V. And this by no means proves revelation to be useless; but, on the contrary, considering mankind as they are, and how few have either time or talents to pursue this profound speculation, it proves that divine revelation is an inexpressible blessing to the human race. But notwithstanding the inestimable privilege of the sacred oracles, we clearly discover a sufficient warrant for the attempt, made in the first part of this Essay, to ascertain the doctrine of the Trinity upon the sound principles of reason and demonstration. How far the attempt has been successful, is submitted respectfully, without any apology, to the decision of the learned world : the author, conscious of the rectitude of his views, and fully convinced of the truth of the reasoning, can neither flatter the reader, nor fear the shafts of criticism. The honest enquirer after truth will make allowances for imperfections in an attempt entirely new, and upon a subject where no assistance could be borrowed; and the censures of the weak, captious, and uncandid, he despises. His enquiry has been after truth; and all he desires is, the illustration of the fundamental doctrine of all true religion and with caution and reverence he has laid down his views, willing to

receive assistance, and refusing contradiction or any other principle than manly reasoning and demonstration. He cannot shrink from his attempt until fair reasoning is advanced to prove he is wrong; and if this can be done, he shall willingly concede, and embrace the truth from whatever quarter. If it be said that no one of the ancient philosophers ever made the attempt, nor ever made the discovery of the Trinity; the answer is they were all satisfied with the knowledge they had of it by tradition. And besides, it is perfectly evident that no one of the ancient philosophers ever ascertained the powers and faculties of the human mind correctly; how then was it possible for them to have ascertained the perfections and personality of the Divine Essence? Impossible. Their fault lay in vain imaginations, in unfounded theories, and the pursuit of non-existing ideas, without that calm and sober research of the faculties and powers of their own mind, by inductive reasoning, which would have enabled them to rise in their views of the Divine Being. Yet they pretended to account for the origin of all things; some admitting one principle, which they called Fate; and some admitting two principles: and, wandering in the

vortex of unfounded theory, they said much, and proved little. But grant that they never made the discovery of the Trinity; does that prove that it never could be made at any other time? Does it follow, because it never was discovered by the ancient philosophers, that now, when it is revealed, it may not be proved by the light of nature from reason and demonstration? This is only an attempt to ascertain that the Divine Being was the same before revelation was made that it now is, and this attempt guided by the infallibility of the divine perfections.

VI. Again; how are we to argue with a person who denies the doctrine of the Trinity altogether, and the inspiration of the Scriptures at the same time? He uses his reason against all this; and must we be silent, or quote texts of Scripture which he does not admit to have the meaning we affix to them? There is no ground left to meet such an opponent, but his own field of reason and demonstration. Here, then, let us meet him, and try on which side reason preponderates. If he is right, let us give up the cause; but if he is wrong, let us treat him respectfully, appealing to his reasoning faculties, and convinc

ing him of his great error. Quoting texts with such an antagonist is of no use; and yet it is our duty to defend the doctrine, and that too upon the principles of our opponents. Let us meet them on their own ground, and turn their own weapons against themselves. This is fair; and revelation loses nothing by the attempt.

It is to be farther observed, that the fathers of the council of Nice urged all their arguments against the Arians from reason and demonstration, and almost never quoted Scripture: but they were not acquainted with the inductive system, and therefore argued concretely, and not abstractly. This proves, that in the purest times of the church, reason was applied to the illustration of the subject, in the best manner the reasoners could; and if it was so then, why may it not be so now? Upon examination it will be found, that almost every one of the arguments used by Athanasius against Arius are taken from reason applied to the subject, but scarcely one is advanced from Scripture. Those who deny that reason may be applied to the subject, would do well to examine the arguments of the council of Nice as they appear in the Nicene creed, and the arguments advanced by Athanasius as they appear

in the Athanasian creed. The reader will find the proof of all this in Cudworth.

Now, if Athanasius and the whole council thought it lawful to argue the subject in this way with the Arians, why is it not lawful in the same way to argue it now? Indeed, until the subject be fairly established by reason and demonstration, those who deny it will never be satisfied nor silenced. We may go still farther, and tell those who say that reason and demonstration should not be applied to the subject, but the language of Scripture only, they would do well, in treating of it, to read the words of Scripture only, (which every common reader can do as well as they,) for the moment they begin to use their own words or language upon the subject, that moment they apply reason to it, seeing they do not pretend to inspiration. They may say they found their reasoning upon Scripture, and draw their conclusions from the divine word. To this we answer, that if we found our reasoning upon the divine perfections, and draw our conclusions fairly from them, our reasoning is as legitimate, and has as much divine authority as theirs. Reasoning from the perfections of the Divine Being, when fair inductive conclusions are drawn, is