contrary to an intuitive or self-evident truth. Therefore, as God is the Author of our mental nature, it is God who compels us to disbelieve one of two contradictory propositions; and hence, if his revelation contained any such propositions, he would himself compel us to disbelieve part of his own revelation. But God's object in giving a revelation is, that it should be believed; therefore he would not give a revelation and insert propositions in it which he compels us to disbelieve, that is, contradictory propositions: therefore a revelation coming from God, cannot contain propositions which demonstrably involve self-contradiction. In reference to this proposition, it has been alleged by some, that the doctrine of the Trinity involves such a contradiction. They reason thus: The idea of one and the idea of three are contradictory and subversive of one another, so that the same thing cannot be one and three at the same time. But Trinitarians affirm that God is one and three at the same time; therefore they affirm what cannot be true, i. e. a contradictory proposition. But the major proposition is stated in a loose and indefinite manner, and is not true in every instance; for a triangle is one and three at the same time, when considered as one among many figures, and in reference to its sides. In order to be true, that is, admissible, the major proposition must run thus: "It is impossible for the same thing to be 1 and 3 in the same respect at the same time." To this we assent; but in this form, the doctrine of the Trinity is by no means embraced under it; for it need not be told to the intelligent reader, that Trinitarians unanimously deny that God is one and three in the same respect. They expressly teach, that God is one in one respect, and three in another respect. The first respect they denominate by the term essence, and the second by the term persons. Therefore, as the Trinitarian proposition is not embraced in the major, the conclusion of course is not applicable to it.

But it has been objected, that some of the phraseology of

Trinitarians, expressive of the reciprocal relation between the persons of the Godhead, involves contradiction. Those, who advance the objection, reason thus: The one God is said to be threefold in his persons; but each person is the one God; therefore each person is threefold. But the major is not clearly stated. The idea intended is this, "God who is one (i. e. God in the respect in which unity is affirmed of him, namely, in essence) is three in person (i. e. in another respect, called person) ; but each person (i. e God, in each of the respects called persons) is the one God (i. e. is God, in the respect in which unity is affirmed of him, namely, in essence):-But this minor is not true therefore the conclusion is a non sequitur. In order to cover the conclusion, the syllogism must stand thus: "God in (essence) the sense in which he is one, is also three (in the same sense, essence); but each of these three (persons) is God in the sense in which he is one (in essence); therefore each of these three (persons) is three in the sense (in essence) in which God is one." But it need scarce be mentioned that we deny the major and minor, as strenuously as any other persons can: for we deny that he is one and three in the same sense. If it be alleged, that explanations of the distinction in the Supreme Being have sometimes been attempted, and from these and the language of Trinitarians in general, it is evident that they understand the terms essence and person, in a manner which necessarily involves self-contradiction; it must be admitted, that this has unfortunately sometimes been the case. But this will not be surprising when we recollect the inexplicability of the divine nature, and the high degree of mental discipline which is requisite, before men can clearly discern the proper limits of the human understanding. Nor are the divines of the present day responsible for any phraseology but their own; and we believe they uniformly disavow the terms and ideas objected to. They believe that God is one in one respect, and three in another respect. To the respect in which he is one, they gave the

name essence; the other respect, in which he is three, they designate by the term person. But in so doing they do not intend to convey any positive ideas of the several respects to which they are applied. They are to be considered as equivalent to the Algebraic letters X and Y, which stand for unknown quantities or properties; as if it had been said, "in X respect God is one, and in Y respect he is three :" and thus the propositions are more contradictory than if we were to say, “ a triangle in X respect (i. e. considered as a figure) is one, and in Y respect (in reference to its sides) it is three;" or, that "man in X respect (in reference to his soul and body) is two fold, and in Y respect (considered as an individual of our race) is one." We do not forget that the triunity of the triangle results from its material properties, inasmuch as, like all matter, it consists of parts; and that God is without parts [ens simplicissimum]: but we do not adduce these examples to prove from analogy either the truth or the possibility of the Trinitarian doctrine; its truth must rest on the divine record, and if that is established its possibility necessarily follows. We only state these as several unconnected propositions, but similarly constructed and of course equally void of contradiction. Moreover, as we do not define the distinction in the Deity at all, it cannot be urged that we define it to be such as depends on parts; hence, the absence of parts in God, cannot be alleged as an argument against the distinction which is negatively proposed. For, it is impossible that there should be contradiction betweem terms the ideas of which are all strictly negative, and do not imply, by inference either more or less remote, any idea of a positive nature. PROP. 3. A divine revelation might naturally be expected to teach truths untaught by reason.

