the Divine Government : Hearken unto SER M• Me, ye men of Understanding; Far be it XVI. from God, that He could do Wickedness. A righteous and juft Man, may be depended upon that he will not do an unjuft thing: Much more therefore, far be it from the Almighty, far be it from the Supreme Lord and Governour of all things, that He fhould commit iniquity.

Many things myfterious, many things incomprehenfible, there needs must be in the nature of the Supreme Being: But Injustice or Iniquity, Hard or or Unrighteous Dealing with any of his Creatures; This, above all things, far be it from him; This, whatever we do, far ought we to keep it from all our Notions and Conceptions of him. Objections will be ftarted, and Difficulties (in particular cafes) cannot but arife But whether we can anfwer them or no, we are fure they must be false; because no evidence can be fo ftrong, in proof of any particular doctrine inconfiftent with this Notion, as are the Arguments which prove in general, the truth of the divine Juftice. However therefore our short understanding may perhaps fail in reconciling things, yet the Foundation

SER M. must be ftood to as being demonftrably XVI. true, and what can never be moved; yea,

furely God will not do wickedly, neither will the Almighty pervert judgment.

My Defign in the following Difcourfe upon these words, is to prove briefly, that God is, and cannot but be Juft; to explain wherein the Nature of that Juftice confifts; to remove the Objections arifing from particular cafes against this general Truth; and finally, to apply what shall be faid, by fome useful Inferences in Practice. And

If, THAT the Supreme Lord and Governour of all things is, and cannot but be Juft in all his Actions, may be made appear in the following manner. There being neceffarily in Nature a Difference of Things, which is what we call Natural Good and Evil; and a Variety in the Difpofitions and Qualifications of Perfons, which is what we call Moral Good and Evil; from the due or undue adjustment of thefe Natural Qualities of Things to the moral Qualifications of Perfons, arife unavoidably the Notions of Right and Wrong. Now the Will of every intelligent Agent, being always directed by

fome

fome Motive; 'tis plain the natural Mo- SER M. tive of Action, where nothing irregular XVI. interpofes, can be no other than This Right, or Reafon of Things. Whenever

therefore This Right and Reafon are not made the Rule of Action ; it can only be, either because the Agent is ignorant of what is Right, or wants Ability to pursue it, or else is knowingly and willingly diverted from it by the Hope of fome Good, or Fear of fome Evil. But now None of these causes of Injuftice, can poffibly have any place in God: His Actions therefore must always neceffarily be directed, by Right and Reafon and Justice only. For having all Knowledge, 'tis impoffi ble he can be deceived in judging what is Right: having no Want of any thing, his Will cannot poffibly be influenced by any wrong Affection; and having no Dependence, his Power can never be limited by any fuperiour Strength. 'Tis very evident therefore, that He who knows thus perfectfectly the Rule of Equity, and neceffarily judges of things as they really Are; who has complete Power to execute Justice according to that Knowledge, and no possible temptation to deviate in the leaft there

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from;

SER M.from; who can neither be impofed upon

XVI..

by any Deceit, nor moved by any Bias, nor awed by any Power; 'tis very evident (I fay) that fuch a Being will always do what is Right; without iniquity, and without partiality; without prejudice, and without refpect of Perfons.

THERE is a fhorter way, which has frequently been made ufe of, to prove that all the Actions of God, muft needs be Just; by alledging, that whatever He does, is therefore Juft, because He does it. Which Argument, is not proving, but fuppofing, the thing in Queftion: For, the Reafon why God's doing a thing, proves it to be Juft; is only upon This foundation, that, knowing him to be a perfectly Juft Being, we are fure, if the thing had not been in itself Juft; he would not have done it. And in This fenfe indeed, the Argument is very good and reasonable. But those who use it, have generally turned it to a very different and very falfe Meaning: As if, because whatever God does, is certainly fuft; therefore, whatever Unjust and Unreasonable things they in their Syftems of Divinity afcribe to him, were made just and reafonable by their

fuppofing

fuppofing God to be the Author of them: SER M• Or, because the Effence of God is incom- XVI. prehenfible, and all his Attributes infinitely tranfcending the Perfections of any finite Beings; that therefore Justice in Him, was not the fame Thing, nor to be judged of by the fame Notions, as Justice among Men: Or that, God being All-powerful, and having no Superiour to render an account of what he does; therefore whatever is afcribed to Him, though in itself it may feem unjust, and would be Unjuft among Men, yet by Supreme power is made Juft and Right. And upon This kind of Reasoning, is built the Doctrine of abfolute Reprobation, and fome other the like Opinions. But now, in reality, What is this elfe, but fpeaking deceitfully for God, and deftroying the Truth of the divine Attributes, under the appearance of defending them? For if every thing that Power can do, is Just; What then is fuftice, but mere Power only, and not any thing really in the Nature of Things? And fo, the worst and most cruel Being in the World, with fufficient Power annext, would in these men's Senfe, be as fuft, as Supreme Goodness itself.

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