there of every member of the human family, whose misfortune it has been not to have heard of the name of their Almighty Saviour; I beg to advert to the concluding paragraph in the former part of my strictures thereon, contained in the same Magazine; in which I claimed from you the privilege of a further discussion of the subject, in reply to the concluding part of J. G.'s observations.*

My argument, sir, in favour of the salvation of the heathen, is founded on three fundamental principles, all of which are clearly laid down in the oracles of divine inspiration, viz. 1st, That "God is no respecter of persons;" and consequently, in every age and country, "he that feareth God, and worketh righteousness, is accepted of him," Acts x. 35. 2ndly, That "Jesus Christ hath by the grace of God tasted death for every man;" Heb. ii. 9. and consequently, that " every man" is entitled to the benefits flowing from his death. 3dly, That it is "not by works of righteousness that they have done," that even Christians are admitted to the favour of Heaven, and eternally saved; but it is according to his mercy," that God saves even believers in Christ, "by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost," Titus iii. 5. Now, the psalmist tells us that the "tender mercies of God are over all his works ;" and that, consequently, "he is loving to every man, and good to all." And as the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit is as universally free in its operation as the air we breathe; and as the benign, gracious, and moral influence of the Sun of righteousness is as universally free in its extension over the spiritual world, as that of the natural sun is over the material world, so we can no more limit the regenerating grace of our Lord Jesus Christ to a particular class of people, than we can

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The following proposition of J. G. was noticed in the former part of my strictures, but perhaps not so fully replied to as may be thought necessary, viz. "To suppose that a sinner can be saved in a state of heathenism, is the same as to suppose that he can be saved without the aids of the Holy Spirit; or that the Holy Spirit works savingly in the hearts of sinners in some other way than through the means of the truth as it is in Jesus: either of which suppositions appears to be quite repugnant to every precept of the Bible, and to be quite derogatory to the character of God, the character of Christ, and the character of the Holy Spirit." A substantial answer to the exclusive principle on which this statement rests, will, I trust, be found in the observations now laid before the public; yet, I beg also particularly to observe in reference to it, 1st, The operations of the Holy Spirit, though certainly most powerful when acting in unison with the faith of the gospel, never were limited to an association with that faith; witness, for instance, the cases of the Ethiopian Eunuch, and of Cornelius, who, though originally heathens, and secondarily perhaps Jewish proselytes of the gate, unquestionably

worshipped God in spirit and in truth," before they had either heard or felt any thing of the faith of the gospel, or, as J. G. styles it," the truth as it is in Jesus. Nor can J. G. deny that they thus worshipped the true God, under the influence of his Holy

limit the extension of the atmosphere, or the light and heat of the sun-beams, to particular countries. I grant, indeed, that the air is not so congenial to vegetation, nor are the rays of the sun so comfortably felt, in Lapland as in more southern climates, nor can a blind man in any country see those rays of the splendid luminary; yet still, I can no more presume to say, that the dispensations of grace have excluded a vast majority of mankind from the blessings of salvation, than I can venture to assert, that the dispensations of Providence have secluded whole nations from breathing the atmospheric air, and from beholding the light of the sun! God is every where, morally as well as vitally, present; and in him all men "live, move, and have their being." And as all men shall ultimately be judged by an act of the most impartial justice, so the foundation of that judgment must be laid in the proportion of grace that each man could and might have enjoyed under his peculiar dispensation. For, "to whom much is given, of them much will be required;" and vice versa.

These principles, sir, if I mistake not, open a door of salvation to the heathen world, which J. G. in vain endeavours to shut; for had they no means of knowing and serving God, it would be impossible for God, upon the principles of common equity, to bring them into judgment for not knowing and obeying him. But, sir, this matter is of too high, and of too important a nature, to be decided by human arguments; "to the law and to the testimony," -what say the oracles of God to the question? Let us attend still more particularly to their unequivocal and decisive language. Thus says the inspired penman; "For the invisible things of him are clearly seen from the creation of the world,† even

