should plan or ordain, or decree, or purpose, or be the proponent of an economy of wrong." The doctrine is, that a divine arrangement, method, purpose, permission, consent, involves an element of vitality which gives realization to the subject matter of the purpose or plan. So that to deeree sin, or permit it, or consent to it, as in any proper sense in accordance with the mind and will of God, is to be the author, actor, efficient cause of sin. Now if this reasoning is valid in its application to sin, it is equally so in its application to holiness. Dr. S. teaches that "all free agency is cause," "it has an executive faculty; it has in itself the prerequisites of conduct, and character, and rightful destiny, in a voluntary executiveness." "Capacity is the measure of accountability; man is held responsible for such truth as he can understand, and such righteousness as is in his power." "All morality resides in that which is cause, and all cause is personal cause, and resides inherently in all intelligence." If Dr. Squier reasons well respecting God's relation to moral evil, then we may say also that holiness as sin in the finite, does not take place in any proper sense in accordance with the mind and will of God; because if he decrees, ordains, purposes or permits holiness in finite beings, He is the sole author and actor of it; for God "purposes and ordains and arranges only what He does as efficient cause." This certainly appears to be inconsistent with the plain teachings of Scripture. When it is affirmed that we arethe workmanship of God, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, for which God before prepared us, that we should do them," there is implied if not asserted, a divine plan or arrangement respecting the conduct of free agents, and yet the good works are their own and not God's. "Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son;" here too is a purpose or decree respecting the conduct of moral beings, yet conformity or holiness is of them as voluntary agents. I have chosen you and ordained you that you should go and bring forth fruit." "For God hath not appointed us to wrath, but to obtain salvation." "Being disobedient, whereunto also they were appointed." In these three passages the words ordained and appointed, have the same original. Tips has necessarily the idea of designation, appointment, purpose, yet obedience and disobedience are of men. If God is the efficient cause of all he purposes, plans, or permits as "in some proper sense in accordance with his mind and will," then he either does not purpose or permit sin and holiness, or if he does, he is the efficient cause of both. We see, however, no reason for doubting that God purposes and permits sin as really

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as holiness, and yet in neither one nor the other as an actuality, is the fulness of moral freedom impaired; and that He predestinates to wrath as really as to mercy, and yet men destroy themselves, and in a proper meaning of the language, work out their own salvation. A being may be properly said to purpose the known consequences of his own voluntary acts. These truths both reason and scripture oblige us to believe.

The extreme position of Dr. S. respecting God's relation to moral evil, appears to be taken under the notion, that any other view of the case renders God the author, actor, cause of sin. If this does not separate the Creator and providential Governor of the Universe entirely from his moral creation as a race of sinners, it denies that He orders or arranges the operations of finite intelligence, or that sin and holiness occur in any proper sense according to his will, without constituting him the efficient cause of the same. This view of God's position towards evil, has for its counterpart, the human race, as finite cause, setting up, by a sort of coup d'etat, an economy of wrong within the divine economy, totally distinct and apart from it, in no sense according to the decree, purpose, plan or permission of God. "It is not by his warrant, or prescription, or permission. An enemy hath done this. It is wholly of them that sin." (p. 135.) Here then are the most considerable and momentous events of the world's history, which have transpired entirely apart from any plan, or purpose, or permission of "God that made the world, and all things therein;" and indeed in some sense without his foreknowledge,—if we understand Dr. Squier; for he regards foreknowledge as implying "an intention and a confidence as all the truth in its contents." And so he says "it is obviously not necessary that God should arrange the wrong in the finite in order for it to be; or in order for him to encounter it successfully." We confess that we have not been accustomed to consider the economy of God, or the system which he has chosen, as embracing only physical phenomena, events in which God is sole cause, excluding all finite will and intelligence, as originating, and occupying, and acting in an economy of its own. Doth God take care for oxen only? Was the sin of Adam, and the defection which marks his posterity, merely an unfortunate occurrence out of the sphere of God's economy, and for which he made no provision in the system which he established? Was the plan of redemption through Christ merely a supplement to the original arrangement of God? Was not rather the purpose of redemption cotemporaneous with the purpose of creation? and was not the sin of man foreknown, and a place assigned for it

in the economy of God? The certainty of sin and holiness in the finite, may be foreknown of God, and secured by him through laws of influence which are consistent with moral freedom; and by this means He is equally Lord over that which is evil, as over that which is good. Dr. Squier has stated substantially the true doctrine of moral liberty when he says:- we are open to influences which are not of our constituent being, and it is the nature of our executive faculty to act freely and responsibly, under and in view of them." The divine arrangement and use of these influences, meaning merely external antecedents of volition, may secure the certainty of sin and holiness, and liberty of will be inviolate. With this principle, there need be but one economy, one divine system, embracing not simply physical causes and their phenomena, but all finite intelligence, in which man shall be free, and yet all events occur in some proper sense according to the mind and will of God.

