picture of the first; but that will ferve as a fpecimen of the mafterly manner in which thofe three forms of artificial fociety are delineated.

"The fimpleft form of government is defpotifm, where all the inferior orbs of power are moved merely by the will of the Supreme, and all that are fubjected to them, directed in the fame manner, merely by the occafional will of the magiftrate. This form, as it is the most fimple, fo it is infinitely the most general. Scarce any part of the world is exempted from its power: and in thofe few places where men enjoy what they call liberty, it is continually in a tottering fituation, and makes greater and greater ftrides to that gulph of defpotifm which at last fwallows up every fpecies of government. This manner of ruling, being directed merely by the will of the weakest and generally the worst man in the fociety, becomes the most foolish and capricious thing, at the fame time that it is the most terrible and deftructive that well can be conceived. In a defpotifm the principal finds, that, let the want, mifery, and indigence of his subjects be what they will, he can yet poffefs abundantly of every thing to gratify his moft infatiable wishes. He does more. He finds that these gratifications increase in proportion to the wretchedness and flavery of his fubjects. Thus encouraged both by paffion and interest to trample on the public welfare, and by his ftation placed above both shame and fear, he proceeds to the most horrid and shocking outrages upon mankind. Their perfons become victims of his fufpicions. The flightest displeasure is death; and a disagreeable afpect is often as great a crime as high treason. In the court of NERO, a perfon of learning, of unquestioned merit, and of unfufpected loyalty, was put to death for no other reason than that he had a pedantic countenance which difpleafed the emperor. This very moniter of mankind appeared in the beginning of his

reign to be a perfon of virtue. Many of the greatest tyrants on the records of hiftory have begun their reigns in their fairest manner. But the truth is, this unnatural power corrupts both the heart and the understanding. And to prevent the least hope of amendment, a king is ever surrounded by a crowd of infamous flatterers, who find their account in keeping him from the leaft light of reason, till all ideas of rectitude and justice are utterly erased from his mind. When ALEXANDER had in his fury inhumanly butchered one of his best friends and bravest captains, on the return of reafon he began to conceive an horror fuitable to the guilt of fuch a murder. In this juncture, his council came to his affiftance. But what did his council? They found him out a philosopher who gave him comfort. And in what manner did this philofopher comfort him for the lofs of fuch a man, and heal his confcience, flagrant with the finart of fuch a crime? You have the matter at length in PLUTARCH. He told him, that let a fovereign do what he will, all his actions are just and lawful, because they are his. The palaces of all princes abound with fuch courtly philofophers. The confequence was such as might be expected. He grew every day a monster more abandoned to unnatural luft, to debauchery, to drunkenness, and to murder. And yet this was originally a great man, of uncommon capacity, and a strong propenfity to virtue. But unbounded power proceeds step by step, until it has eradicated every laudable principle. It has been remarked, that there is no prince fo bad, whofe favorites and minifters are not worfe. There is hardly any prince without a favorite, by whom he is governed in as arbitrary a manner as he governs the wretches fubjected to him. Here the tyranny is doubled. There are two courts, and two interefts; both very different from the interefts of the people.

The favorite knows that the regard of a tyrant is as inconftant and capricious as that of a woman; and concluding his time to be fhort, he makes hafte to fill up the measure of his iniquity, in rapine, in luxury, and in revenge. Every avenue to the throne is fhut up. He oppreffes and ruins the people, while he perfuades the prince, that thofe murmurs raised by his own oppreffion are the effects of difaffection to the prince's government. Then is the natural violence of defpotism inflamed and aggravated by hatred and revenge. To deferve well of the fate is a crime against the prince. To be popular, and to be a traitor, are confidered as fynonymous terms. Even virtue is dangerous, as an afpiring quality, that claims an efteem by itself, and independent of the countenance of the court. What has been faid of the chief, is true of the inferior officers of this fpecies of government, each in his province exercifing the fame tyranny, and grinding the people by an oppreffion, the more feverely felt, as it is near them, and exercised by base and subordinate perfons. For the gross of the people,--they are confidered as a mere herd of cattle, [a milder phrase than the fwinish multitude] and really in a little time become no better: all principle of honeft pride,---all fenfe of the dignity of their nature is loft in their flavery. The day, fays HOMER, which makes a man a flave, takes away half his worth; and in fact, he lofes every impulfe, but that low and bafe one of fear.---In this kind of government, human nature is not only abused and infulted, but it is actuctally degraded and funk into a fpecies of brutality. The confideration of this made Mr. LOCKE fay, with great juftice, that a government of this kind was worfe than anarchy. Here then we have the acknowledgment of a great philofopher, that an irregular state of nature is preferable to fuch a government: we have the confent of all fenfible and generous men, who carry

it yet further, and avow that death itself is preferable: and yet this fpecies of government, so justly condemned, and fo generally detefted, is what infinitely the greater part of mankind groan under, and have groaned under from the beginning. So that by fure and uncontested principles, the greatest part of the governments on earth must be concluded tyrannies, impoftures, violations of the natural rights of mankind, and worse than the most diforderly anarchy."

name,

The abuses of aristocracy, and of democracy, are described with equal force. The former is faid to differ from a defpotism but in the people being, to all intents and purposes, as much flaves, when twenty, independent of them, govern, as when but one domineers. The tyranny is even more felt, as every individual of the nobles has the haughtiness of a fultan :---the people are more miserable, as they seem on the verge of liberty, from which they are for ever debarred:---this fallacious idea of liberty, while it presents a vain shadow of happiness to the subject, binds fafter the chains of his fubjection. What is left undone by the natural avarice and pride of those who are raised above the others is completed by their suspicion, and their dread of lofing an authority, which has no fupport in the common utility of the nation. Democracy holds out the appearance of greater advantages, because the people there make their own laws, tranfact the greater part of public business in their own perfons, and can call their officers to account for any breach of truft, or failure of duty. But if we refer to the histories of the most celebrated republics, we shall find every one of them to be a tiffue of rashness, folly, ingratitude, injuftice, tumult, violence, and tyranny.

In reply to a very prevailing opinion, that the errors of the feveral fimple modes of government may be corrected by a mix

ture of all of them, and a proper balance of their respective powers, it is obferved, first, that the junction of regal, ariftocratic, and popular power would form a very complex, nice, and intricate machine; which, being compofed of fuch a variety of parts, with fuch oppofite tendencies and movements, must be liable to diforder from every accident. A fyftem of this kind would give rife to frequent cabals, tumults, and revolutions. Secondly, the impoffibility of determining the distinct rights of the feveral constituent parts would prove a new and conftant fource of debate and confution. Inftead of carrying on the bufinefs of government, the queftion would be, who had a right to exercise this or that function of it. And, during fuch contests, all forts of villainy in office would remain unpunished,---the greatest frauds and robberies in the public revenues would remain unpunished,---and abuses grow by time and impunity into customs, until they prescribed against the laws, and became too inveterate often to admit a cure, or such only as might be as bad as the disease. "Thirdly," continues our plaufible declaimer," the feveral parts of this fpecies of government, though united, preferve the spirit which each form has feparately. Kings are ambitious; the nobility haughty; and the populace tumultuous and ungovernable. Each party, however in appearance peaceable, carries on a defign upon the others; and it is owing to this, that in all questions, whether concerning foreign or domeftic affairs, the whole generally turns more upon fome party-matter than upon the nature of the thing itfelf; whether fuch a step will diminish or augment the power of the crown, or how far the privileges of the fubject are like to be extended or restricted by it. And thefe queftions are conftantly refolved, without any confideration of the merits of the caufe, merely as the parties who uphold thefe jarring interefts may chance to prevail;

and