earth, than he, who, though not so violent in the motion, is yet more constant in his abode: and though his haste be less eager, yet his observations may be more serious. "Omnis festinatio cæca est," saith Seneca; precipitancy and unstableness, as well in the motions of the wit as of the body, dazzleth and disableth the eyes. And it is true in the mind, as in the stomach, too quick digestion doth always more distemper than nourish, and breedeth nothing but crudities in learning. Nor can I call that so much study, as agitation and restlessness of the mind; which is as impatient of true settled labour, as it is of quiet. Now the reason why such a temper of mind as this, is corruptive to the memory, is, first, because memory is always joined with some measure of love; and we most of all remember that which we most respect. “Omnia quæ curant, meminerunt:" there where the treasure is, the mind will be also: there therefore where our love is most constant, our memories will be most faithful. So that sudden, vanishing, and broken desires, which, like the appetite of sick men, are for the time violent, but give presently over; as they argue an eager love for the present of that we pursue, and, by consequence, a fastidium' and disesteem of that which we soon forsake f; so do they necessarily infer weakness on the memory, by how much they make our hopes the stronger. For, as Seneca speaks, "Caduca memoria futuro imminentium &;" men, strongly bent upon things future, have but weak memories of things past.

Secondly, The body of any one homogeneal learning, hath this excellent property in it, that all the parts of it do, by mutual service relate to, and communicate strength and lustre each to other: so that he who goes through with any science, doth, from every new branch and conclusion which he meets with, receive a greater clearness, and more strong impression of his former degrees of knowledge. Now then, that man, who, out of impatiency of that restraint, cannot endure to go through an art, to search into the root, to observe the knittings and dependencies of the parts among themselves, to see by what passages truth is derived from the principles, to this or to other branches; must needs be so

Arist. Rhet. lib. 1. c. 12.

De Benef. lib. 3. c. 3.

much the more forgetful of what he knows, by how much he is ignorant of those other parts whereunto it referreth.

Other causes there are of weakness in the memory; as, namely, a distrust, and from thence an unexercise of it. Whereupon Plato tells us, that the use of letters, in gathering Adversaria and Collections, is a hindrance to the memory; because those things which we have deposited in our desks, we are the more secure and careless to retain in our minds. And on the other extreme, a too great confidence in it, and thereupon an over-burdening it with multitude of notions, whereby, as it sheds much over, so it is withal indisposed for the ready use of what it retains; it falling out in a huddle and tumultuary heap of thoughts, as in any other throng, that we can never so easily find out, or order and dispose what we desire to use, but are confounded in our own store. But I forbear to insist on these, because I hasten to the higher and more noble part of man.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Fancy: its offices to the will and reason: Volubility of thoughts, fictions, errors, levity, fixedness.

Now, for the imagination; the dignity thereof consists, either in the office, or in the latitude of it. Its office is to be assistant both to the understanding and the will: its assistance to the understanding is principally in matter of invention, readily to supply it with variety of objects whereon to work; as also to quicken and raise the mind with a kind of heat and rapture proportionable, in the inferior part of the soul, to that which, in the superior, philosophers call extasy; whereby it is possessed with such a strong delight in its proper object, as makes the motions thereof towards it to be restless and impatient: and of this is that of the poet,

"Est Deus in nobis ; agitante calescimus ipso."

By divine raptures we aspire,

And are inflam'd with noble fire.

Μαρακὸς ὁ Συρακούσιος καὶ ἀμείνων ἦν ποιήτης, ὅτ' ἐκσταίη. Arist. Problem.

The office of the imagination to the will is, to quicken, allure, and sharpen its desire towards some convenient object. For it often cometh to pass, that some plausible fancy doth more prevail with tender wills, than a severe and sullen argument, and hath more powerful insinuation to persuade, than the peremptoriness of reason hath to command. And the reason hereof is, because liberty being natural unto man's will, that course must needs most of all gain upon it, which doth offer least force unto its liberty; which is done rather by an argument of delight, than of constraint: and best of all, when a rational and convincing argument is so sweetened and tempered, to the delight of the hearer, that he shall be content to entertain truth, for the very beauty and attire of it; so that you shall not know, whether it were the weight of the reason that overruled, or the elegancy that enticed him. A man can be well pleased to look with delight on the picture of his enemy, when it is drawn with a skilful and curious hand. And therefore in that great work of men's conversion unto God, he is said to allure them, and to speak comfortably unto them, to beseech, and to persuade them; to set forth Christ to the soul as altogether lovely, as the fairest of ten thousand, as the Desire of the Nations, as the riches of the world f; that men might be inflamed to love the beauty of holiness. That which must persuade the will, must not only have a truth,' but a 'worthiness' in it. In which respect, the principles of knowledge are called άğiμara,' worthy,' or honourable speeches: and the gospel is not only called λóyos wiσròs, a true saying,' but λóyos žios, a worthy saying;' and, in that respect, fitted for acceptation.'s It is true of the will, which Seneca hath observed of princes, "Apud reges, etiam quæ prosunt, ita tamen, ut delectent, suadenda sunt:" That unto them even things profitable must be represented with the face rather of delight than of necessity: even as physicians, when they minister a very wholesome potion:

"Prius oras pocula circum

Contingunt dulci mellis flavoque liquore."

