of this country have so long entertained, and done so much to abolish. General amiableness of character, too, must be referred to the same source. Yet have there been many men possessed of this last attribute who have never had their eyes opened to the moral iniquity of the human, or rather the inhuman, traffic. Indeed, a great master *, in lately describing the character of Mr. Windham, has given us one specimen of this contrariety of character, as we may call it, too remarkable to be passed over in illustration. ." What sound or rational view," says Lord Brougham, "could justify his hostility to all voluntary defence, his reprobation of all expression of public gratitude to the services of our soldiers and sailors, his unqualified defence of bull-baiting, his resistance of all checks upon cruelty upon the brute creation ?"-" He defended the slave-trade"-"he resisted all mitigation of our criminal law" "and he opposed every project for educating the people." We know how some would explain this character phrenologically, by assuming the coexistence of other feelings along with that of Benevolence; and that explanation is prooably correct. But, on the other hand, is it not surprising that one of whom Lord Brougham could write in the following strain, should not have had those animal feelings to which we now refer, if not in moderate endowment, at least, far from leading him, in conjunction with the fine moral organs which he must have had, to such outre expression of the animal propensities as these. "It required all men's tenderness," Lord Brougham continues, "towards undoubted sincerity and clear disinterestedness, to think charitably of such pernicious heresies in such a man. It demanded all this charity, and all this faith, in the spotless honour of his character, to believe that such opinions could really be the convictions of a mind like his. It was the greatest tribute which could be paid to his sterling merit, his fine parts, his rare accomplishments, that in spite of such wild aberrations he was admired and beloved." (Edin. Rev., No. 137., pp. 235, 236.) Again, what is the general tendency of mind arising from a large development of Love of Approbation? Is it not a love of publicity, -a desire of shining out in person before the world? Now we are told, on the best authority, that in the head of Jeremy Bentham "Love of Approbation is enormous," and it is but right to add, that "the influence of great Love of Approbation is strongly displayed in some of Bentham's works." (Phren. Jour., Vol. I., N. S., p. 439.) Yet how strange a manifestation, compared with

Let young phrenologists beware of trusting Lord Brougham's mental portraits. They are not even meant to be true sketches; and if the wish existed, Lord Brougham's other qualities would not suffice for the object. — Elitor.

what most people would expect, did he exhibit of so strong a feeling! He shut himself up from the world, and wrote in a language which he knew that few could understand, and with the certain knowledge, that the praises of men, so dear to his heart, would never, or at best but faintly, reach his living ear! So difficult is it to judge correctly of the turn and tendency which men's minds may acquire.

Of what use then, some one will ask, is Phrenology, or is it of any use at all? But why should we answer a question that has been asked and answered so often and long ago? Is it not something to have been set upon the right road which must, in the end, lead to perfect knowledge of mind- of man? Is it not something to have gained at last the elements of a science which leads to a clearer perception of human nature, and to a juster appreciation of human necessities and wants, than have yet entered into the thoughts of philosophers, or statesmen, or divines? We admit that nothing positive has been added to the human mind. Phrenology has inserted no new faculty; it has given no new feeling. What it has given, or is at least capable of giving, is a perfect knowledge of all those faculties and feelings which men recognise as integral parts of our common nature. To those who know how long, and with what ill success, the philosophers and schoolmen of old laboured to get this, such an acquisition will appear to be far from unimportant. To have obtained a knowledge of the foundations in nature upon which the natural wants and necessities of human society are based, to have obtained a knowledge of the extent and limits which must henceforth be set to mind in all its grades of manifestations, to have obtained a knowledge of man's capacities, his capacities for evil and for good, no less than what he is unfit for,quid valeant humeri, quid ferre recusent,— is surely no small addition to the stock of human knowledge.

Of the many ways in which this knowledge falls to benefit mankind, the application of it in the choice of legislators, and through them to the work of legislation, is the most extensive, and calculated to be the most beneficial.

In the progress of these remarks we would now attempt to sketch the character and qualifications of a legislator.

A legislator is called upon to give laws, not only to his contemporaries, but also to posterity-laws which must affect not only his own country and kindred, but in general all nations. more or less. It is his duty, not simply to erect a standard of perfection in his own mind, to which the world ought instantly to be assimilated, as Plato and Aristotle and others have represented, nor to accept of "the good old paths" of his fathers, as the Rubicon of social advancement beyond which it would

