In what manner, then, could a knowledge of the Divine Justice, or of the demerit of sin in the sight of God, be conveyed to the minds of the Jews?

There is but one way in which any being can manifest to other minds the opposition of his nature to sin. A lawgiver can manifest his views of the demerit of transgression in no other way than by the penalty which he inflicts upon the transgressor. In all beings who have authority to make law for the obedience of others, the conscience is the standard which regulates the amount of punishment that should be inflicted upon the dis obedient; and the measure of punishment which conscience dictates, is just in proportion to the opposition which the lawgiver feels to the transgression of his law; that is, the amount of regard which he has for his own law, will graduate the amount of opposition which he will feel to its transgression. The amount of opposition which any being feels to sin is in proportion to the holiness of that being, and conscience will sanction penalty up to the amount of opposition which he feels to crime.

If the father of a family felt no regard for the law of the sabbath, his conscience would not allow him to punish his children for violating, by folly or labour, a law which he did not himself respect. But a father who felt a sacred regard for the Divine law, would be required by his conscience to cause his children to respect the sabbath, and to punish them if they disobeyed. The penalty which one felt to be wrong, the other would feel to be right, because the disposition of the one towards the law was different from the other.

The principle, then, is manifest, that the more holy and just any being is, the more he is opposed to sin, and the higher penalty will his conscience

sanction as the desert of transgressing the Divine law. Now, God being infinitely holy, he is, there fore, infinitely opposed to sin, and the Divine conscience will enforce penalty accordingly.

This is the foundation of penalty in the Divine mind. The particular point of inquiry is, How could the desert of sin, as it existed in the mind of God, be revealed to the Israelites?

If the penalty inflicted is sanctioned by the con science of the lawgiver, it follows, as has been shown, that the opposition of his nature to the crime is in exact proportion to the penalty which he inflicts upon the criminal. Penalty, therefore, inflicted upon the transgressor, is the only way by which the standard of justice, as it exists in the mind of God, could be revealed to men.

The truth of this principle may be made apparent by illustration. Suppose a father were to express his will in relation to the government of his family, and the regulations were no sooner made, than some of his children should resist his authority, and disobey his commands. Now, suppose the father should not punish the offenders, but treat them as he did his obedient children. By so doing he would encourage the disobedientdiscourage the obedient-destroy his own authority, and make the impression upon the minds of all his children that he had no regard for the regulations which he had himself made. And, further, if these regulations were for the general good of the family, by not maintaining them, he would convince the obedient that he did not regard their best interests, but was the friend of the rebellious. And if he were to punish for the transgression but lightly, they would suppose that he estimated but lightly a breach of his commands, and they could not, from the constitution of their minds, suppose

otherwise. But if the father, when one of the children transgressed, should punish him and exclude him from favour till he submitted to his authority, and acknowledged with a penitent spirit his offence, then the household would be convinced that the father's will was imperative, and that the only alternative presented to them was affectionate submission, or exclusion from the society of their father and his obedient children. Thus the amount of the father's regard for his law, his interest in the well-being of his obedient children, and the opposition of his nature to disobedience, would be graduated in every child's mind by the penalty which he inflicted for the transgression of his commands.

So in the case of an absolute lawgiver: his hostility to crime could be known only by the penalty which he inflicted upon the criminal. If, for the crime of theft, he were to punish the offender only by the imposition of a trifling fine, the impression would be made upon every mind that he did not, at heart, feel much hostility to the crime of larceny. If he had the power, and did not punish crime at all, he would thus reveal to the whole nation that he was in league with criminals, and himself a criminal at heart.

So in relation to murder, if he were to let the culprit go free, or inflict upon him but a slight penalty, he would thus show that his heart was tainted with guilt, and that there was no safety for good men under his government. But should he fix a penalty to transgression, declare it to all his subjects, and visit every criminal with punishment in proportion to his guilt, he would show to the world that he regarded the law, and was opposed directly and for ever to its transgression.

In like manner, and in no other way, could God

manifest to men his infinite justice and his regard for the laws of his kingdom. Did he punish for sin with but a slight penalty, the whole universe of mind would have good reason to believe that the God of heaven was but little opposed to sin. Did he punish it with the highest degree of penalty, it would be evidence to the universe that his nature was in the highest degree opposed to sin and attached to holiness.

Now, whatever may be said in relation to the application of these principles to future rewards and punishments, one thing will be apparent to all, which is all that the present argument requires to be admitted, that is the mind of man would receive an idea of the amount of God's opposition to sin, only by the amount of penalty which he inflicted upon the sinner.

Having ascertained these premises, we return to the inquiry, How could the demerit of sin in the sight of God, or the idea of God's attribute of justice, be conveyed to the minds of the Jews?

The people had now, in a good degree, a know ledge of what sin was. In addition to the light of natural conscience, which might guide them to some extent in relation to their duties to each other, they had the moral law, with the com mentary of Moses, defining its precepts, and applying them to the conduct of life. Their minds were thus enlightened in relation to sin in the following particulars. First, those acts which were a transgression of the positive precepts of the law. Second, omissions of duties enjoined in the law; and, Third, many acts which the spirit of the law would condemn, but which might not be defined in any particular precept, would now be noticed by enlightened conscience, as sin against Jehovah, their holy benefactor, and the giver of the law.

Having thus been taught what was sin of commission and omission, one obvious design of the institution of sacrifices,* and one which has been perceived and understood, both by the Jews and Gentiles, was to convey to the mind the just demerit and proper penalty of sin.

There were three classes of sacrifices in the old dispensation in which death was inflicted. The first, which Gentiles, as well as Jews were permitted to offer, was the holocaust, or whole burntoffering, which was entirely consumed by fire Sacrifices of this description seem to have been offered from the earliest ages. They were offered, as the best informed think, as an acknowledgment of, and atonement for, general sinfulness of life. They seem to have had reference to the fact, of which every man is conscious, that he often violates known duty, and does many things which the light of nature and conscience teaches him not to do.

After the whole burnt-offering, was the sin-offer ing, sacrificed for an atonement, when the individual had transgressed any specific precept of the moral law.

The trespass-offering differed only from the sinoffering, as the learned suppose, in this, that it was a sacrifice for sins of omission, or for the non-per formance of duty, while the sin-offering was made for a violation of the specific precepts of the moral law. Whether the design of the different classes of sacrifices was as above specified or not, is not

The question whether the sacrifices, and the particular regulations concerning them, were of Divine origin, does not affect the argument. Whether they were originally instituted by Divine command, or whether Moses, acting under Divine guidance, modified an existing institution and adapted it to the Divine purposes, both the design, and the end accomplished, would be the same. There are good reasons, however, for the opinion, that sacrifices for sin were of Divine appointment.