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Attention of the Reader to what I have written. I am ready to own, that in this Matter I depend on the Reader's Courtesy. But only thus far I may have some Colour for putting in a Claim; that if the Reader be disposed to pass his Cenfure on what I have written, I may be fully and patiently heard, and well attended to, before i am condemned. However, this is what I would humbly ask of my Readers, together with the Prayers of all fincere Lovers of Truth, that I may have much of that Spirit which Christ promised his Disciples, which guides into all Truth; and that the blessed and powerful Influences of this Spirit would make Truth victorious in the World.

A Ge

A

General TABLE

OF THE

CONTENTS.

PART 1.

Wherein are explain'd various Terms and Things belong
ing to the Subject of the ensuing Difcourse.

S

ECT. I. Concerning the Nature of the Will.

Pag. 1, &c.
SECT. II. Concerning the Determination of the Will. 6
SECT. III. Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Necef-
fity, Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence. 18
SECT. IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Ne-
ceffity and Inability.

28

SECT. V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of

moral Agency.

38

PART
PART II.

Wherein it is confidered, Whether there is, or can be
any fuch Sort of FREEDOM OF WILL, as that wherein
Arminians place the Effence of the Liberty of all moral
Agents; and whether any such Thing ever was, or can
be conceived of.

SE

ECT. I. Shewing the manifest Inconsistence of the
Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, confifting in
the Will's felf-determining Power.

Pag. 44

SECT. II. Several supposed Ways of evading the foregoing
Reasoning confidered.

50

SECT. III. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition
in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its
Exiftence,

57

66

SECT. IV. Whether Volition can arife without a Cause,
thro' the Activity of the Nature of the Soul.
SECT. V. Shewing that if the Things afferted in these
Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are alto-
gether Impertinent, and can't help the Caufe of Armi
nian Liberty; and how this being the State of the Cafe,
Arminian Writers are obliged to talk inconfiflently.
SECT. VI. Concerning the Will's determining in Things
which are perfectly indifferent, in the View of the

72

Mind.

78

SECT. VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will
confifting in Indifference.

88

SECT. VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will,
as oppofite to all Neceffity.

102

107

SECT. IX. Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will
with the Dictates of the Understanding.
SECT. X. Volition neceffarily connected with the Influ-
ence of Motives; with particular Observations on the
great Inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's Assertions and Rea
fonings, about the Freedom of the Will.

117

SECT. XI. The Evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of

the Volitions of moral Agents.

137

SECT. XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future Vo-
litions of moral Agents, inconsistent with such a Con-

tingence of those Volitions, as is without all Neceffity.

164

And

And infers a Neceffity of Volition, as much as an abfo-

lute Decree.

171

SECT. XIII. Whether we suppose the Volitions of moral
Agents to be connected with any Thing antecedent, or
not, yet they must be necessary, in such a Senfe, as to
overthrow Arminian Liberty.

PART III.

183

Wherein is inquired, Whether any such Liberty of Will
as Arminians hold, be neceffary to moral Agency, Vir-
tue and Vice, Praise and Difpraise, &c.

S

ECT. I. God's moral Excellency necessary, yet vir-
tuous and Praiseworthy.

Pag. 188

SECT. II. The Acts of the Will of the human Soul of
JESUS CHRIST neceffarily holy, yet virtuous, praise-worthy,

rewardable, &c.

194

222

SECT. III. The Case of fuch as are given up of God to Sin,
and of fallen Men in general, proves moral Neceffity
and Inability to be confiffent with Blame-worthiness. 213
SECT. IV. Command, and Obligation to Obedience, con-
fiftent with moral Inability to obey.
SECT. V. That Sincerity of Defires and Endeavours,
which is supposed to excufe in the Non-performance of
Things in themselves good, particularly confidered. 237
SECT. VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to
Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it and all, either
virtuous or vicious Habits or Inclinations, inconsistent
with Arminian Notions of Liberty, and moral Agency.

249

SECT. VII. Arminian Notions of moral Agency incon-
fiftent with all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in
either virtuous or vicious Actions.

260

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Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reasonings of Armi-
nians, in Support and Defence of their Notions of Li-
berty, moral Agency, &c. and against the opposite
Doctrine, are confidered.

S

ECT. I. The Effence of the Virtue and Vice of the
Dispositions of the Heart, and Acts of the Will,

lies not in their Causes, but their Nature.

269
SECT.

SECT. II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphy-
fical Notion of Action and Agency, which seems to be
generally entertain'd by the Defenders of the foremen-
tion'd Notions of Liberty, moral Agency, &c.
SECT. III. The Reasons why fome think it contrary to
common Sense, to suppose Things which are neceffary, to
be worthy of either Praise or Blame.

278

288

SECT. IV. It is agreeable to common Sense, and the natural
Notions of Mankind, to suppose moral Neceffity to be
confiftent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punish-

ment.

297
SECT, V. Concerning those Objections, That this Scheme
of Neceffity renders all Means and Endeavours for the
avoiding of Sin or the obtaining Virtue and Holiness,
vain and to no Purpose; and that it makes Men no
more than mere Machines, in Affairs of Morality and
Religion.

309

SECT. VI. Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine
which has been maintain'd, That it agrees with the
Stoical Doctrine of Fåte, and the Opinion of Mr. Hobbes.

319

SECT. VII. Concerning the Neceffity of the divine Will.

323

SECT. VIII. Some further Objections against the moral

Neceffity of GOD's Volitions, considered.

335

SECT. IX. Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine
which has been maintain'd, That it makes God the
Author of Sin.

354

SECT. X. Concerning Sin's first Entrance into the World.

376

SECT, XI. Of a supposed Inconsistence of these Principles

with GOD'S moral Character.

379

SECT. XII. Of a supposed Tendency of these Principles
to Atheism, and Licentiousness.

385

SECT. XIII. Concerning that Objection against the Rea-

soning by which the Calvinistic Doctrine is supported,

That it is metaphysical and abftrufe.

390

The CONCLUSION.

WH

HAT Treatment this Discourse may probably meet
with from fome Persons.

400

Confequences concerning several Calvinistic Doctrines; such

as an univerfal, decisive Providence.

402

The

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