Christ was sent into the world to | lutely certain, that God must have die, the just for the unjust. He says himself, "For this cause came I unto this hour." But if God was not indifferent respecting Christ's death; then he could not have been indifferent respecting the means and manner of his death. The former must inevitably involve the latter. Hence, God could not have been indifferent respecting the wicked conduct of the Jews in betraying and crucifying the Lord of glory. But if God was not indifferent respecting the wicked conduct of the Jews, in the crucifixion of Christ; then he could not have been indifferent respecting any part of that vast chain of events, which, from the creation of the world, tended to prepare the way, and introduce the important scenes of Christ's sufferings. And if God was not indifferent respecting these events, or actions of his creatures; no reason can be given, why he should be indifferent respecting any action or event which takes place in this lower world. It may be received, then, as a settled point, that God can never have been indifferent respecting the wicked conduct of mankind. This leads me a step further, to ob serve, 2. That God must have decreed either that the wicked conduct of mankind should take place, or that it should not. This conclusion is inevitable. For if any being is not indifferent respecting an object, he must necessarily have some choice respecting that object. If I was not absolutely indifferent whether I should write this essay or not; then, certainly, I must have chosen either to write, or not to write. So of every being in the universe. But the decrees of God are what he chooses on the whole. If he chooses on the whole, that thing should exist; that choice is his decree. Hence, it is also abso any decreed either that the wicked conduct of mankind should take place, or that it should not. He must have decreed, either that Judas should betray Christ, or that he should not; either that Pilate should condemn him, or that he should not; either that the Jews should put him to death" by wicked hands," or that they should So of all the wicked conduct which has ever existed in this fallen world; God must certainly have decreed either that it should exist, or that it should not. But, not. 3. It is evident from fact, that God never decreed, that the wicked conduct of mankind should not exist. Wickedness has been practised by all mankind, in every age of the world, from the apostacy of Adam to the present time. God himself has declared, that "the wickedness of man is great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is only evil continually." If, then, God had decreed that evil should not exist; the wickedness of mankind must exist in opposition to his decrees. That is, it must exist in spite of all that God could do to prevent it. For to say, that God is not disposed to accomplish his purposes, is a contradiction. To suppose, then, that God chose, on the whole, to prevent the existence of evil, reduces us to the only alternative of supposing that he is unable to prevent its existence. That evil does exist, and has existed from the days of Adam, cannot be denied. But is God unable to do what he chooses? God is almighty. It is absolutely certain, then, that if he chose, on the whole, to prevent the existence of evil, it would never have had existence. There is no other conclusion possible. God has not decreed that the wicked conduct of mankind should not exist. If, then, God could not have been indifferent respecting the wicked conduct of mankind; and, hence, must have decreed either that it should take place; or that it should not; but never decreed that their wicked conduct should not take place; it appears, to a moral demonstration, that He has decreed their wicked conduct. We may observe, of passages to prove, that God decreed the conduct of Pharaoh; of the wicked Canaanites; of Jeroboam; of Ahab; of Judas Iscariot; and that his eternal determinations extend to all the tribes of the earth, and include all the moral actions of all mankind. But sufficient, it is deemed, has been said, to establish this point; and we hasten to show, H. That the decrees of God afford no excuse for the wicked conduct of mankind. And, 1. Moral good, or moral evil, depends on the nature of the moral action, and not on any decree or determination. The distinction between virtue and vice is found The is agreeable to common sense.