ed; any more than a man will come to Christ, without the drawing of the Father. The drunkard has not a moral power, that is, a sufficient inclination, to forsake his cups, while he does not forsake them; nor the lewd person to forsake his lewd practices; nor the murderer to hold back his hand from shedding of blood, any more than the natural man has to embrace the gospel.

There is therefore no propriety in exhorting the unregenerate, to do only such things as are consistent with an entirely depraved and wicked heart, as if nothing further could be expected of them at present, any more than there would be in exhorting the most abandoned of mankind, to do only what is consistent with their disposition and course of life, because nothing better can be expected of them, till they are better disposed, or are under greater restraints.

Accordingly, there is no such compounding with the natural man, for what he can do, without a heart to do any thing that is good, to be met with any where in the sacred scriptures. God's present demand upon every one of us is," Give me thy heart." He does not say, give me thy external obedience only, make a decent show of seeking and serving me, and it shall suffice for the present; for as for thy heart, I know, "there is no hope, it hath loved strangers, and after them it will go." The law requires truth in the inward parts ; yea, it demands a perfect heart. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength; and thy neighbour as thyself." Not mercly thou shalt seek and pray for this temper, towards God and man, but thou shalt have it. The New Testament preachers of salvation through Christ, say, "Repent and believe the gospel; repent and be converted that your sins

may be blotted out." The sum of their preaching, "both to Jews and also to the Greeks," was, "Repentance towards God, and faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ." Not testifying, as the manner of some is," that if sinners will do what they can (meaning what their wicked hearts will let them do, what the carnal mind, which is enmity against God, may consent to) they will not be left to perish; but God will undoubtedly have pity on them, and afford them farther help.

Certainly, if the divine law is just, no man can justly excuse himself, or be excused, short of a perfect heart, and a perfect life. And if the gospel is true, there is no safety for any sinner, no ground of dependance that God will have mercy on him, or ever show him any favour, short of Christ, and an actual interest in him by faith. "He that believeth not, is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God. He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him. He that believeth not shall be damned."

It is extremely obvious, that the scriptures every where treat the impenitent and the unbeliever, with as little ceremony as any sinners whatsoever. And it is exceedingly evident, I think, from what has now been said, that reason affords no plea in their favour, but what will equally excuse any sinner in the world, in being as he is, and in doing as he does. If the want of a good heart, is a good plea, every sinner, and every imperfect saint, may avail himself of it to his complete justification. Those who are sanctified but in part, cannot be blamed for being but imperfectly holy. Those who have no true holiness at all, cannot be required to have any, or be blamed if they act as well as they can without it. And, by the same rule, not so much as an external reformation can be required of

those who have no mind to reform. Nothing can be said to the purpose of excusing sinners on account of the badness of their hearts, unless we would undertake to maintain this general principle, that the duty of every one, must be only according to every one's disposition. But if this principle is true, every one must easily see, there can never be any such thing as neglect of duty, or desert of punishment, or need of grace, in the universe.*

* It has been objected that the phrase moral inability, is used in these discourses, and by many of late, in a different sense from that in which it has formerly most commonly been used by divines and philosophers; and in so large and loose a sense as has a tendency rather to darken counsel by words without knowledge. That under this general name we include, and confound together, things of a very different nature, and which ought to be carefully distinguished. That there is a wide difference between a mere unwillingness, or the prevalency of a contrary inclination in particular instances, and the want of a principle from which it is possible a certain kind of actions should be done, let what motives will be exhibited, and what pains will be taken. For instance, between the inability of the drunkard to forsake his cups, while he does not forsake them, and the inability of the na. tural man to embrace the gospel.

To this it is replied. In these discourses, under moral inability to that which is good, is meant to be included all that impotency which consists in moral depravity; whether in principle or exercise: whether in privation, that is, the want of moral rectitude only, or in any positive lusts and corruptions; and whether native or contracted; whether removable by moral suasion, or not without a new creation. Now under this general notion of moral impotency, it is granted there are several things included which in some views are of distinct consideration, and upon some subjects may be of importance to have carefully distinguished. But these differences, it was, and is still conceived, do not affect the present enquiry. In every supposeable instance, sin, as far as it pre

2. From what has been said it may appear, that there is no force in that common plea in the mouth of sinners, namely, "That they did not bring their depravity upon themselves, but were born with it. If their hearts are altogether sinful, they did not make them so, nor is it any of their fault; they have only such hearts as were given them, without their choice or consent." Now, in arguing thus, they evidently view a wicked heart, in no other light than as a mere weakness, which a man would not choose, but cannot help. They consider it as a thing not at all faulty in its own nature; so that if they are to blame on account of it, it must be

vails, is inconsistent with the prevalence of its opposite, viz. duty, or holiness; and involves a real impossibility of its opposite's taking place, so far as it takes place. Whether depravity is total or partial, native or contracted, transient or permanent, still as long as it continues, and as far as it goes, it implies a kind of impotency and a real impossibility, in regard to having or doing certain opposite things. And if it is of the nature of moral depravity-if it is in itself, anomia, a moral evil, the impotency-the impossibility implied in it, does not in any measure exculpate or excuse, in one case any more than in the other. The divine grace or the manner of divine operation requisite to reform the profligate, and to renew the unregenerate, is different, essentially different.But as to the question about excusing (the only thing under present consideration) there is no difference; since all the difficulty to be overcome, in either case, is of the nature of moral depravity.-The terms natural snd moral it is true have been used in a number of different senses on different occasions, and there are few words but what have been so The sense in which they are here used is not however new. Nor is the meaning of natural and moral inability in these discourses, any more large or loose or indeterminate, than the meaning of natural and moral good, or natural and moral evil; natural and moral perfections, or natural and moral infirmities.

F

for something previous to it, and quite of another kind. Concerning innocent natural infirmities, we justly judge in'the above manner. Thus if a man is sick we do not blame him for it; we know bodily sickness is no moral evil. But if we are told the man brought his sickness upon himself, by intemperance, or some bad conduct, then we blame and condemn him for that bad conduct; that was a moral evil, though his sickness is not so. Now those who make the above plea, reason just in this manner about sin itself; as if it were no sin, merely to be a sinner; or to commit sin when one has an inclination to do it. But that the bringing a sinful disposition upon ourselves, had we done this, would indeed have been a very wicked thing.

Hence it seems to many, as if the poor sinful children of men, were only as it were under a fit of sickness, which Adam brought on himself and them, by doing an evil deed which he might easily enough have avoided, in as much as he was perfectly holy; but that we his miserable offspring, being by nature sinners, are under a necessity of sinning, and therefore cannot be to blame for it. It seems as if Adam was in reality the only sinner, and his first sin the only sin of the human kind; because that sin was committed while man had not an imaginary, but a real, a moral as well as natural power to abstain from all sin. That is, the first sin did not arise from, or consist in, any defect of the will; and herein consists the sinfulness of it. If Adam did not sin before he had any inclination to sin, and while he was strongly enough inclined to the contrary, it is easy to see, he had just the same excuse for his first sin, as we have for any of ours. Let his first sin be placed where it will, whether in actually eating the forbidden fruit, or in hearkening to any temptations to do it, or in being off his watch, or in whatever