given up, and the faculties were called Acquisitiveness, Destructiveness, and Secretiveness; and poetry and religion were changed for Ideality and Veneration.

This might be made more striking to the tyro in Phrenology, by adducing the same remarks and the same mode of proceeding as applicable to some of the natural appetites. Suppose, for example, a man of observation, like Gall, going about and observing the actions of mankind, in order to discover their natural appetites; and suppose, in exemplification of hunger and thirst, that he at first never met with them except in their abuse, it is evident that he would speak of man having implanted in him a natural appetite of gluttony and of intoxication. But afterwards, on finding that these were not universal and innate, but really abuses of natural appetites common to all mankind, he would change the names, and then speak of the appetite of hunger and the appetite of thirst. It is the same with the mental powers. Theft is an abuse of Acquisitiveness, just as gluttony is an abuse of hunger. Man could no more exist in this world without the natural tendency to acquire, than he could do so without the natural appetite of hunger. Indeed, if the former did not exist, the latter, in many cases, could not be gratified lawfully. Still, the presumption that man had implanted in his mental constitution. certain powers giving him a tendency or inclination to perform bad actions, deterred many from proclaiming their belief in Phrenology; and strange as it may seem, the idea of man having a faculty of religion in the mind, prompting him to do good and to worship God, deterred a different set; and hence it has been the aim of all phrenologists, to find out, if possible, the primitive function of every faculty, and then to name the organ according to this fundamental power, and not according to any particular act, much less to an abuse. This is the reason why the name of almost every organ has been changed, and some of them oftener than once.

Phrenology is indebted for this, perhaps more to Mr. Combe and other living phrenologists, than to Gall or Spurzheim; for it is undeniable that, in regard to many of the faculties, the founder of the science was never acquainted with their legiti mate sphere of operation; having been so constantly in the habit of noting faculties, whilst acting energetically, or in their abuse, and not when legitimately employed in their ordinary operations.

The organ marked five was at first called the organ of the propensity to quarrel or fight; then, of Courage; then, of Combativeness; and Mr. Robert Cox, in a paper lately published in the Phrenological Journal, Vol. IX. p. 147., proposes

to change it still farther to the propensity to oppose, or "Opposiveness." He believes, that every result of the organ, No. 5., can be reduced to opposition either aggressive or defensive; and he quotes a great many examples in proof of this opinion. Its legitimate function, therefore, is to oppose.

On reading the paper by Mr. Cox, it appeared to me that a very good purpose would be answered could it be possible to alter, in some similar way, the name of the organ marked No. 6., and called Destructiveness; for although this word is not so repulsive to our nature as that of murder, still it will, I think, be allowed that we generally attach something bad to the word destruction; or, at least, that persons, strangers to the science, will at once set down the organ called Destructiveness, as a bad organ, and the man who has it large, as a bad man; which all phrenologists would pronounce to be very erroneous. Now this is prejudicial to the diffusion of the science, and if all the organs could be so named, as to take away completely such an impression, (I mean the impression that there is any faculty in the mind given for bad purposes,) it would be highly advantageous to the progress of Phrenology. It is certainly true, that the name is comparatively of little consequence, provided the real nature and fundamental function of the organ be understood; but it is just because the real nature is not understood by the people at large, that the name should be attended to. This is of little importance to advanced phrenologists, but the bulk of the people judge of the nature of the faculties almost solely from their names.

I have for a long time considered that the definition given by Spurzheim, of the faculty No. 6., does not imply the real legitimate fundamental power. And if it could be shown that Destructiveness is to a certain degree an abuse of the faculty, then it must be allowed to be an improper name, and some other designation expressive of its use must be adopted. Dr. Spurzheim defines it "propensity to destroy in general, without determining the object to be destroyed, or the manner of destroying it." If this be correct, then it is clear that destruction must characterise every action prompted by the faculty. He farther says, "it gives the propensity to pinch, scratch, bite, cut, &c. &c., to stab, strangle, demolish, burn, kill, suffocate, poison, murder, or assassinate." He appears to me to dwell almost wholly on the abuses of the faculty, speaking of persons having a pleasure in killing, others having an irresistible desire to murder, and being fond of shedding blood. Indeed, all the acts of Destructiveness, spoken of by Spurzheim, are undoubtedly abuses. Mr. Cox proposes to substitute. for Destructiveness the name "propensity to injure." (See

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Phrenological Journal, vol. ix. p. 407.) Even this, however, I humbly think, is an abuse of the faculty. I cannot think there is, in the human mind, an innate propensity to injure ; but if so, every act must be an act of injury. To injure means strictly to hurt unjustly, to do mischief undeservedly, to wrong, to annoy, to affect with inconvenience." It is so defined in Walker. All these acts appear to be abuses of some just act; and to adopt the term "propensity to injure,” would still be to name the organ according to its abuse, not according to its use.

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It is proper, however, to observe, that Mr. Cox allows that the literal meaning of the word "injury" is the invasion of others' rights; and he states that he uses it in its popular sense, without reference to the justice or injustice of any particular infliction. In a foot note to his paper, he says "injury does not necessarily imply malice or mischief; there are occasions when it is beneficial to injure." Now I think this is clearly a contradiction in terms; for if it is beneficial, it surely cannot be injurious at least we do not then use the word injury. He proceeds, "we may destroy, kill, or chastise for good purposes as well as bad; nay, we are compelled to do so." This is very true, but in these cases we do not say we injure;" that word is never employed under these circumstances. very fact that the thing done is "for good purposes," necessarily presents the term being so employed. Indeed, it appears to me plain, that to injure always means to act unjustly or improperly; and if the act is not unjust and improper, it ceases to be injurious in the strict sense of the term. Mr. Cox concludes, "Destruction is extreme injury; to kill is to injure mortally; slander and reproach are verbal injuries; chastisement is injurious to bodily comfort: we injure a statue by breaking off its nose." (Phrenol. Journ., vol. ix. p. 407.) In all these, there appears to lie an abuse of some faculty. What word then would imply the legitimate act?

