justly wonder, that the whole system of truth did not break in upon them at once. We have great reason to be thankful, that they were enabled to lay such a foundation, and that others, in succeeding ages, have, in any measure, raised and improved the superstructure: yet I will not presume to say, that all protestants are now agreed in what I take to be the truth here; it would be much for the credit, and much for the interest of their cause, if they were: and we ought earnestly to pray, that God, by his Spirit of goodness and love, would purge out the remainder of that old leaven, which still sours the hearts of some. But, I persuade myself, I am about to represent sentiments, in which multitudes of worthy and excellent men, of all parties amongst us, concur; and they seem to be breaking in on men's minds with a growing light: May it shine more and more, until the perfect day! The protestant doctrine on this head, so far as protestants are consistent with themselves, seems plainly to be this: "That none are to be subjected to any kind or degrees of civil penalties, merely on account of their religious opinions, or for any practices arising from them, if those practices be not detrimental to the peace of society, which the magistrate, by his office, stands engaged to preserve."

We readily allow, that if any man's religious principles carry him on to any actions injurious to others, in their persons or properties, he is to be restrained and punished, as any other offender might be. Should any man, for instance, offer his son as a sacrifice to Moloch, he would justly be treated as a murderer, notwithstanding any plea of conscience which he might pretend to make. For the magistrate has no business with conscience, which is entirely under the jurisdiction of God, but must never be allowed as an excuse for an action injurious to others; for this very obvious reason, that if it should be so allowed, there would be no room for any penal laws at all, and consequently all civil government would be overthrown. For a bold and impudent malefactor would never fail to have recourse to this easy and unanswerable apology, if his judges were so weak as to ad

Nor can we indeed imagine any blacker villainies, than those which some have pretended to cominit for conscience-sake.

We likewise grant, on the same principle as before, that if any man's religion necessarily subject him to the obedience of a foreign prince, the government under which he is born and protected, has a right, by the grand law of self-preservation, to insist on some more than ordinary security for his good behaviour in such circumstances. And this is evidently the case of the papists amongst us. They are under such obligations in conscience

to obey the pope, and to submit themselves to whatsoever prince he shall see fit to establish here, that they are at best but very precarious subjects to that royal family which the gracious providence of the Almighty has been pleased to fix on the throne of these nations; especially while there is a pretender to that throne devoted to the see of Rome, and espoused by it. Justly therefore may the present government insist on such security from them, as it does not demand from other subjects. And if in consequence of this, some hardships should fall on a few peaceable and well-disposed persons, who are too wise and honest to act to the utmost of what their own principles would warrant, it must be borne as an inconvenience inseparable from present circumstances. And perhaps it is an inconvenience less than those very persons might suffer, from the establishment of a religion so oppressive and tyrannical, as popery always appears, when it comes to be arrayed with the robe of the magistrate, and armed with his sword. However, it is a pleasure to every good-natured protestant, to think, that what they can suffer by the laws put in execution against them, is not very extreme; and that they suffer this, not for believing transubstantiation, or purgatory, nor for praying to saints, or bowing down before images; but merely for acknowledging the supremacy of the Pope, a doctrine so hurtful to all other supreme authority, that it is amazing all the princes in Europe have not long ago renounced it with the utmost disdain.

Allowing for such cases as these, which are not properly exceptions, we still maintain our proposition in its utmost extent; and assert, that unless God, the searcher of hearts, is pleased to interpose by a special revelation, which there is now no reason to believe he will ever do, taking the matter on the principle of human reason, or of the christian religion, no man is to suffer the least degree of punishment, either in his person or property, on account of his religious opinions, or of any practice consequent upon them, which is not an overt act, plainly inconsistent with the public peace, and punishable in another subject. They who are for a toleration limited, as good Mr. Baxter used unhappily to express it, "to errors which are not quite intolerable ;" and would have such punished at least with fines and imprisonments, if not with greater severities, seem not to be aware of the consequences of their own scheme: and, as Dr. Owen very forcibly speaks, in his excellent Treatise of Toleration*, "They had need to examine their light; for their tenet

*Which, by the way, goes on as large principles, as Mr. Locke's afterwards did, and contains what is most essential in the controversy.

must lead down to the chambers of blood." We do not indeed pretend to say, that the Magistrate is obliged to make such provision for maintaining and accommodating those whom he apprehends to be teachers of error, as he may for those who are of his own sentiments, and consequently, whom he believes on the side of truth. This would be carrying matters to an excess; but surely, he has no right to inflict any penalties upon them, nor, in any degree, to abridge them in those liberties, which peaceable subjects are entitled to. And if he may exclude any from such places of civil trust, as their capacity, experience and fidelity might otherwise qualify them for, merely because their religious persuasions, and their modes of worship, differ from his own, it is upon principles, which I am yet to learn; nor can I perceive at present, how they are to be reconciled with those of a christian, and a protestant.

You will easily imagine, what reason I had to be thus particular in stating, and in guarding my proposition. I proceed, II. To offer some obvious, but important considerations, for the proof of it.

