tation, have affirmed, that I had in that paffage, openly declared against charity. This hath induced me, on notice of a fecond edition being intended, to offer a few reflections on this fubject; which I hope fhall be conducted in as cool and critical a manner, as can in reafon be defired, that I may not offend against charity, even when writing upon the fubje&t.

Let me begin by fettling precifely the fubject of the inquiry. It will, or at least ought to be, acknowledged, that with many the current meaning of the word charity is, to have a favorable opinion of the fentiments of others, who are fuppofed to differ from us; that is to fay (for it is not very easy to define it clearly) to think, that they are innocently mistaken in judgment, and that they have as honeftly inquired after truth as ourselves; and therefore to conclude, that as perfons truly fincere, and acting according to their light, they fhall meet with the final acceptance of God. That this is the meaning with many, if it should be denied, I prove from the following circumftance, that charity in fentiment, or charity in general (except when it is taken in a limited fenfe, as fignifying bounty to the poor) is always applied to those who differ from us, and never to those who agree with us; and indeed it is about the difference that it is fuppofed to be exercifed.

1. Now, the first thing I obferve upon this is, that if the above be the fcripture meaning of charity, then certainly fome bounds must be fet to it; and it must be praise or blame worthy according to the cafes in which it is exercifed. I make this fuppofition, because though it is propofed in the courfe of thefe remarks, to fhow, that the above is not the fcripture meaning of the word; yet there is really, within certain limits, a duty of this kind prefcribed to us in feripture, but never called charity. The duty I mean is mutual forbearance, and guarding against rafh judgment; but it is remarkable, that neither in the defcription of this duty, nor in the arguments urging to the practice of it, is the word charity, or the neceffity of charity, ever once introduced.a The proper objects of

1

a I do not know whether I fhould call it an exception from this, that in one paffage, when the Apostle Paul is fpeaking of

forbearance are matters of indifference, or rather matters of comparatively small moment; and the fin of rafh judging confifts in believing things to be of more moment than they are, and attributing outward actions or expreffions to bad motives or principles, without neceffity. I fay, without neceffity; becaufe it is allowed by every judicious and accurate writer upon rafh judging, that a perfon cannot be chargeable with this fin, merely for thinking ill of another's temper or practice, upon clear and irrefiftible evidence. To do otherwife, in many cafes, is either wholly impoffible, or argues a weakness of underftanding; which cannot be the object of approbation, nor confequently of imitation.

Let us therefore fuppofe, that this duty of forbearance, which indeed I take to be wholly diftin&t in its nature, is the charity fo ftrongly recommended, and fo highly applauded in fcripture, and that it is to be exercised with regard to the opinions of others. In that cafe it must have certain bounds, for the following reasons,

1. If it were otherwise, we should then either want a

meaning for many declarations and precepts in fcripture; or, which is worse, fhould perceive them to be evidently abfurd and ill founded. That I may not tire the reader, I fhall not adduce the tenth part of what is faid on this fabject in fcripture; but muft beg of him to weigh the following paffages, and to make fome reflections on their manifeft purpose: Jude v. 3, 4, “ Beloved, when I gave "all diligence to write unto you of the common falvation, it was needful for me to write unto you, and ex“hort you, that ye fhould earnestly contend for the faith "which was once delivered unto the faints. For there

are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of

the oppofite fins, of judging others on the one hand, or defpifing them on the other, he introduces walking charitably. But it is in a fenfe quite oppofite to what it would have been used in by one pleading for the modern charity. It is not the man who judges rafhly that he charges with uncharitablenefs, but him who defpifeth his weak brother, and is at no pains to avoid giving offence: Rom. xiv. 15. "But if thy brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkeft thou not charitably. Deftroy not him with thy meat for whom Chrift died.”

"old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men, turning the grace of our God into lafcivioufnefs, and deny. "ing the only Lord God, and our Lord Jefus Chrift."— Here I think is plainly a duty with regard to opinions, altogether different from that of forbearance. The one requires us not fo much as to judge our brethren; the other requires us to contend earnestly with them. The one fuppofes the trifling difference to be wholly buried; the other implies, that it should be kept clearly in view, and all poffible pains taken to fupport the truth, and to refute the error. The one fuppofes entire peace and union; the other implies a firm and refolute oppofition, so as to come to no terms which imply confent or approbation. The phrafeology through the whole paffage teaches us to interpret it as I have done; "There are certain men,” fays he, "crept in unawares;" plainly fignifying, that if they had not crept in fecretly, they would not, or ought not to have been fuffered to come in openly. Now, if charity and forbearance be the fame thing, here are some perfons defcribed, whom we are not to forbear, and confequently for whom we are to have no charity: therefore it muft have fome limitation. Let it be as extenfive as you will, it is not boundless.

