might not be "under the law, but under grace." But then the covenant of grace is not gracious enough to be entirely just; because by reason of original sin, we are utterly disabled for the performance of the condition upon which salvation is still suspended. To remedy the unreasonableness of this, new grace from God is required. Accordingly, "he giveth more grace.” "He gives such grace to all of us, whereby the performance of the condition is truly possible; and upon this ground he doth and may most righteously require it!" Thus, not only the obedience and death of Christ, but likewise all the grace of the Holy Spirit which is necessary to salvation, is found no more than barely sufficient to screen the ways of God to men, from the just imputation of unreasonableness and unrighteousness!* It is certainly difficult to conceive, how any man, who really views things in this light, however much he may talk of free grace, can ever feel himself any more obliged and indebted to God, than if he had only dealt with us in a righteous manner from first to last, never requiring more of us than we were able to do, and so no occasion or room had been given for any grace in the affair. And yet this view of the matter is

According to this representation of the matter, I desire it may be attentively considered, whether this, which is called grace, does in any thing really differ from debt in the strictest sense? If it would be an unrighteous thing in God, to require a compliance with the gospel, without bestowing all that grace which is necessary in order to a compliance; then since he does indeed require such a compliance, would it not be an unrighteous thing in him to withhold such grace? Hence (things being circumstanced as they are) this grace which all are made partakers of, is no more than what all may claim as their just due. And therefore, does not the whole come to this at Jast, that this common grace, which is so much contended for, is not common grace, but, common debt?

really as friendly to the grace of God, as any conceivable one which proceeds upon the principle that nothing more can be justly required of us, than we have a moral as well as natural power to do.

But what I had more especially in view here, was to enquire how it comes to pass that any in fact do not embrace the gospel, if that grace is given to every one which is sufficient in all respects to enable him to do it. If we want the faculties of body or mind, or the opportunity and means, which are necessary in order to obtain the knowledge of the truth, those difficulties must be removed; and if we want a heart to take pains to know the truth, or to love and embrace it when discovered, that difficulty also must be removed, or else we are not, in every sense, enabled. It is not, in all respects, truly possible that a sinner should come to Christ, till every thing that is inconsistent with his coming is removed out of the way. It is truly impossible that any one should cordially embrace the gospel, so long as he has not such a heart in him; though it would be impossible in a very different sense, if he had not external light, or natural powers sufficient. And now, if God gave that grace to all of us, whereby we were enabled in both these senses to comply with the gospel, the infallible consequence would be, that we should all of us actually do it. To say that a man has both natural and moral ability to do a thing, is the same as to say that nothing in nature is wanting in order to his doing it, but only his own good will, nor that neither. Or, that he both could do it if he would, and is sufficiently willing to do it. And whenever this happens to be the case, I believe, it is not very likely, the thing will after all not be done. If in the instance before us it is really thus; if sinners not only could come to Christ if they would, but they

have likewise all that willingness of mind, which is necessary in order to their actually coming, what in the universe can ever be assigned as the reason why in fact they do not come? This must certainly be an event, absolutely without any cause.

The truth is, when people puzzle themselves upon this subject, and insist, we are not accountable, and cannot be blamed, any further than we have a moral as well as a natural power to do otherwise than we do, what their minds run upon is only natural power after all. They may say they know what we mean by moral power, viz. that disposition to do a thing which is necessary towards our doing it; and they mean the same. But however, when they get into the dispute, they get bewildered, and lose sight of the distinction. They do not suppose an impenitent sinner, going on still in his trespasses, has a present, actual disposition, and a sufficiently strong one, to hearken to, and obey the gospel. But something like this seems to be in the bottom of their minds, viz. that he must be able to be disposed; or he must have such a disposition as would be sufficient, if he was disposed to make a good use * of it. Now this is only to use the word disposition improperly, and to conceive it to be a mere natural power; a price in our hands which may be used well or ill, and which will turn to our benefit or condemnation, accordingly as we are disposed to improve it. The disposition they think of, is not in the least degree virtuous, nor any ways necessarily connected with virtuous conduct. But it may lie still, or go wrong, and will do so, unless a man is disposed, and exerts himself, to make it act and keep it right. The sinner is not helped out of his difficulty in the least, by having such a disposition as this. Yea, should we go farther and say, the impenitent sinner might have a

heart to embrace the gospel, if he would take proper pains in order to do it; and he might do this if he was so disposed; and he might be so disposed if he would try; and he could try if he had a mind for it. Yet, if after all, he has not a mind to try, to be disposed, to take any proper pains, to get a heart, to embrace the gospel, or do any thing that is good; he is still in as bad a situation as any body supposes him to be in. There is no more hope of his coming to good so long as this is the case with him, no more possibility of it; nor do we say any thing more in his favour, than if we had only said as the scripture does of the fool, "that there is a price in his hand to get wisdom, "but he has no heart to it." Pushing the sinner's moral depravity and impotence back in this manner, may get it out of sight of those who cannot see above two or three steps, but this is all the good it can do. There is still a defect in him somewhere; and such a one as will prove his everlasting ruin, unless removed by such grace as he has never yet experienced.

It must for ever hold true and certain, that if sinners do not come to Christ, it is either because they could not if they would; or else because, on the whole, they are not willing. And if, in the room of coming to Christ, we should substitute some lower and preliminary condition of grace and salvation, it would be just the same case. Suppose it were using means, praying and seeking in the most engaged manner the unregenerate sometimes do; all do not come up to this; and the reason certainly is, they are under a natural or else a moral inability of doing it. Either they could not seek in this manner, if they would, or else they are not inclined to do it, but on the contrary are disposed to employ their time and thoughts about other things. So that bringing down the conditions of the

gospel lower, in consideration of the depravity of men; or supposing common grace, whereby all are enabled to come up higher than they could of themselves, removes no difficulties, at least not those designed to be removed, unless the way of life is supposed to be level to the inclinations of all men; or that all are, in fact, made willing, and are actually saved.

On the whole, I think the principle, that God can in justice require of his creatures, only what he gives them a moral, as well as natural power to do, must be given up. Otherwise we are reduced to a necessity of supposing all the blame, if any are lost, must lie entirely on God, and not on them. And as to those who are saved, they can have nothing to say in his praise, but only that he has been barely just to them. That having given his Son to obey and die, to deliver them from his law, which was an infinitely unreasonable one, for fallen creatures to be under; and having given his Spirit to enable them to come up to the otherwise impossible terms of the gospel, he has on the whole, dealt not unrighteously by them. If, therefore, we think, there is any way to vindicate the righteousness of God. in the damnation of any; or that any thing can fairly be said to the praise of the glory of his grace, in the salvation of them that are saved, we must suppose he is not obliged in justice to give all men both those kinds of ability that have been spoken of. And if we believe that any, in fact, do not obtain salvation, we must conclude they are not in both these senses, enabled to obtain it. Which was all I undertook to prove under the second head. The

3d. Thing proposed was, to consider the moral inability of sinners in this matter.

There is not so much need of labouring to confirm this, that unregenerate sinners have not such a heart