shall take place, and is called definite, because their existence is determined. They differ, you see, in their object; that of the former, being all things that might exist; that of the latter, being only such things as are to exist. The first kind of knowledge is founded on the omnipotence of God; he knows all things which his power could perform. The second kind of knowledge is founded on his will or decree, by which things pass from a state of possibility to a state of futurition. God knew of innumerable worlds and orders of creatures which his power could have brought into being; but he knew of them, not as things which were to be, but as things which might be. But, he knew of the universe which actually is, as certainly to have a future existence, because he had determined to create it. Lastly, these two kinds of knowledge differ in their order, because the former preceded his decree, and the latter is subsequent to it. Of the things which his Almighty power could accomplish, he purposed to do this and not that; and consequently, the one became certain, and the other remained only possible.

There is a third kind of knowledge, which some Divines have ascribed to God, and which is called scientia media, because it lies in the middle between the two kinds already explained, and differs from both. It differs from natural and indefinite knowledge, because it is conversant not about possible, but about future things; it differs from free and definite knowledge, because it is not founded upon the decree of God, but upon the actions of his creatures, which he foresees. He knows how men will act if placed in particular cir cumstances, if endowed with certain talents, if favoured with certain opportu nities, if exposed to certain temptations. His knowledge is not the effect of his own purpose, but of the foresight of their character and condition; it is not derived from himself, but from his creatures. The design of introducing this distinction, was to give support to the doctrine, that the divine decrees which relate to men are conditional; or that, for example, men were chosen to eternal life upon the foresight of their faith and obedience; and hence it has been strenuously opposed by the advocates of unconditional decrees. They have endeavoured to shew, that it is a useless distinction, this middle science being comprehended in the knowledge of simple intelligence, or the knowledge of all possible things; that it solves no difficulties, but leaves the question, how God is not the author of sin? unanswered, since he placed Adam in circumstances in which he knew certainly that he would fall; that it renders God dependent upon his creatures, from whom part of his knowledge is derived, and by whose conduct his determinations are regulated; and that it exempts men from the control of their Maker, leaving them to act independently of any act of his will, or any prior arrangement of his wisdom, solely in the exercise of their own liberty. Some of these objections appear to have weight; but, perhaps, this media scientia might be so explained as to free it from them, and render it quite consistent with orthodoxy. Whether you give a distinct name to it or not, you might, one should think, say with the utmost safety, that God, whose understanding is infinite, knew in what manner men would act if placed in particular circumstances, and did place them in such chrumstances, with a view to accomplish the design of his administration.

You will understand, by what has been said, the connexion between the

knowledge and the decrees of God. When he decreed, he selected, if I may speak so, from the infinity of possible things, those which his wisdom judged proper to be done; and the things thus selected were henceforth future and certain.

No man will deny, that there are divine decrees, who believes that God is an intelligent being, and considers what this character implies. An intelligent being is one who knows and judges, who purposes ends and devises means, who acts from design, conceives a plan, and then proceeds to execute it. Fortune was worshipped as a goddess by the ancient heathens, and was represented as blind, to signify that she was guided by no fixed rule, and distributed her favours at random. Surely no person of common sense, not to say piety, will impute procedure so irrational to the Lord of universal nature. As he knew all things that his power could accomplish, there were undoubtedly reasons, which determined him to do one thing, and not to do another; and his choice, which was founded upon those reasons, was his decree. Upon this subject, we cannot avoid speaking of him after the manner of men; because, in endeavouring to conceive, the acts of his mind, we necessarily refer to the operations of our own, however great is the difference between infinite and finite. When various plans are laid before us, and we prefer one to the rest, this act of our minds is a decree or purpose by which our subsequent conduct is regulated. The works of God, in like manner, necessarily presuppose a decree, as the plan of which they are the developement. It will certainly be admitted, that God intended to create the world before he actually created it; that he intended to make man before he fashioned his body, and breathed the breath of life into his nostrils; that he intended to govern the world which he had made, according to certain laws; and it will be farther admitted, that when he resolved to create the world, and to make man, and to establish laws physical and moral, he had some ultimate object in view. Having constructed a machine, and set it in motion, he knew what would be the result; and this result was the true reason, or the final cause, why the machine was constructed. This intention of the Deity is his decree. To this general idea of a decree no man can object, whatever difficulties may occur in the detail of the doctrine, because it is as simple, and as necessarily forced upon our minds, as the idea of a purpose in the mind of a wise man, preceding an enterprise in which he embarks, or a particular mode of life which he adopts. In fine, the decree of God is his will, in which the exertions of his power, and the manifestations of his other perfections, originated. When we speak of his decreeing or purposing, we mean nothing mysterious and profound, but merely, that before he acted, he willed to act, that his operations ad extra were not the effects of necessity, but of counsel and design.

