are, by the natural and unalterable state of things, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs, on which others build their opinions.*

But, men are evermore obstinate in what they have once assumed: whether it be a love of that which brought the first light and information into their minds; or whether, content with any appearance of knowledge, right or wrong, when they have once gained it, they hold it fast, and not unfrequently with an inveterate tenacity. Thus, says the celebrated philosopher I have just quoted, they are often as fond of their first conceptions as of their first born, and will by no means recede from the judgment they have once made. This, however, is a fault in the conduct of the understanding, and. not in the principle of verity; since this firmness, or rather obstinacy of the mind, is not from a resolute adherence to truth, but from a tame submission to prejudice.

Truth can only get possession of our minds by the irresistible light of self-evidence, or by the force of demonstration. It can receive no validity from our passions, nor should it receive

* Locke.

any

any tincture from our prejudices. But, as we are to deal with one another, and live in community, how clear in its advantage is the law of universal morality! If this man were to act by one law, and that man by another, how easy it is to see, that endless clashings and mischiefs would arise. No trial can be had, nor can a judge determine in any cause, but upon a common law, which parties at both sides can understand, and to which they submit by agreement. The sentiments and reasonings of mankind are invariably different; in some they are clear and strong, in others, weak and ill formed; and on this account they are forced to form themselves into societies, and to determine what shall be their common law.

The individual, then, may be found sometimes to say one thing, while the public say another. But private reason can never have a claim to legislative wisdom. No faculty or pretension in an individual, can authorise him, singly, to become lawgiver to another. We know enough, indeed, to direct us in the management of ourselves, although there be secrets within us, which it is as impossible for us to comprehend, as it is for a circle to encompass itself. And therefore, it has always appeared to

be

be a good observation of Bruyere, that however dissatisfied a man may be with his immediate portion of riches, power, or other good things, he yet is always thoroughly well satisfied with the stock of sense and understanding with which he hath been gifted.

But to return to Mr. Hume. In the following essays, says he, I have endeavoured to throw light upon some subjects, from which uncertainty had hitherto deterred the wise, and obscurity the ignorant. I propose to unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy, by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty. And, it will be happy, if reasoning in this easy manner, "I can undermine the foundation of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have served hitherto only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error."* Observe the consequence, which incredulity confers. To refuse credit, even for the instant, induces an appearance of superiority; and nothing is so cheaply gained; for it is only withdrawing attention from evidence, and declining the fatigue of comparing probabilities.-

VOL. VI.

Philosoph. Essays.

D

+ Johnson.

Το

To endeavour to answer declamation by ar gument, is labouring to lay hold on that which has nothing real in it, and is literally wasting strength upon unembodied air. Formerly it was the business of philosophers, to give us a due veneration for the dignity of human nature; they described it as it really was, beneficent, brave, and a lover of its species. But, all this we are now given to understand, is chimerical; that the notion was invented by crafty knaves, to make dupes of the young, the vain, and the ambitious; that nature has confined us to the all sufficient sphere of self love; and that our most pompous boasts of a generous disinterestedness, are but the artful disguises of Let egotism have its votaries. But, what spirited or honourable man would have it said of him, "Ortus erat e salice, non e quercu?" You would not, I am certain.

that passion.

That constitution must be depraved, which converts aliment into poison; and the eye cannot be sound which day light dazzles into blindness. Not less depraved, nor less unsound, must that understanding be, which perverts knowledge into unbelief, and becomes ignorant of God, in proportion as the world becomes enlightened

lightened with an insight into his works. It is a shorter way, indeed, as I have said, to a great reputation, to object than to defend; to pull down, than to set up. But, tell me, how can a good man, in the sober hours of reflection, answer it to his conscience to have rendered contemptible a system, wnich gives to virtue its sweetest hopes, to impenitent vice its greatest fears, and to true penitence its best consolation; which restrains even the least approaches to guilt, and yet makes those allowances for the infirmities of our nature, which the Stoic pride denied to it, but which its real imperfection, and the goodness of its Creator require? To endeavour thus to shake the foundations, on which I cannot but conceive the whole moral world, and the great fabric of social happiness entirely rests, is a mischief levelled at human society, which no scepticism can warrant, and for which no ability can apologize.*

Even, as I have frequently repeated, supposing the evidences of the Christian religion doubtful, what right has any individual to rob a whole people of its happiness? This would be a new species of tyranny. Can we then, in fact, in any manner respect that spirit of philosophizing,