Spirit; nor will he, I think, venture to assert, that had either, or both of these upright men, died while under that previous influence, they would have eternally perished. 2dly, Hence it follows, that the influences of the Holy Spirit have been imparted to men, "in some other way than through means of the truth as it is in Jesus;" i. e. of the explicit knowledge and confession of that truth, in the subjects of these influences. And, 3dly, As the Holy Spirit cannot contradict himself, so his operations upon the minds of both Jews and heathens cannot be "repugnant to every precept of the Bible," which have been dictated by that Spirit; and much less is it true, that those gracious operations can degrade the immaculate character of each person in the ever-blessed Trinity! In this unguarded assertion, I fear J. G.'s zeal has transported him beyond the bounds of that solemn reverence which is due to the sacred character of that Being, who, without the permission of J. G., "worketh all things after the counsel of his own will!" Eph. i. 11.

Here I have taken the liberty of transposing the arrangement of the Apostle's words, from the order in which they are placed in the common translation, into one which, I believe, will be found much more congenial to the original Greek, and more clearly expressive of the evident meaning of St. Paul, and the drift of his argument.

his eternal power and Godhead, which are understood by the things that are made; so that they (i. e. wicked and idolatrous heathens) are without excuse. Because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful: but changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man," &c. &c. Rom. i. 20-22. Hence, it is plain, that the divine light and moral influence imparted to man in a state of nature, and without the aid of any special revelation from heaven, were quite sufficient to have conducted mankind into a saving knowledge of the true God, and of their duty to him, and to each other also, had that light been duly cultivated, and that influence faithfully obeyed.

Nay, the apostle goes farther, for, speaking of the Gentile nations, who never enjoyed the benefit of a revealed moral law, and speaking of them also, even under the direful influence of the corrupt principles they had imbibed, and of the vicious practices in which they had long indulged, the Holy Spirit by St. Paul declares, that God did not leave himself without an internal witness of the purity of his own nature, and the moral obligations which that purity, combined with his divine authority, laid upon the heathen world-a witness existing in their own bosoms, enlightening their consciences, and which, while it convinced them of sin, shewed them "the more excellent way," whereby they might please God, escape his eternal vengeance, and secure his favour on earth, and consecutively his salvation in heaven. All this is combined in the following extracts from the divine oracles :-"For there is no respect of persons with God.-For as many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law. For not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified," Rom. ii. 11, 12, 13. If it be asked, 'But how shall the heathen know, and be enabled to perform, the righteousness of the law as the medium of their salvation?? St. Paul tells you in direct terms, "For when the Gentiles, who have not the (written) law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these not having the law, are a law unto themselves: WHICH SHEW THE WORK OF THE LAW WRITTEN IN THEIR HEARTS;" and this, not merely to condemn, but to justify them also, according to the light which shone upon their obscure dispensation; for the apostle adds, "their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing, or else excusing one another," ver. 14, 15.

Now, sir, the point is settled, and by divine authority also. For that God, who is the God of both Jew and Gentile, tells us, that he hath planted a law in the bosom of the latter, which, if obeyed, will conduct its subjects to "glory, honour, and immortality;" but which, if disobeyed, will justly consign them to eternal perdition: and hence, neither the justice nor the mercy of God can be impeached in withholding the knowledge of a Redeemer for ages from the Gentile world; although "the riches of his grace" are abundantly magnified, and his triumphant mercy supremely exalted, by the ultimate display and glorious manifestation of that Redeemer, in all his sacred dignity and almighty power.

Before these important facts, sir, the futile arguments of your correspondent J. G. fly like chaff before the wind: nevertheless it may be necessary, not only thus to accomplish their general refutation, but also to apply those principles which the Holy Spirit hath opposed to J. G.'s doctrines, in a more detailed way, to his fallacious statements. You will therefore, sir, I trust, bear with, and indulge me with space in your columns, while I attempt this, in as brief a manner as the depth and importance of the subject will admit of.