— 4. That the truth of this sentiment is established from the abundant testimony of Scripture. When 2. Peter preached to the Jews, on the day of Pentecost, he said unto them, concerning Christ, "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wickeded in the nature of things. This hands have crucified and slain." Again it is written, "For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." The apostles, also, declared concerning the death of Christ and his murderers, "For they that dwell at Jerusalem, and their rulers, because they knew him not, nor yet the voice of the prophets which are read every Sabbath day, they have fulfilled them in condemning him. And though they found no cause of death in him, yet desired they Pilate that he should be slain. And when they had fulfilled all that was written of him, they took him down from the tree, and laid him in a sepulchre." These pas-holiness, during the whole course sages of Scripture abundantly teach, that God had fore-ordained all the conduct of the Jews and rulers toward the Lord Jesus Christ, and caused them to accomplish his purposes; though their motives were entirely sinful, and their conduct grossly criminal in his sight. We might, also, cite a multitude of his mediatorial work. But who will say, that the holiness of the Divine Redeemer was not holiness, or that his conduct was not virtuous; because it was pre-ordained? Who will pretend to say, that the labours of the Apostle Paul were not virtuous and praise-worthy; because he was a chosen vessel, to 649016 A bear the name of Christ to Gentile nations? But if the conduct of good men is truly virtuous and praise-worthy in its own nature, notwithstanding the divine decree; why may not the conduct of wicked men be vicious and blameworthy in its own nature, notwithstanding the Divine decree? Who will say, that the lying spirit, which was fore-ordained and sent into the mouths of all Ahab's prophets, was not a lying spirit, because of the Divine decree? Such an assertion would be perfectly absurd and ridiculous. The wicked conduct of mankind, then, is evil in its own nature; and its quality can never be destroyed by any decree or fore-ordination whatever. But whatever is morally evil, in its own nature, always implies guilt. And whatever implies guilt, renders it absolutely certain that the guilty person has no excuse for his conduct. For no person can justly be considered and treated as guilty, who has any just or reasonable excuse for his moral condict. 2. The decrees of God do not destroy the free agency of mankind. Free agency consists in choosing. This is all the free agency of which we are able to conceive. No one can desire to be any more free, than to act of choice. This is all the free agency there is, or can be, in any being whatever. It is all the free agency that God possesses. He acts voluntarily, and is, therefore, a free agent; and mankind act voluntarily; and are, therefore, free agents. We cannot conceive of any moral being, who does not act of choice. Nów, in order for the decrees of God to destroy the free agency of mankind, they must prevent their choosing. But this is contrary to fact. Who will say, that the Jews and Gentiles did not choose to do as they did, in crucifying the Lord of glory? Who will say, that Judas did not choose to betray Christ; or that Peter did not choose to deny him? Such an assertion would be contrary to common sense. Every one is conscious of choosing to do whatever he does do. But whenever any person acts of choice, it always supposes that he has power or ability to do differently. And this power to do differently, is not destroyed by any divine decree. Those, who act of choice, are certainly under no compulsion. Choice is the very opposite of compulsion. Judas was not compelled to betray his Lord; nor was Peter compelled to deny him. Hence, they both certainly had power to do differently. But still their conduct was decreed and foretold. It is a dictate of common sense, that mankind act freely in all their conduct. But when mankind choose to conduct wickedly, and consequently, are able to conduct otherwise; what excuse can they offer for their sinful conduct? What excuse could the Jews offer for their wicked conduct, in crucifying the Son of God; though it is expressly declared that they fulfilled the Divine purposes? It is a demonstrable fact, and often has been demonstrated, that God has fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass: and it is a demonstrable fact, and often has been demonstrated, that-mankind act freely in all their conduct; and consequently, have no excuse for any sinful action, but are altogether blame-worthy. 3. The holy and wise God condemns mankind for their wicked conduct. He threatens the transgressor with eternal destruction. He says, "Wo unto the wicked! it shall be ill with him; for the reward of his hands shall be given him." And God has actually punished thousands of incorrigible sinners for their wicked conduct. But if we say that the Divine de 66 crees afford mankind an excuse for their wicked conduct; we impeach the Divine character. We virtuik. ally charge God with injustice and E cruelty. But, who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?" Who will rise up, and urge, that God condemns and punishes the wicked, while yet they have a reasonable excuse for their conduct? This is the language of rebellion. It is bringing the highest charges against the Sovereign of the universe. We may add, 66 declared to his face, that he would betray him. But, after the commission of this horrible crime, Judas came and cast down the thirty pieces of silver in the temple, and said, "I have sinned, in that I have betrayed the innocent blood." Peter had been informed of the Divine purposes, that he should surely deny his Lord. But