answers to this test; and to show that it does so, will be the object of the following observations. The question thus proposed for discussion is one of experiment, in the strictest meaning of the term; the basis of the argument being not what a speculative imagination might suppose the constitution of the universe to have been, had God so willed it, but what it actually and demonstrably is. The conclusion at which of course, we hope to arrive, will be, that upon tha practical basis no consistent system of theological belief can be erected, excepting that for the possession of which we are indebted to the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. If those remote and mysterious conclusions, which we derive from that Divine source, are found strictly to harmonize in all their parts with the facts previously established by the native faculties of our minds, the probability in favour of its presumed authenticity is at once established:-if every other possible attempt at explication is found, upon examination, either to mis-state the primary truths of the constitution of nature, or to fail in accounting for any of its startling anomalies, the probability thus assumed will amount to little short of certainty. Such is the position which we trust that the Christian Revelation will be found to occupy, if impartially examined, in the first place, as a system of doctrines consistent with itself, and with the acknowledged course of nature; and, secondly, when contrasted with those various theories which have, from time to time, been urged by ingenious men in opposition to it. The question, we repeat, is one of strict experiment; and being such, we shall commence our observations by advancing such assertions only as probably no religionists of whatever denomination will hesitate in admitting.

No one fact, then, connected with the circumstances of human nature would seem to be more completely established by experience than that contained in the Scriptural aphorism, that the heart of man is evil

from his youth. This evil tendency is conspicuous, not merely in the gross vices and ferocious habits of the savage, or in the unsubdued passions of the comparatively ignorant members of more civilized communities, but under every, the most plausible modification of society in its highest state of artificial refinement. The same selfishness of motive, the same worldliness of feeling, the same concentration of the thoughts upon the trifling interests of sensual gratifications of the present moment, with a reckless indifference for the higher principles of morals, however disguised by the conventional decencies of society, characterize our species to the last, wherever the strong external stimulant of religion is wanting.

Yet, though such are the ordinary habits of our nature when left to itself, nothing, on the other hand, is more certain, than that the principle of religious feeling is also natural to man, and suggests to him one of his most prominent wants. Let his attention once be diverted from its usual channel by some strong moral excitement-let sickness or sorrow dissipate for a moment the illusions of the bodily senses,-or the intellectual powers, whether from curiosity or some worthier motive, seriously occupy themselves in the examination of the great questions connected with our first origin, and with our ultimate destination, and a reverential feeling of devotion, accompanied by a consciousness of his own responsible position, takes possession of him as a matter of course. That the sentiment thus roused is not the production of mere ignorance and superstition, is evident from the circumstance that the accutest understandings and the most exquisitely attempered dispositions are most disposed to its influence. We have only to feel it in order to be unanswerably convinced of its Divine origin. The sensations thus excited are experimentally the noblest and the purest of any that we are conscious of possessing. The uniform mode of their operation, in every variety of the human mind, is

again another proof that they derive their origin from the regular course of our natural constitution, and not from the desultory suggestions of caprice. That, for instance, the examination of the wonderful structure of the universe leads us necessarily, by a direct and unanswerable chain of inference, to the theory of an intelligent and self-existent First Cause; that a like examination of our own intellectual operations and perceptions leads us as necessarily to conclusions favourable to the doctrine of the immateriality,* and, therefore, probable immortality of the thinking principle within us, and that the feeling which we denominate conscience, will, in exact proportion to the degree in which we cultivate it, create a still increasing

*Every judgment which we can possibly form, after a careful examination of the operation of our minds, leads us to conclusions, perfectly irreconcilable with the supposition of the soul's materiality. Not one of the many phenomena of matter with which we are acquainted has the slightest resemblance to those of thought and consciousness. But the objection to the materialist theory does not terminate here. Admitting, what it would be a mere gratuitous assumption to admit, that sensation might possibly be the result of mere corporeal organization, we should still find ourselves unable to account for that conviction of our own singleness and individuality which accompanies every exertion of our thoughts. Why, we should still ask, if the soul is but an assemblage of divisible parts mechanically adjusted, has not every sensory organ a distinct and peculiar consciousness exclusively and incommunicably its own? What is the one indivisible entity which presides over the whole; which takes cognizance of, and pronounces judgment upon, the various animal and intellectual perceptions, and refers them all to itself? in un popolo o in un esercito," says Francesco Soave, "un sente fame, uno sete, e questi ha caldo, e quel freddo, ed altri ha dolore in una mano, altri in un piede o nel petto o nel capo, chi dirà mai che il popolo o l'esercito tanto insieme sia consapevole delle sensazioni che ha separatamente ciascuno individuo ?