The very first principle laid down by J. G. in that part of his essay now under review, (Mag. for April, col. 321,) contains a direct imputation upon the divine equity of the Judge of mankind; for it in effect asserts, that a law is given to the heathen world, by the divine Legislator, which, under pretence of conducting them to heaven, is designed only to justify, while it secures their eternal condemnation.Now, sir, a proposition which thus impugns the divine equity, cannot be true. The ground of J. G.'s error on this point is, that he founds an argument of necessity upon a fact which is the result of choice. Upon St. Paul's statement already quoted, it is clear, that if the heathen world had followed "the light of nature," that light would have conducted them to salvation. But the apostle tells us, "They did not like to retain God in their knowledge," (Rom. ii. 28.) which it is plain they might have done, if they had pleased: and that knowledge, Christ himself tells us, is the source of eternal life. (John xvii. 3.) Adam and

I am perfectly aware that our Lord here unites the knowledge of himself, with that of his heavenly Father, as the source of eternal life to believers in him. But this is the result of the voluntary renunciation of God, and of the voluntary violation of his law, by both Jew and Gentile. Had these not taken place, man could not have required the interposition of a Mediator to reinstate him in the knowledge and favour of God. This fact, in its utmost latitude of application, I admit as readily as J. G. himself, but

Eve, in their primeval state of innocence and purity, possessed a title to eternal life, by direct communion with God, under the influence of the law of nature and if their posterity had all retained their personal innocence in reference to the same law, God would never have condemned any of them to eternal death for the transgression of their first parents. Every impenitent sinner perishes by and for his own voluntary transgression alone.

But J. G. goes on to say, (col. 321,) "Had it been possible that men could be saved by the light of nature, it would have quite superseded the necessity of a written revelation, and of the expiatory atonement of Christ; and we, consequently, should never have heard of the one or the other." This argument is erroneously stated; J. G. should have said, 'Had all mankind lived up to the dictates of the law of nature, then both a written revelation and an expiatory atonement would have been alike unnecessary." And this fact would have admitted of no controversy; but in thus asserting the impossibility of salvation by the light and law of nature, he directly contradicts the testimony of the Holy Spirit by St. Paul; and while in addition to this, he withholds from them the benefits of redemption, he not only seals their damnation, but makes the God of nature and of providence its author, and the God of grace its abettor! He takes it for granted, that because all mankind have corrupted their way before God, therefore it was impossible they could have acted otherwise.

Now, if this impossibility do really exist, it must have its source in one of the following causes, viz. either, 1st, the law was originally unsuitable to the nature for which it was framed, and to which it was given; or, 2dly, that nature was subsequently alienated from the law, and disqualified for its observance. The first of these will not be alleged by J. G., and the second can only be true so far as men wilfully pervert the powers of their own minds; thus giving themselves a moral, when nature never gave them a necessary disqualification for obedience to her own law. For God is the God of nature, and the Father of all human spirits, who even in a heathenish state are styled "his offspring," Acts xvii. 28.

Whatever portion, therefore, God may

not the argument founded upon it. I also readily admit that no heathen who has violated the injunctions of the law of nature, can be reinstated in the divine favour, through any other medium than the mercy of God extended to him by virtue of the great atonement for sin; but this does not prove that such mercy can only flow through the explicit knowledge of its fountain, in the recipient of that mercy. This is the point I oppose.

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| impart of his own moral image to his offspring, we may rest assured that he infuses no opposition to his own law into their minds; and hence I conclude, that there is no impossibility in the human mind becoming subject and obedient to the law of nature, written thereon by the finger of God; nor is there any inconsistency in believing, that the necessary result of that obedience would be a full recovery of the divine image; a freedom from sin, productive of fruit unto holiness, and, in the end, everlasting life. For " the law of God is perfect, converting the soul;" and it is the Holy Spirit who writes this law on the human heart, both of the believer in Christ, where his name is known, and of the upright heathen, where the sound of the gospel has not yet been heard: and God is equally the Father of both; although the faithful Christian stands highest in the divine favour, as he shines brightest in the image of God. (To be concluded in our next.)

REPLY TO STRICTURES ON MALA PROHIBITA, OR LEGAL ENACTMENTS MAKING MORAL RIGHT AND WRONG.—(col.258.)