when the deed was done, his conscience smote him," and he went out and wept bitterly." The Jews, also, were pricked in their hearts, at the sermon of Peter, on the day of Pentecost, though he told them plainly, that they had fulfilled the Divine decrees in crucifying the Son of God. Thus the consciences of mankind have condemned them for their wickedness in thousands of instances. Since, then, moral good and evil do not depend on the Divine decrees, but on the nature of moral actions; since the decrees of God 4. That mankind have frequently condemned themselves for their wicked conduct: notwithstanding the Divine decrees, Pharaoh knew the Divine purposes respecting himself; for God told him, that he had in very deed raised him up to fit him for destruction. But the conscience of Pharaoh condemned him for his wickedness, and he was constrained to cry out, at different times, "I have sinned; the LORD IS RIGHTEOUS; but I and my poo-do not destroy the free agency of ple are wicked." The consciences mankind; since the holy and wise of Joseph's brethren smote them God condemns them for their wickfor their wicked conduct; though ed conduct; and since mankind God had "sent" him into Egypt, have so frequently condemned "to preserve them a posterity in themselves, and justified the conthe earth, and to save much people duct of God; we may have the alive." They said one to ano- assurance, that the decrees of God ther, We are verily guilty con- afford not the least excuse for the cerning our brother, in that we saw least transgression. the auguish of his soul, when he besought us, and we would not hear." Judas knew the Divine purposes respecting himself; for his conduct was foretold ages before he was born. Our Lord, also, 66 This subject suggests a number of important inferences, which, by the leave of the Editor, will besubmitted in a subsequent essay. PHILO-HOPKINSIAN. ON REVIVALS OF RELIGION. | it is not easy, in all cases, to dis No. V. The subject introduced in my last essay, was the distinction between a genuine and a spurious revival. It was then discussed in part only. It was observed, that tinguish between a genuine and a spurious work, because they are so often intermixed with each other, and because they have so many points of resemblance. A few remarks were made on the nature of false religion, and a definition of a sparious revival was given. Some of the points of resemblance between a genuine and a spurious work were then brought into view, and the subject left for the consideration of my readers. In this essay, and the following, I propose to point out some of the principal marks of distinction. saved; he begins to resort to reli- He 1. In a genuine revival, there is real conviction of sin; in a spurious one there is not. There is, indeed, in a spurious revival, much that is called conviction. We often hear the word applied to every degree of awakening, let its nature be what it may. Whenever a sinner is alarmed, whenever he feels a sense of his danger, whenever he begins to manifest any anxiety for securing his eternal happiness, he is said to be under conviction. If this were the proper meaning of the word, there could be no distinction made, in this respect, beBut when the work is genuine, tween a genuine and a spurious it goes deeper. The sinner disrevival. Such appearances are covers that the law of God is spircommon to both. But this is not itual and holy, and extends much the proper meaning of the word. farther than he had before thought. Conviction of sin is something very He sees that it reaches to every different from all this. To pro- secret desire and purpose of the duce all this, nothing more is nec- soul, and requires perfect obediessary, than that the sinner should ence, on pain of eternal death. In realize that God is angry with him, the light of the law, thus set home and disposed to punish him accord-upon his conscience, he obtains a ing to his deserts. He is indeed, new discovery of the temper of his convinced that he is a sinner; for own heart. He sees that it is all no man can refuse to acknowledge sin. He now realizes that he has that. But his sense of his sins is done nothing but sin all his life. obtained by looking over his past He now sees that his heart is enlife, and considering the outward mity against God; and considering acts of transgression with which he himself in God's hands, and that has been chargeable. And per- God will probably destroy him forhaps he takes into view, also, ever, to glorify his own great name, some of the grosser sins of the he feels his heart rise, and rage, heart, such as the indulgence of with a spite and malice, of which unlawful desires, and the plans of he before thought himself incapawickedness he has contrived.- ble. He no longer denies the docComparing these with the threat-trine of total depravity. He knows enings of divine vengeance, which it is true in his own case. He sound in his ears, he is alarmed sees that all his prayers and tears and filled with anxiety. He begins and cries have been selfish and to enquire what he must do to be wicked. He is no longer able to a |