Titus i. 10, 11, 13. "For there are many unruly and "vain talkers and deceivers, especially they of the cir "cumcifion: whose mouths must be flopped, who fubvert "whole houses, teaching things which they ought not, for filthy lucre's fake.-Wherefore, rebuke them fharply, that they may be found in the faith." Now, let me afk any unprejudiced reader, whether fharp rebuke be not a very different thing from forbearance? How can you rebuke those whom you may not fo much as judge? or why fhould you attempt to make them found in the faith, if they are already received of God? As it is expreffed, Rom. xiv. 3. Befides, what is the meaning of fubverting whole houfes and of flopping the mouths of the falfe teachers, to prevent or remedy this fubverfion? In the fame epiftle, chap. iii. 10. the apoftle fays, "A man that is an heretic, after the firft and fecond admonition, re"ject." Does not this fuppofe, that it is poffible for a je&t.”

man to be a heretic? Does not the apoftle here ordain a fentence of expulfion to be paffed against him, after the pains taken to reclaim him appear to be fruitlefs? It is plain, therefore, that if charity be the fame with forbearance, it must have lim for if every body must be forborn, then certainly nobody can be expelled.

I must not here pafs by an astonishing interpretation put by fome, and men of learning too, upon the following verfe of the fame chapter: "Knowing that he that is fuch, "is fubverted and finneth, being condemned of himself;" that is, fay fome, no man is an heretic in the fenfe of this paffage, but who is felf-condemned, or is acting contrary to his own conviction; fo that he must be rejected, not for the error of his judgment, but for the obftinacy and depravation of his heart. I do not remember to have seen any stronger inftance of the power of prejudice, than giving fuch a fenfe to the word self-condemned. If any man can really conceive a cafe in his own mind, of a heretic obftinately perfifting in his error, and fuffering for it, in oppofition to his own inward conviction, and at the fame time this circumftance clearly afcertained as the foundation of his fentence, I wish he would teach me how to conceive it at prefent it feems to me utterly inpoffible. If any perfon thus fpeaks lies in hypocrify, is it to be fuppofed, that he will confefs it? and if he do not confefs, how is it poffible to prove it? The plain meaning of being condemned of himfelf, in this paffage, is, that his errors are fo contradictory to the other articles of his faith, fuch an abjuration of his former profeffion, and generally tend fo much to immorality in practice, that he is condemned as it were out of his own mouth.

In the 2d epiftle of John, the apofile fays, ver. 9, 10, II. "Whosoever tranfgreffeth, and abideth not in the doctrine. of Chrift, hath not God: he that abideth in the doctrine of Chrift, he hath both the Father and the Son. If there "come any unto you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your houfe; neither bid him God speed: "for he that biddeth him God fpeed, is partaker of his evil "deeds." I fhall not ftay to examine nicely the import of not receiving fuch a one into our house, and not bidding

him God fpeed. It is fufficient for my purpose, that no fense can be put upon it low enough to make it agreeable to the treatment we ought to give to our brethren whom we are forbidden to judge. These we are to receive, as Christ hath received them, and ta keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.

To all thefe I only add, without any reflection upon it, the reproof of Chrift to the church of Pergamos: Rev. ii. 14. "But I have a few things against thee, because thou "haft there them that hold the doctrine of Balaam, who "taught Balac to caft a ftumbling-block before the children "of Ifrael, to eat things facrificed unto idols, and to com"mit fornication. So haft thou alfo them that hold the "doctrine of the Nicolaitans, which thing I hate."

2. If charity be the fame with forbearance, it must have limits, or it would be the ftrongeft impeachment of divine wisdom and goodness, in not giving marks fufficiently clear to diftinguifh truth from falfehood. If we are to entertain a favorable opinion of the fentiments and flate of others, it must be entirely founded on the fuppofition, that they have inquired with honefty and impartiality; and that they are not blinded by prejudice or corrupt paffions. This I fuppofe will be readily allowed; because it is the ufual way of speaking or writing on the subject. They may be mistaken,' it is often faid, but without their fault: they may have freely and impartially inqui 'red, and yet may, after all, think differently with equal fincerity. This, I contend, can only hold in matters of fmall moment, and in themfelves of a doubtful nature; and in these, the obfervation is juft, and correfponds with reafon, fcripture, and experience. But in truths of the highest moment, if there are any fuch at all, to fuppofe that men equally fincere and impartial, may, notwithstanding, have fentiments directly oppofite, feems to me an impeach. ment of divine wisdom. How can it be, unless the evidences for and against them, be pretty equally balanced? How is the judgment determined at all, but by a fort of compound ratio, to fpeak in the language of mathematicians, of the outward evidence, and the prepoffeffion of the mind? Strong prepoffeffions will account for any opi