be impious to go, but rather to "store his mind with the exquisite learning of former ages," "and so imbue himself with the sound philosophy of later days," so to study the varying opinions, manners, and political condition of mankind, that he may be able to apply the great principles of natural justice and jurisprudence, first, as they ought to be applied in legislating for mankind; and secondly, in so far as it would be wise or beneficial to apply them in his own age and nation. Why should we now enumerate or expatiate upon the various endowments, mental and moral, which would find scope and employment in this office? What faculty or feeling is there which would not be of use? Having intellect to see the good, the legislator should have feelings ever prompting him to pursue it. Having intrepidity of mind to urge himself onward in the paths of moral rectitude, and to repel aggression on the part of others, he should be endowed with a firmness of purpose not to be diverted from the great object which should be first in his wishes, the elevating of his fellow countrymen and his fellow creatures, even by their own ingratitude. The feeling of firmness is one which derives all its claims to regard from the company in which it is associated. With weak intellectual powers, and but moderately developed moral organs, it produces the bigot, who clings to instilled opinions, or adheres to habits in which he has been trained, long after their absurdity and bad tendency have been exposed. Yet it is a feeling which, united with a better understanding and higher feelings, is of the utmost value, and to a legislator it is indispensable. Well and truly has Horace described its influence, in union with conscientiousness, on the Justum et tenacem propositi virum-the man not to be driven from his purpose by the violence of a mob, nor the frowns of a tyrant. Benevolence, too, universal sympathy a sympathy not narrowed by those blasting influences, which often confine the exertions of really benevolent men to persons of their own caste, or creed, or clime, must enter largely into the character of a legislator; and all that he says and does should be beautified and brightened by the influence of Ideality and Hope. In addition to this, if we should say of him who ought to be placed in this conspicuous situation by the suffrages of his fellow citizens, that he should be a man of an enlarged mind, destitute of prejudice, open to conviction, — of great knowledge, and of "that freedom, that disposition and those habits that may enable him to attain any part of knowledge he shall apply himself to or stand in need of," we would

Brougham's inaugural address to the students of Glasgow college.

only be speaking in a vague and general language, to which most educated men would be ready to give assent. But if we shall proceed to say that the Legislator should be one who has studied the philosophy of the human mind, so as to make himself acquainted with those wants of society which are natural and should be gratified, as well as those which are factitious, superinduced in communities only by disregarding the constitution of nature, and which ought therefore to be discouraged; that he should know that the moral and intellectual parts of human nature, so much weaker in force than the more animal, though not less necessary, parts of the constitution, require to be encouraged and drawn out by exercise and education; while, on the other hand, he should know that punishment can do but little to abolish or abate the evil tendencies of our nature, and that for this purpose a course of moral treatment can alone ever be effectual; - that he should be one having confidence in the capacity of human affairs for indefinite improvement, as well as their natural tendency to improve; -that he should be one having an enlightened confidence in the wisdom and goodness of God's moral government of the world, and be disposed at all times to trust to the simplicity of nature, and natural causes, rather than the wisdom or the wiles of cabinets; if we should say all this of him who would be called upon by a free people at once to obey and govern them, or if using fewer words, but words that express it all, we should say of him that he should be a PHRENOLOGIST, in all the depth, and length, and breadth of that important designation, we doubt much whether we should be equally well understood, and we doubt more, whether, being understood, our views would be much or generally relished. This notwithstanding, we repeat the expression and adhere to it, A LEGISLATOR SHOULD BE A PHRENOLOgist.

"In order to lay a solid foundation for the science of Politics," says Mr. Dugald Stuart, "the first step ought to be, to ascertain that form of society which is perfectly agreeable to nature and to justice, and what are the principles of legislation necessary for maintaining it." * It is scarcely too much to say that this first step has never yet been taken - taken at least by those who could introduce it into the practice of legislation, and on a scale commensurate with its dignity and importance. The reason for this will probably be found to be, that the unquestionable means of ascertaining "that form of society, which is perfectly agreeable to nature and to justice," have never yet been presented to the world. Now, it is just in this very way

* Elem. of the Phil. of the Human Mind, 3d ed. vol. i. p. 250.

that Phrenology is destined to benefit the world; and it is in this respect that Phrenology derives all its value and preeminence over other systems of philosophy. We have now recognised ultimate principles, to which all may and must refer as data on which all their reasonings are founded. "While the philosophy of mind continued a purely abstract theory," says Mr. Combe, "moralists and divines enjoyed an unlimited privilege, of which they largely availed themselves, of ascribing or denying to human nature whatever qualities best suited their several systems; but now the case is different. Organs cannot be added to or displaced from the brain, by the fancy or the logic of contending disputants or sects; and philosophers and divines must henceforth study human nature, as it exists, and accommodate their views to its actual qualities and relations."* It is from these last considerations, more than the efforts and influence of individual genius, that we would rest our hopes of the world's ultimate improvement. What genius and the good intentions of some have been able to do, the world has already seen, and there does not appear to be any sufficient reason for believing that the past efforts of genius are at all likely to be eclipsed by the splendour of those which are to follow. But it yet remains to be seen how far the human race may be morally elevated and refined by a universal diffusion of knowledge bearing upon the constitution of mind and all the feelings of humanity. It would be doing an injustice, not to acknowledge that philosophers even heretofore have not been averse from admitting the existence of such a feeling as benevolence, and there have not been wanting those who have borne honourable testimony to the existence of a sense of justice and other of the higher attributes of mind. But there is an advantage known only to those who have felt it, in possessing a knowledge of the existence of these high feelings certified, as one might say, by the hand of nature. Inductive reasoning may indeed bring conviction of the general truth of Phrenology, to the mind of a man who has formed opinions at variance with those consequences which ought to follow from a conviction and thorough understanding of that science, and these last opinions he may continue to hold while he thinks himself a phrenologist, but we believe it to be morally impossible for a man who not only sees the truth of Phrenology, but who also feels it, and makes it the rule of his conduct and the guide of his life, one who is accustomed to trace it out in all its consequences as affecting the moral constitution of man, not to have an instantaneous conviction on many of those subjects

Constitution of Man, Peop. ed. p. 5. col. 2.