vention, in this their judgment, avoided with great wisdom the extremes, into which the theories of fome zealous republicans would have led them. They held that this mifconduct of king James amounted to an endeavour to fubvert the conftitution, and not to an actual fubverfion, or total diffolution of the government. They, therefore, very prudently voted it to amount to no more, than an abdication of the government, and a confequent vacancy of the throne. The government was allowed to subsist, though the executive magistrate was gone; and the kingly office to remain, though James was no longer king. Thus the conftitution was kept entire; which, upon every found principle of government muft otherwife have fallen to pieces, had fo principal and constituent a part as the royal authority been abolished, or even fufpended.

Hence it is easy to collect, that the title to the crown is at prefent hereditary, though not quite fo abfolutely hereditary as formerly; and the common ftock or ancestor, from whom the defcent must be derived, is alfo different. Formerly the common ftock was king Egbert; then William the Conqueror; afterwards, in James the Firft's time, the two common ftocks united, and fo continued till the vacancy in the throne in 1688. Now it is the N 2

princefs

princefs Sophia, in whom the inheritance was vested by the new king and parliament. Formerly the descent was abfolute, and the crown went to the next heir without any restriction. But now, upon the new settlement, the inheritance is conditional; being limited to fuch defcendants of the princess Sophia, as are proteftant members of the church of England, and are married to none put proteftants.

In this due medium, confifts the true conftitutional notion of the right of fucceffion to the imperial crown of these kingdoms. Both, the extremes, between which it steers, have been thought to be destructive of thofe ends, for which focieties were formed, and are kept on foot. Where the magistrate, upon every fucceffion, is elected by the people, and may, by the exprefs provision of the law, be depofed by his fubjects, this may found like the perfection of liberty, and look well enough when delineated on paper; but in practice will be ever found extremely difficult. And, on the other hand, divine indefeasible hereditary right, when coupled with the doctrine of unlimited paffive obedience, is furely, of all conftitutions, the most flavish and dreadful. But when fuch an hereditary right, as our laws have created and vefted in the royal stock, is closely interwoven with those liber

ties, which are equally the inheritance of the fubject, this union will form a constitution, in theory the most beautiful of any, in practice the most approved, and, in all probability, will prove in duration the most permanent.

This conftitution it is the duty of every Britain to understand, to revere, and to defend.

CHAP. CXI.

ON THE POWER OF THE BRITISH MONARCH.

THE king of Great Britain, notwithstanding the limitation of the power of the crown, is one of the greatest monarchs reigning over a free people. His perfon is facred in the eye of the law, which makes it high treason fo much as to imagine, or intend his death. Neither can he, in himfelf, be deemed guilty of any crime, the law taking no cognifance of his actions, but only in the perfons of his minifters, if they infringe the laws of the land.

As to his power, it is very great, though he has no right to extend his prerogative, beyond the ancient

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ancient limits, or the boundaries prescribed by the conftitution. He can make no new laws, nor raise any new taxes, nor act in opposition to any of the laws. But he can make war or peace; fend and receive ambassadors; make treaties of league and commerce; levy armies, and fit out fleets, for the defence of his kingdom, the annoyance of his enemies, or the fuppreffion of rebellions; grant commiffions to his officers, both by fea and land, or revoke them at pleasure; fummon the parliament to meet, and, when met, adjourn, prorogue, or diffolve it; refuse his affent to any bill, though it has paffed both houses; which, confequently, by fuch a refufal, has no more force, than if it had never been moved. This prerogative, however, the kings of England have very seldom ventured to exercise.

He poffeffeth also the right of chufing his own council; of nominating all the great officers of state, of the houshold, and of the church; and, in fine, is the fountain of honour, from whom all degrees of nobility and knighthood are derived. Such is the dignity and power of a king of Great Britain.

С.НАР.

CHA P. CXII.

OF THE PARLIAMENT.

PARLIAMENTS, or general councils, in fome shape, are of as high antiquity as the Saxon government in this island, and coeval with the kingdom itself. Blackftone, in his valuable Commentaries, fays, "It is generally agreed, that, in the main, the conftitution of parliament, as it now ftands, was marked out fo long ago as the 17th year of the reign of king John, A. D. 1215. In the Great Charter, granted by that prince, he promises to summon all archbishops, bishops, abbots, lords, and greater barons, perfonally; and all other tenants, under the crown, by the sheriff and bailiffs, to meet at a certain place, within forty days notice, to affefs aids and fupplies when neceffary. And this conftitution hath fubfifted, in fact, at least from the year 1266, in the reign of Henry III. There are still extant writs of that date to fummon knights, citizens, and burgeffes to parliament.",

The parliament is assembled by the king's writs, and its fitting must not be intermitted above three years. Its conftituent parts are, the king, fitting there in his royal political capacity, and the three eftates

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