And here I shall particularly shew, that persecution, for conscience-sake, in all its kinds and degrees, is built on the absurd supposition, that one man has a right to judge for another, in matters of religion;-That it contradicts the grand principle of doing to others, as we would think it reasonable they should do to us ;-That it is by no means calculated to answer the end pretended to be aimed at by it ;-but, on the other hand, tends to introduce a great deal of mischief and confusion, and to overthrow truth and religion in the world.-On these accounts, it is inconsistent with natural religion;-and it appears from the whole tenor of the christian revelation, that it is most contrary to that.

1. Persecution for conscience-sake, i. e. inflicting penalties on men, merely for their religious principles or worship, is plainly founded on an absurd supposition, that one man has a right to judge for another, in matters of religion.

How absurd this supposition is, has been fully proved at large, by many excellent writers in this controversy; and you have, no doubt, often heard, how contemptibly weak those arguments are, by which the Romish church would appropriate this right to itself. Nevertheless, absurd as their pretence to infallibility is, I confess there is much more consistency in the persecutions of those who claim such a privilege, than of those who acknowledge they are destitute of it. Can any man, with

the least colour of reason, pretend that I have a right to judge for myself, and yet punish me for using it? That is, for doing that which he acknowledges I have a right to do. To plead for it, would be a direct contradiction in terms. And if it should be said, as some have most weakly asserted, that the erroneous are to be punished, not for their opinions, but for their actions in consequence of those opinions, I would then enquire, for what actions? And how are these actions condemned? Not on account of their tendency to disturb and annoy the public; for that case has already been excluded from the charge of persecution and, when that is excluded, I repeat the question, How are those actions condemned? Why, the persecutor must say, "I know them to be contrary to the divine law." But, how do you prove, that you are not mistaken? If you allow of argument on the head, you give up the cause of persecution so far. If you wave argument, you only, in effect, say, "The actions are wrong, because I condemn them; i. e. in other words, I am infallible, I am to judge for myself and you; and, by a parity of reason, for all the world besides." And who might not make that pretence? Or, how should it ever be decided but by the sword, in the present circumstances?

2. Persecution is most evidently inconsistent with that obvious and fundamental principle of morality, That we should do to others, as we could reasonably desire they should do to us.

This is a rule which carries its own demonstration along with it; and it was intended on purpose to take off that bias of self-love, which would draw us aside from the strait line of equity, and lead us to be partial judges between our neighbours and ourselves. Now, I would ask the advocate of wholesome severities, How he would relish his own arguments, if they were turned upon himself! What if he were to go abroad into the world, amongst papists, if he be a protestant; amongst mahometans, if he be a christian? Supposing he was to behave like an honest man, like a good neighbour, like a peaceable subject; avoiding whatever would injure and provoke, and taking all opportunities to serve and oblige those about him: would he think that, merely because he refused to follow his neighbours to their altars, or their mosques, he should be seized and imprisoned, his goods confiscated, and his person condemned to tortures, or death? Undoubtedly, he would complain of this as a very great hardship. And what if one, who heard him plead for religious severities at home, were to remind him of it, would he not be wounded with his own arrows? What could he answer? "I am in the right and these people are in the wrong."

Nay, would the inquisitor, or the Turk, cry full as loudly as he, "But we are in the right:" and they might justly add, “With what face can you complain of us, for treating you in such a manner, as, you must confess, you should think yourself bound in conscience to treat us, if we were in your power, as you are in ours?" Surely, a man would see the absurdity and injustice of such a treatment, when it fell upon him; when, with such measure as he had meted to others, it was measured to him again. And accordingly, I must observe, as many have done, that the effect of this argument is so cogent, that those who, when they have had the power in their own hands, have been least willing to tolerate others, have immediately found new light breaking in upon them, as soon as they have needed toleration themselves.

3. Persecution is evidently absurd, as it is, by no means, calculated to answer the end which its patrons profess to intend by it.

I say, which they profess to intend: for if the priests do really intend to make the laity slaves, that they may exalt their own empire, and increase their possessions, it may indeed very probably answer that end; and these holy men may make themselves fat with the sin and plunder of the people, and purchase church-lands with the price of their blood. But, to save appearances at least, they profess to intend the glory of God, and the salvation of men; for so you know the forms of the inquisition run, "To answer to sundry questions relating to their soul's health, as well as the correction of their manners and excess." Now, I beseech you, let it be seriously considered, how persecution can be like to do good to men's souls.

To be sure, if it does them good at all, it must be, by making them truly religious. But what is true religion? Is it to repeat a creed, or subscribe a confession, to wear a name, or perform a ceremony? If it be, I am sure religion is much changed from what it was, when the scriptures were writ: and the nature of God must be entirely changed too, before such a religion can be acceptable to him, or before it can have the least value in his sight.

True religion must be founded in the inward conviction of the mind, or it is impossible it should be what yet it must be, a Reasonable service *. And pray let it be considered what violence and persecution can do, towards pro

*Rom, xii. 1.