MR. EDITOR,

SIR,-In troubling you with my sentiments upon the question whether mala prohibita are binding upon conscience, I certainly did not intend to enter into any discussion in support of them. As however, I know that what is unanswered is oftentimes deemed unanswerable, and as having started the question, I may be considered in some measure bound in courtesy to answer the objections which your correspondent, Non- Jurisconsultus, has urged against my views, I shall beg leave to trouble you with a few observations in reply to his strictures.

He has the candour to acknowledge, that if my assertion be correct with respect to an agreement existing among the members of a state, and the terms of which I stated to be, "that in return for the protection afforded by the state, there should be an obedience to its laws on the part of those who are thereby protected," the inference which I drew with respect to the binding nature of its enactments upon the conscience necessarily ensues. The correctness of this assertion, however, he very flatly denies; and as it is a point of some importance in the consideration of the question, I hope I shall be excused if I examine it more fully than I otherwise should do. The basis indeed upon which your correspondent rests his confident

But

denial, is, I conceive as infirm and weak, as it well can be; for it is built upon the supposition that to support my views of the question, it is necessary that the state upon every breach of its laws should put the offender out of its protection. surely this conclusion does not at all follow from my proposition. This would be at once to infer that all offences are of equal magnitude, and ought to be visited with the same punishment; whereas reason, as well as even the dictates of common sense, teach us, that omnia peccata non paria sunt. We have every cause for believing that the judgment of the moral governor of the universe will be proportioned to the nature and degree of the offence committed, and it would exhibit neither wisdom nor equity in human legislation, if it were to depart from this rule in the administration of its justice.

The reason why the state does not put every offender of its laws out of the pale of its protection is, because that in so doing it would manifest no proportion between the penalty and the crime. It is for this cause that a criminal is shielded by the law, for though he may in a particular instance have violated its commands, he still asserts his claims to its protection, upon the principle that he has not violated it so essentially, as that it can refuse its protection, without the exercise of manifest injustice. But supposing that an individual were to assert his independence of the state, that he were to live as an isolated character unconnected with society, and that he were entirely to forego its privileges as well as its duties, there cannot be a doubt, I think, that such a person would not be under the protection of the law. It is upon the answer given to this supposition alone, that the correctness of my assertion must depend, and notwithstanding the ingenuity displayed by NonJurisconsultus in evading the real point in dispute, I do certainly expect that your readers will not be so very easily led astray from it.

I am not fond indeed of enforcing my statements by a reference to authority, or it would be no difficult matter for me to shew, in opposition to the dicta of my opponent, that it has been the opinion of almost all political writers, from Aristotle downwards, that the cause of the original formation of society was mutual protection. It is in fact, I conceive, clear that this protection could not be afforded, unless each member of the state were bound to pay obedience to the laws which were enacted by it. If every individual

101.-VOL. IX.

might contravene its authority, and refuse submission to its enactments, all that anarchy, tumult, and confusion, to prevent which, society was framed, must necessarily

ensue.

Your correspondent will not, I think, deny, that it is the duty of a state to afford protection to every individual member of it, and that unless it do so, the ends for which it was constituted are quite valueless. But how can it perform this duty unless each of its component parts furnish it with the means of doing so? If every person have the power of breaking the law with impunity, if he have the chance of violating its commands without receiving any punishment for his guilt, it must be obvious that the power of any state to give protection must be very considerably abridged. It is worth while, in this discussion, to attend to the advantages and disadvantages which political society occasions.

The most obvious advantage which now presents itself to my mind is, a greater portion of security than we could enjoy in a state of nature. In that state most of those rights which are conferred by society can be but imperfectly understood. No individual so circumstanced can have any right more than another, to claim dominion over a particular portion of property, for there being no rules by which to define the nature of that claim, and the principles upon which it is formed, property must necessarily be subject to the grasp of that character, who is capable of employing the most force and violence. It is on this account, I confess, that I entertain some doubt, whether, in a state of nature, any person can have a right even to the soil which he may have cultivated for his own benefit. True it is, that every one ought to have the fruits of his own personal labour, but yet as the soil upon which that labour is expended, belongs to the general community of mankind, and to each one of them as much as to another, no man can have more right than his fellow to appropriate it for his own benefit. But in society these rights are defined, and the enjoyment of them is secured. We give up, as is universally allowed by political writers, certain privileges existing in a state of nature, in return for the security which the state affords us, in the enjoyment of those artificial rights which we acquire in society. But as this security can alone emanate from the due administration of law, it seems natural to suppose that a submission to its commands must be necessary to enable it to afford its pro