That they their patients may both please and cure,

With mixed sweets their palates they allure."

And hence is that observation, that the first reformers and drawers of men into civil society, and the practice of virtue, wrought upon the will by the ministry rather of the fancy, than of rigid reason: not driving them thereunto by punctual arguments, but alluring them by the sweetness of eloquence; not pressing the necessity of morality by naked inferences, but rather secretly instilling it into the will, that it might at last find itself reformed, and yet hardly perceive how it came to be so. And this was done by those musical, poetical, and mythological persuasions; whereby men, in their discourses, did, as it were, paint virtues and vices, giving unto spiritual things, bodies, and beauties, such as might best affect the imagination. Yea, God himself hath been pleased to honour this way of setting out higher notions, in that we find some room in the holy scriptures for mythologies, as that of the vine, the fig-tree, and the bramble; for riddles, for parables, similitudes, and poetical numbers and raptures', whereby heavenly doctrines are shadowed forth, and do condescend unto human frailties. And another reason hereof is, because the desires of men are fixed as well on pleasant as on profitable objects: so that those inducements must needs have most authority, which have that happy mixture of utile et dulce' together, not only pressing necessity upon the understanding, but pointing, as it were, and deciphering delight to the fancy. And this reason Scaliger gives in his enquiry, how false things, such as Plato's elysium, Homer's fictions, Orpheus' music, should delight wise men: "Propterea quod exsuperant vulgares limites veritatis," saith he; because they are not exacted to the rigour and strictness of reason, nor grounded on the severity of truth; but are (as I may so speak) the creation of fancy, having a kind of delightful liberty in them, wherewith they refresh, and, as it were, open and unbind the thoughts; which otherwise, by a continual pressure in exacter and more massy reasonings, would easily tire.

m

Concerning the latitude of this faculty, it hath therein a double prerogative above others; one, in the multiplicity of operations; another, in the framing of objects. To the former of these, I reduce the thoughts; which, by reason of their

Plut. de Educat. Liberorum. Scal. Subtil. 307, 12.

Judges xviii. 12, 14.

Hos. xii. 10.

quickness and volubility, and withal their continual interchanges and successions, are the most numberless operations of the soul of man: where, by thoughts,' I understand those springings and glances of the heart, grounded on the sudden representations of sundry different objects: for when the mind begins once to be fixed and standing, I call that rather 'meditation' than thought.' This multiplicity of thoughts is grounded, first, upon the abundance of their objects; and next, upon the quickness and activity of apprehension: that, is the matter; this, the form of those thoughts, which I now speak of. The abundance of objects is seen in this, that it includes all the variety of species belonging to the faculties: as that knowledge which the schools call 'philosophia prima,' doth, within its own limits, draw in, in some sort, all the several objects of particular sciences. There are thoughts belonging unto the will, flying and pursuing thoughts, wishings, and loathings; and there are thoughts belonging to the understanding, assenting and dissenting thoughts, belief and disopinion. There are thoughts likewise proceeding from anger, fiery and revengeful thoughts; from envy, gnawing and repining thoughts; from joy, sweet and refreshing thoughts; from conscience, comforting and affrightful thoughts; and so in all other faculties. And for the quickness of working, the motions of the thoughts show it in the concurrence of these two things, suddenness of journey, and vastness of way; while, like lightning, they are able to reach from one end of heaven unto another, and, in one light and imperceptible excursion, leave almost no part of the universe untravelled. Now, of these two grounds of multiplicity in thoughts, the former, namely, the abundance of objects, is 'ab extrinseco,' and dispersed over things; (though they are not otherwise the objects of thought, than as the mind reflecteth on the phantasmata,' or images of them in this faculty) but the latter, which is the quickness of apprehension, though it may seem to be the most peculiar work of reason, yet the imagination hath indeed the greatest interest in it: for, though the act of apprehending be the proper work of the understanding, yet the form and quality of that act (which properly makes it a thought in that strict sense, wherein here I take it), namely, the lightness, volubility, and suddenness thereof, proceed from the immediate restlessness