The Scriptures make mention of the decrees of God in many passages, and in a variety of terms. They speak of his foreknowledge, his purpose, his will, the determinate counsel of his will, his good pleasure, and his predestination: Christ, says an apostle, "was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God."* "Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate."+ "He hath made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure, which he hath purposed in himself."+"He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." It is unnecessary to multiply quotations. There are two remarks which I would make upon the language of Scripture: First, when it represents the decrees of God as his counsel, the word is not to be understood in its usual acceptation, as implying consultation with others, or reflection, comparison, the deduction of inferences from premises, and the establishment of a conclusion as the result of the previous process. This slow procedure suits our limited faculties, but the decisions of an infinite mind are • Acts ii. 23. † Rom. viii. 29. + Eph. i. 9.

§ Ibid. 11.

stantaneous. His decrees are called his counsel, to signify that they are consummately wise. Secondly, when they are called his will, it is not meant to insinuate that they are arbitrary decisions; but merely, that in making his decrees, he was under no control, and acted according to his own sovereignty. When a man's will is the rule of his conduct, it is usually capricious and unreasonable; but wisdom is always associated with will in the divine proceedings; and accordingly his decrees are said to be the "counsel of his will." A question has been agitated upon this subject, which is very abstruse, and of which I almost despair of being able to convey a clear idea to you, as I am not sure that I distinctly understand it. It relates to the manner in which the decrees are in God, whether essentially, or inhesively and accidentally. The first is accounted the orthodox opinion. I know not how to explain it; but it is affirmed that the decrees of God are not different from himself, and are identified with his essence, and that he never was without his decrees. If I have any glimpse of the meaning, it appears to be this, that in God there is nothing analogous to thought in man, which is not his soul itself, but an act of his soul. It is easy to put together words, which shall express this proposition; but I doubt much whether any man can affix a distinct idea to it, with whatever confidence he may repeat it. You may say, that the decrees of God are God himself decreeing, and you may say the same thing of a man, that his decrees are the man himself decreeing: the decrees, however, are not more identified with the essence in the one case, than in the other. We do not indeed understand the operations of an infinite mind, and they must be very different from those of our own; but we would persuade ourselves and others that we do understand them, although it frequently happens, (and the present case, I think, is an instance,) that we darken counsel by words without knowl edge. What is the meaning of decrees which are God himself? or what can we infer from the assertion, that God could not be without his decrees, but that they were as necessary as his existence, and consequently, that it was necessary that the world should be created, and all the events should happen, which have taken place, or will take place throughout an endless duration? There have been distinctions invented to support this opinion, and to answer objections; but I may spare myself and you the trouble of retailing them, as they would neither entertain nor instruct you.

The decrees of God relate to all future things without exception; whatever is done in time, was fore-ordained before the beginning of time. His purpose was concerned with every thing, whether great or small, whether good or evil; although, in reference to the latter, it may be necessary to distinguish between appointment and permission. It was concerned with things necessary, free, and contingent; with the movements of matter, which are necessary; with the volitions and actions of intelligent creatures, which are free; and with such things as we call accidents, because they take place undesignedly on our part, and without any cause which we could discover. It was concerned about our life, and our death; about our state in time, and our state in eternity. In short, the decrees of God are as comprehensive as his government, which extends to all creatures, and to all events. God did not merely decree to make man, and place him upon the earth, and then to leave him to his own uncontrolled guidance he fixed all the circumstances in the lot of individuals, and all the particulars which will compose the history of the human race from its commencement to its close. He did not merely decree that general laws should be established for the government of the world, but he settled the application of those laws to all particular cases. Our days are numbered, and so are the hairs of our heads. We may learn what is the extent of the Divine decrees from the dispensations of providence, in which they are executed. The care of Providence reaches to the most insignificant creatures, and the most minute VOL. I.-45 2E2

events, the death of a sparrow, and the fall of a hair. Some, indeed, talk of a general providence, by which I know not well what they mean, unless it be to save the Almighty the trouble of entering into details, and to burden him only with the office of upholding the general system. Hence they wisely tell us, that he takes care of the species, but not of the individuals; not perceiving that it is hardly possible to express a greater absurdity in fewer words. Å species is a general name by which the common and distinguishing qualities of a number of individuals are denoted. The species is nothing but the individuals under a particular classification. How then can the species be taken care of, if the individuals be neglected? In the same way, to allude to a familiar instance, in which a man would take care of his pounds who took no care of his pence. The notion of a general, to the exclusion of a particular providence, is irrational, as well as unscriptural. It is only by attending to individuals, and the regulation of minute affairs, that the business of the world can be carried on. We may say of providence, as the Psalmist says of the sun, that nothing is hidden from its heat, that its influence pervades the whole system of things. As God works all things according to the counsel of his will, we infer from his works what his counsel is, as we judge of an architec plan by inspecting the building which was raised under his directions.