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tection. The state defines and fixes certain individual rights, it gives security in the possession and enjoyment of those rights, but as it is its duty to legislate for the whole community, the stipulation which is entered into must be, that obedience should be paid to those laws which are enacted for the benefit of the whole body of society, in return for the benefits it confers, and which otherwise an individual would not enjoy. To suppose that all the advantage is on one side, that there is no quid pro quo, is perfectly contrary to all our ideas of the principles of justice.

It may be owing to the little perspicuity of intellect with which I am blessed, but I do certainly own that I am unable perfectly to understand the nature of your correspondent's reasoning, in the fourth paragraph of his paper. He has been guilty, I think, of too much refinement and subtlety, to convey his views correctly to the minds of his readers; for though he appears to insinuate that I am wrong in supposing that in the original constitution of society, the state (an aggregate body) and its members enter into a contract with one another, yet in the course of his reasoning he is obliged to make the same supposition. In the second sentence of the paragraph in question, he himself makes use of the term 'members;' but the word 'members' is relative in its meaning, and must ex vi termini have reference to some other person or thing. Again, further down, he actually supposes the existence of a state, and represents it as bartering with its members. The sentence to which I allude, is as follows: 'we will give you sufficient supplies, say the members to the state: do you give us protection.' I should not notice this inconsistency of your correspondent, because I believe it has not much to do with the real merits of the question, but inasmuch as he seems to make it a prominent part of his argument, and as he has accused me of being in error upon the point, it is just that I should be allowed to retort the charge upon my accuser.

But, in fact, it signifies very little whether individuals are represented as entering into an agreement with one another, or with the state; that they make some kind of agreement in some way, the sentence I have quoted of Non-Jurisconsultus sufficiently admits. In that sentence he acknowledges in as full a manner as he well can, that in return for the supplies furnished to the state, it shall administer protection to those who com.

pose it. But, what let me ask, is the specific meaning which is meant to be attached to the term "supplies?” As far as I understand it, it is, that the members should pay obedience to the laws, that they should contribute their proportion of duty, towards enabling the state to give its protection to every one who composes it, that they should furnish it with the capacity of distributing its justice equally amongst every part of it.

The

This leads me to notice the distinction which is drawn by your correspondent on this point. He says "obedience to the laws, instead of being the terms of a state's protection, is the means of protection.' I really was a little surprised to find a distinction of so little importance urged: for though I admit that obedience to the laws is the means of protection, it in no manner follows that it is not at the same time the terms of their protection. If these means, on which your correspondent insists, were always possessed, if every individual would join in upholding the authority of law, and unite in affording it a capacity to dispense justice, then protection need not be claimed. state of things would then be such, that the rights of the weaker member of society would not be infringed upon by the stronger and more designing, because in their disposition to maintain the authority of the law, there would be wanting an inclination to commit those violations of right, which make protection necessary. It is perfectly useless to talk of a security from the commission of oppression and wrong, if there is no one to be found to cause these evils. But the fact is, that laws are framed in order to afford to one individual protection, in the enjoyment of the rights which society confers, from the perpetration of wrong on the part of another.

A state, owing to the very circumstances which cause its formation, naturally takes into consideration, that there will be some characters found who will endeavour to circumvent its authority, some who will endeavour to infringe upon the limits of right and wrong, which it has defined. The terms, therefore, upon which it dispenses justice and administers law, are, that the great body of society shall assist in upholding its authority against individual oppressors. True it certainly is, that it is this assistance from the general bulk of the community, that supplies it with the means of thus acting, but it is equally clear, that the only terms upon which it could be afforded, are, that pro