A DISCOURSE OF MIRACLES. The INTRODUCTION. HERE is no one propofition in naT ture more certainly to be demonftrated, than the existence of an eternal, infinitely wife, and powerful cause, to whom all other beings owe their exiftence, and on whom they entirely depend. And, as it would not have been confiftent with the most perfect wisdom, to have given being to creatures without fome valuable end and defign; we may juftly reason farther, that as he made them originally, he ftill continues to govern them in fuch a manner as most effectually tends to answer the original defign of their creation. And as the natures, capacities and powers of the several beings, that God hath made, are vaftly different, some having faculties and abilities vouchfafed to them greatly superior to what others are poffeffed of; it follows, that there must also be a fuitable difference in the methods of divine providence, or in the manner by which God is pleafed to rule and govern them. From fuch of his creatures, as are deftitute of reafon, he cannot expect a reasonable service, because he knows they cannot perform it; but as for those who have this excellent gift communicated to them, fince they are capable of underfianding the nature and obligation of laws, it is reasonable to think, that the great Author of their beings intended to govern them by proper laws, and to reward or punish them, according as they should obferve, or violate them. That mankind are capable of govern. ment by proper laws, will not, I believe, be disputed. The more difficult enquiry is, what these laws are, and by what means we attain to the knowledge of them. And, . And, I think, it must be own'd, either that our natural powers and reasonable fa culties are abfolutely fufficient of themselves, without any farther help, to lead us into those just and becoming fentiments of God, and that knowledge of the du ties we ftand obliged to perform, which is neceffary to encourage and direct our obedience or else if human reafon should, all circumftances confider'd, be found infufficient to answer this great end, that then fome information from God himself is neceffary, in order to inftruct men what is the obedience he requires, and what the recompence they may expect in performing it. And that God fhould vouchfafe to make fome revelation of himself and his will to his creatures, is a fuppofition much more reasonable in itself, and suitable to the character he beares, of an infinitely perfect being, than that he fhould fend them into the world, and leave them to wander in perpetual uncertainty, both with respect to their behaviour in the prefent life, and their expectations as to another. If fuch a revelation is made, it must either be to every individual, or elfe to fome particular perfons, who, receiving full inftructions from God, and coming in his name, and with proper credentials of their divine mission, may have ability and au thority to inftruct others. To suppose it neceffary that God fhould immediately re. veal himself to every individual perfon, is to suppose it neceffary that God fhould always act by extraordinary methods, when the more common and ordinary would be abundantly sufficient, and would be an overbearing the reasonable powers and faculties of men, without giving them any opportunity for the proper exercise, and improvement of them. As therefore it seems more reasonable to think, that God would select from among the children of men fome particular perfons, and favour them with special inftructions, in order to qualify them to be his meffengers to the reft of the world; fo nothing is more certain, than that fuch perfons, who are fent by him, must come with proper evidence and proofs of their miffion from him; otherwise there could be no obligation upon any to receive and fubmit to them. And as miracles have been generally looked on to be proper testimonials of a perfon's divine authority, and many |