"Se

"Ne si pretenda che il paragone non valga, perchè ogn' uomo e qui separato da ogn' altro. Imperocchè nel cervello ancora, e in qualunque Esser composto, ogni minima parte ha un' esistenza cosi sua propria, e distinta, e separata d'ogni altra, come qualunque uomo in un popolo o in un' esercito.

"Per qualunque verso dunque si prenda un Esser composto, e o si consideri nel suo tutto, o nelle sue parti, è sempre assolutamente impossibile, ch' ei sia consapevole a se stesso di piu sensazioni e percezioni simultanee. E poichè noi di queste simultanee sensazioni e percezioni a noi medesimi siam consapevoli realmente, ne vien d' assoluta necessità, che oltre alla sostanza composta e materiale che forma il corpo, in noi debba esistere un' altra sostanza diversa affatto da quella, cioè, non composta, ma pura, unica, semplice, indivisibile, che è quella che chiamiamo anima o spirito."

susceptibility of moral apprehensions, and a consequent conviction of the imputability of our actions, are propositions, the truth of which it is impossible to deny. Man, therefore, may be said to possess two directly opposite characters, each of them in a certain sense equally natural: the one, that which exists of itself, prior to any regular system of moral cultivation, and which is almost exclusively swayed by animal instinct: the other, that which only waits to be called forth by habits of discipline, and which is sure to manifest itself the moment that circumstances become favourable for its developement. Now, there assuredly can be no doubt which of these two dissimilar states is most worthy of our approbation, and most accordant with the presumed wisdom of Him who placed us in our present condition. The highest possible elevation to which we can attain under the former, is that of apparently inoffensive, and, perhaps, not altogether unserviceable, members of society, concealing the real selfishness of our disposition by the conventional laws of decorum, and subduing our natural ferocity by a sense of its inexpediency, but with a strict limitation of all our hopes and fears within the narrow limits of human life: whilst under the latter, not only every external action, but also every internal thought, is restrained by an efficient control, and, instead of merely temporal and inferior motives of conduct, others of a most vivid and unearthly character are substituted, ample in their scale and character as eternity itself.

Still, however, whilst such is the general capability of religious impression which we derive from our natural constitution, it by no means follows from any necessary deductions of our reasoning powers, what ought to be the peculiar form and modification of that system of belief which alone deserves to fall under the high designation of true religion. That which has reference to the system of the whole universe and to the essential attributes of the Almighty mind itself, is

obviously incapable of being measured by the mere human intellect, taking for its rule and standard the few facts supplied by its very limited experience in this world. We may follow up inference after inference, cautiously deducing remoter and less palpable truths from those primary ones, which are more immediately the result of our personal experience. But the inquiry very soon leads us beyond the utmost verge of legitimate human knowledge. We feel, indeed, with the most unhesitating certainty, that the stake of our happiness is in some way or other interwoven with those undeveloped mysteries which we strive to penetrate, but we are acquainted with no natural instruments by which we can arrive at them. A powerful instinct urges us forward, but our bewildered reason strives in vain to keep pace with it. A correct system of religion again, having, as was just now observed, reference to the real circumstances of nature, it follows as a matter of course, that some one modification of doctrine must be not only superior to all others, but, as truth is self-consistent and immutable, must be exclusive of all others: that is to say, it must be true, and all the rest, so far as they do not constitute an integral portion of it, must be necessarily false. But how are we to arrive at the knowledge what that one and exclusive modification of religion is?

This is an inquiry in which, indeed, our natural intellectual powers must take their share, as even our most vague conjectures must depend upon our reasoning faculties, in the last resort, for whatever degree of probability they may possess; but still it is perfectly vain for us to hope that the area of our spiritual apprehensions can be widely extended by any talent of discovery vested in the human mind itself. Meanwhile it is impossible to infer that God has given us the need of religious sentiment, and yet denied to us the means of gratification. Grant the existence of the instinct, and the analogy of nature will assure us that it was imparted for some definite end and object.