The

But

I would propose the term "propensity to overcome." To overcome means to subdue, to conquer, to vanquish, to gain the superiority; its abuse would be to injure by biting, tearing, scratching, &c. &c.; and its greatest abuse would be to wound, destroy, and murder unlawfully. It may be objected that to overcome is included in the function of Combativeness. it would appear that this organ gives only the tendency or instinct to oppose or fight; and it is quite possible to fight or oppose, and yet not overcome: we may conceive a person extremely fond of opposition, both morally and physically, and who would oppose on any occasion, fitting or unfitting, and yet he might rarely overcome. He might have the tendency to

oppose in great force in his mental constitution, and yet have not the ability to overcome. It is known that some men, nay whole nations, have great Combativeness, and comparatively small Destructiveness. Such persons are remarkable for sudden opposition, for sudden anger, but they soon yield to one with superior Destructiveness; Combativeness giving the tendency to oppose only, and Destructiveness supplying the tendency to overcome. Bob Acres, in the play of the "Rivals,” is an example of the contrary development, namely, large No. 6., with deficient No. 5. He is represented as extremely deficient in courage, being terribly afraid to fight his antagonist; but he shows an extreme desire to overcome him, even to destroy him. There is exhibited in the character many of the abuses of No. 6. He is very fond of swearing, and shows an aptness at inventing new oaths, and a pleasure in doing so; and when dictating the challenge, at the very time he is shaking from head to foot with terror, he says to Sir Lucius, "Do let me begin with a damʼme,” exhibiting large Destructiveness with very deficient Comba

tiveness.

It may be said, however, that every person who opposes or fights, has the inclination or wish to overcome. This is no doubt in general correct, otherwise he would probably not fight at all; but it by no means follows that both proceed from the same faculty; because, if the organ marked No. 6. be but little developed, he will fail in overcoming, notwithstanding his wish; and at all events Destructiveness is required. For example, the soldier goes to the field of battle to fight; Combativeness is the stimulating power here, and in proportion to its development so will the power of fighting be seen; but he cannot overcome without bringing Destructiveness into operation, and in proportion to its development so will be his power to overcome, or to gain the victory. He may fight long enough, and be the bravest of the brave, and yet he may be beaten. Again, he may overcome an enemy, and yet have no wish whatever to destroy him, or even to injure him. Indeed this feeling must frequently be experienced in the field of battle. Hence, if the function of Destructiveness is confined to destroying, as stated by Dr. Spurzheim, or even to injuring, as proposed by Mr. Cox, what feeling prompts to take the enemy prisoner? It cannot be the function of Combativeness, because it is allowed that this only gives the instinct to oppose, or at most to fight. It appears to me to be the consequence of the power of overcoming, and that this is the legitimate function of Destructiveness. If the enemy be killed lawfully, then this is a higher function of the same organ, if unlawfully, it is an abuse of the same organ. But again, it is possible that

a person may oppose and yet not wish to overcome; at least in regard to moral opposition this is true; for we can conceive of a person who opposes for opposition's sake, and when he knows he is in the wrong, and really does not wish to get the better of his opponent: at all events, the two mental powers appear quite distinct from one another.

From the various circumstances enumerated by Mr. Scott, in his Essay on Destructiveness, as exemplifying the function of that faculty, it appears evident that it is often exhibited in a high degree without any destruction ensuing, and consequently that Dr. Spurzheim's definition is erroneous. Mr. Scott says: "A person with large Destructiveness and deficient controlling power may, from fear or for some trifling inadequate motive, destroy life. A man of superior intellect knows his own interest better: conscious of the tendency, he restrains it in its last and most fatal effects, because it produces more desirable ends in its moderate exercise. The pistol, which, when discharged, can shoot only one man, may, when held in a threatening position, overawe one hundred." There is here not even the desire to destroy; on the contrary, there is an aversion to it, and yet there is the determination to overcome, and the power of doing so. Destructiveness is here acting legitimately. He quotes also Hamlet in the scene with Laertes, as a man whose passion, though ready to burst forth, is under proper control: Destructiveness properly guided. When seized by the throat, Hamlet remonstrates with his antagonist: "I pray thee take thy fingers from my throat, for though I am not splenetic and rash, yet have I in me something dangerous, which let thy wisdom fear." Here again there is no destruction; the faculty is under due control; it is kept to its legitimate function. There is a desire, a determination, and also a power to overcome. Combativeness alone cannot explain this, for there is more than opposition; there is a determination to overcome and a power to do so, and yet there is no wish to destroy, but the contrary. It would appear indeed that those who possess most Destructiveness exhibit, where it is legitimately employed, much more coolness and a greater reluctance to proceed to extremities, that is, to let it run into abuse, than those who have not so much of the original power, but whose power is less under restraint. The character of Othello is a good example of this. He shows, throughout the whole play, that he possesses a great endowment of the organ marked No. 6.; but he has far less desire to destroy than almost any other character in the tragedy. He is continually showing his determination to overcome, but his extreme reluctance to murder. He was conscious that he