"* When an

I proceed to lay before you some of the properties of the Divine decrees. And, in the first place, I remark, that they were made from eternity. This is readily granted with respect to some of the decrees, those, for example, which relate to the creation of the world and of man, and to the mission of Jesus Christ; but, it has been maintained, that those, which relate to things dependent upon the free agency of man, are made in time. This opinion, however, is so far from receiving any countenance from Scripture, that it is directly contradicted by it. It is expressly affirmed that believers were chosen in Christ, and that grace was given to them, "before the world began." Apostle says, "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world," he virtually teaches that his decrees are eternal; for his words import, that at the commencement of time the plan was arranged, according to which his works were to be executed. It is manifest that, if they had not been determined upon, they could not have been foreknown as certain. To suppose any of the Divine decrees to be made in time, is to suppose that some new occasion has occurred, some unforeseen event or combination of circumstances has taken place, which has induced the Most High to pronounce a new sentence, or form a new resolution. If he knew from eternity all that he knows in time, no reason can be assigned why he should have delayed his arrangements so long. Temporal decrees suppose the knowledge of the Deity to be imited, and that he is receiving accessions to it in the progress of time. comes to a resolution respecting men, after he has found what part they would act in particular circumstances. No man, who believes that the Divine understanding is infinite, comprehending the past, the present, and the future, will ever assent to the doctrine of temporal decrees. And is there any thing which God does not know? Is he ignorant of events which depend upon human volitions? No; he has foretold them in innumerable instances; prophecy is founded upon his infallible prescience, and shews that all things were certain to him from the beginning, and were so settled that they could not be changed. Although we cannot understand what is meant by identifying God's decrees with his essence, yet we have no hesitation in fixing their date in eternity.

He

In the second place, The divine decrees are wise. Wisdom is discovered in the selection of the most proper ends, and of the fittest means of accomplishing them. That this character belongs to the decrees of God, is evident from what we know of them. They are disclosed to us by their execution, and ⚫ Eph. 1. 4. 2 Tim. i. 9. † Acts xv. 18.

every proof of wisdom in the works of God, is a proof of the wisdom of the plan in conformity to which they are performed. It is indeed, but a very small part of them which falls under our observation; but, we ought to proceed here as we do in other cases, and judge of the whole by the specimen, of what is unknown, by what is known. He who perceives works of admirable skill in the parts of a machine, which he has an opportunity to examine, is naturally led to believe that the other parts are equally admirable. In this manner we should satisfy our minds, when doubts obtrude themselves upon us, and repel the objections which may be suggested by some things which we cannot recon cile to our notions of what is expedient and proper. As far as we can go, every thing is worthy of God; why should we not believe, that beyond the point which bounds our researches, there is the same order, the same beauty, the same correspondence with the Divine character and attributes? Convinced as we are by experience, that the plans of the Almighty are the result of consummate intelligence, ought we not, while we stand at the brink of the abyss which we cannot fathom, to exclaim in the language of profound reverence and hunible adoration: "O, the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!"* Incomprehensible as are the counsels of God, we may be assured that no part of them is the effect of caprice, or of mere will, but that to his mind there appeared a sufficient reason for every thing which he pur posed to do. Some have said, that as his knowledge is infinite, and his wisdom perfect, he must have discerned among possible events which was the best, and have chosen accordingly; and consequently, that the actual system of things is the best possible system. In this manner, they account for the permission of moral evil, and for the creation of such a being as man, although God foresaw that he would abuse his liberty, and involve a whole race in guilt and misery. A system pregnant with such consequences, was preferred, because it was, upon the whole, better than any other. When we reflect upon the wonderful dispensation which has resulted from the fall, and by which God is glorified in the highest, we are almost disposed to assent to this theory; but it seems to be a speculation beyond the reach of our faculties. It is an attempt to soar to a region too pure and sublime for us to breathe in it. Let us be content to move in a lower sphere, and to trace the evidences of wisdom with which we are surrounded there, and by which we shall feel this truth deeply impressed upon our minds, that God is wonderful in counsel, and excellent in working.

In the third place, The decrees of God are free: "Who hath directed the Spirit of the Lord, or, being his counsellor, hath taught him? With whom took he counsel, and who instructed him, and taught him in the path of judg ment, and taught him knowledge, and shewed to him the way of understanding?" He was alone when he made his decrees, and his determinations were influenced by no external cause. He was free to decree, or not to decree, and to decree one thing, and not another. This liberty we must ascribe to Him who is supreme, independent, and sovereign in all his dispensations. In settling the notion of human liberty, Calvinistic divines maintain against Arminians, that it does not consist in a power to act with motives, or without them, or in opposition to them; but in the power of acting according to the prevailing inclination, or according to the motive which appears strongest to the mind. Human volitions are not arbitrary, but are influenced by the previous state of the mind. A man chooses what appears to be good, and he chooses it necessarily, in this sense, that he could not do otherwise. The object of every volition, is to please himself; and to suppose a man to have any other object, that is, to will any thing which does not please him in itself, or in its circum Rom. xi. 33. † Isa. xl. 13, 14.