Any attempt to account for moral evil by simply denying that God has anything to do with it, and that it exists in an economy of its own, without any plan, or purpose, or permission of God, will fail to give satisfaction. There is in most minds an innate reverence for God, as the Creator, and moral Governor of men; there is a clear conviction also, that his kingdom ruleth over all; that all things in the natural and moral world occur in some proper sense according to his will, with his foreknowledge and permission of the same; the conviction is equally clear and prevalent that God is holy, and infinitely removed from any dishonorable relations to the sins of men. These convictions are well enough expressed by the Assembly of Divines: "God did from eternity freely ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creature; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established." Whether or not these words represent precisely the truth as it lies in most minds, they do assert some general principles which can never be controverted. They represent convictions which lie far deeper in the mind than any vices of old theologies; they cannot be shaken by any art of logic, or boldness of dogmatism.

We have intimated already, that "The Problem" which we expected to find, was not discussed, nor fully stated, much less solved, in the book of Dr. Squier. In the last chapter, the suggestion is made that "A moral system is inherently capable of sin, and liable to it, and could not be otherwise." If Dr. S. had informed us why God adopted a moral system inhe

rently liable to sin; or why he did not so arrange the laws of influence over moral beings, as to enable Him to prevent sin, and yet leave them to act with entire freedom and responsibility, he would at least have written a different book.

The subject which seems to be particularly discussed is,"that sin is not a divine method or expedient; that in its inception, progress and fruits, it is not of God; that as a method and a fact it exists solely in the finite, and through apostasy, and against the will of God, and that God holds Himself, or may be justly held, no way responsible for it, or its mischiefs, save in the exercise of Infinite wisdom to prevent and limit, to remedy and punish it, and draw instruction from it." (p. 85.) The sentiments here quoted are repeated often, and in divers forms of speech. With a little qualification, they are common opinions. It was not necessary to write a book to prove that, in simple language, "sin is not of God." With a few unimportant exceptions this has ever been the doctrine of Christian teachers in the church. Even those who have used the form of words, "sin is necessary in order to the greatest good of the universe," or have in some sort sanctioned the use of language implying that God was the author of iniquity, did not intend to affirm that man was not the free and sole agent in his sin, but only that God rendered it certain. The expression, "sin is the necessary means of the greatest good," is now generally discarded; and those who used it twenty-five years ago, indignantly deny that they intended by it that God was in any sense the efficient cause or actor of sin. That man is a responsible agent, and sole efficient cause of his sin, is a general, if not the only doctrine of the churches. Dr. Dwight has stated it with great clearness: "Man is the actor of his own sin. It is wholly his own; chargeable only to himself; chosen by him unnecessarily, while possessed of a power to choose otherwise; avoidable by him; and of course guilty and punishable. Exactly the same natural power is possessed by him, while a sinner, which is afterwards possessed by him, when a saint; which Adam possessed before he fell; and which the holy Angels now possess in Heaven. This power is, also, in my view, perfect freedom; a power of agency, as absolute as can be possessed by an intelligent creature." (Thol. vol. i, p. 414.) The general statements of Dr. Squier that sin is not of God, that man is sole actor, cause of his own sin, are readily admitted. But when it is asserted that all things, including the actions of moral beings, do not occur in any proper sense in accordance with the mind and will of God; that sin is not by his purpose, consent, or permission, for the reason that if true,

God is the efficient cause of sin, we do not hesitate to pronounce it bad doctrine and bad logic. Sin may have its origin in finite cause, and still be strictly metaphysically true that God permits it.

We have a somewhat decided aversion to those extreme views of theology and philosophy, which shut us up to the belief of one of two things, between which, after all, there is little ground for choice. If we adopt the logic of Dr. Squier, we must believe that all the operations of finite cause, or all free actions of moral beings, good and bad, are in no proper sense according to the mind and will of God, or that He is the efficient cause and actor of sin. We accept neither one nor the other. When Dr. E. Beecher, who discusses a kindred subject, by his masterly (bad) logic offers the alternative of believing that the relations of God to men are inconsistent with the principles of honor and right, or that man sinned in a preexistent state, no one takes much pains to refute the logic or deny the fiction; most minds reject both as necessarily false; and his book comes naturally to receive quasi admiration from Ballou, and be criticised by James and other amateur errant theologues and philosophers.

It is well that doctrines or dogmas which have long been received as true, should be examined, and set aside if found to be false; we find no fault with such a course. But when any established doctrine is called in question by some astute logician, and in his great strength, he breaks away from the trammels of "old theologies," he ought to offer some better doctrine, which shall "trammel up the consequence" of his attack.

We commend the book to those interested in the subject discussed; they cannot fail to derive some benefit from its perusal. We submit whether, instead of writing "The Problem Solved," at the beginning of the book, it had not been better to write Q. E. D., at the end; so that unsatisfied readers could interpret it to suit themselves?

Is Christianity from God? or A Manual of Bible evidence for the People. By the Rev. JOHN CUMMING, D. D., Minister of the Scottish National Church, London. With an Introduction by Hon. THEODORE FRELINGHUYSEN. New York: M. W. Dodd. pp. 276. New Haven: F. T. Jarman.

The Introduction to this book sets forth its true character. "It is a Manual of Christian evidence, combining, by very skillful and happy arrangement, brevity, variety and force of argument for the truth of Christianity." Dr. Cumming presents in an attractive and popular manner, the evidence of the Soul's Immortality; the Existence of God; the probability of