That, after all our advances in knowledge, there always have been and still are many truths physical and moral, connected with our world, which are unknown to us, will be admitted. Hence, in giving us a revelation, it was at least possible for

God to teach us truths unknown to reason. But that if he gave a revelation, he actually would teach such truths (either to enforce truths previously known, or unconnected with them), is evident from the nature of the case. If God gives a revelation, such a revelation must have been necessary, or not. If it was not necessary, then God gave a revelation unnecessarily. But God does nothing unnecessarily; therefore, if he gave a revelation it was necessary. Now, the revelation which it was necessary for God to give, must either contain some truths or relations of truths unknown to us before, or not. tains none but such as we knew before, it was unnecessary for

But if it con

God to give it. But it was necessary, or he would not have given it; therefore a revelation from God might naturally be expected to teach truths unknown to us before, truths untaught by Such are the sanctions of his law, the doctrines concerning angels, the resurrection of the body, and the Trinity.

reason.

PROP. 4. We have no reason to expect, that our limited capacities

should be able to comprehend fully the modes and circumstances and relations of those truths which reason could not teach, and which are known only by revelation, any more than of those truths known without revelation; but it is natural to expect that the contrary would be the case. It is evident that the adorable Author of our being has fixed with the utmost precision, the limits of the human understanding. Our minds are so constructed, that whatever is necessary for the practical purposes of life, we can know, and know with certainty. But in the whole store of our knowledge, whatever be its nature, or whatever the subject to which it relates, there is not a single particular to which, in some of its circumstances or relations, there is not some mystery, something inexplicable attached. The fact of the attraction of gravitation we know; and it is upon the certainty and uniformity of this fact, that all its boundless utility in the mechanical arts, as well as in the ex

planation of the phenomena of physical nature, depends. But where is the mechanic, or where the philosopher, who can explain the cause or the mode of operation of this wonderful principle? The fact of the tendency of the magnetic needle to the poles, is known; and relying on its certainty, and on the uniformity of the other laws of nature, the mariner confides his all to the bark which gravitation keeps upon the surface of the water, and spreading his canvass to the winds of heaven, steers with security his adventurous course through every clime. Yet who can explain the cause of this wonderful phenomenon, or the mode of its operation? But let it not be supposed that the nature and relations of these general and important facts are peculiarly mysterious. Mystery equally profound and equally great, is no less a concomitant of every object around us, even of such as appear the most trifling or the best understood. with which I am writing demonstrate this truth. how (in obedience to the divine will) it grew to its slender form? or what philosopher can explain the nature of that something, (called by men cohesive attraction,) by which its particles are held together? In short, in our present state we are a mystery to ourselves; and every object around us presents abundant evidence that the Creator has definitely fixed the limits of our knowledge, and told us, Hitherto shalt thou come, and here shall the proud range of thine intellect be stayed. Therefore,

Let the pen Who can tell

It will be admitted, that either the intrinsic nature, or the mode of subsistence, or some of the relations or circumstances of every thing or truth connected with the present world, is incomprehensible to us.

And it will be admitted, that the incomprehensibility of those modes and circumstances of truths which are incomprehensible to us, arises either from their intrinsic nature, or from the limited character of our faculties; and that it is probably impossible for God himself to enable us to understand some of them without first enlarging our faculties.