unmixed with doubt, can be obtained without diligent inquiry, proceeding from personal interest in the subject?

MR. B.

Certainly not, if you mean rational conviction.

EDWARD.

But if so, where is the right of censuring those, who, not feeling sufficient interest in the subject, have no motive for inquiry?

MR. B.

But why do they not feel sufficient interest in the subject? Can a rational creature be justified in regarding what assumes to be a revelation of the will of his Creator with indifference?

EDWARD.

But might not a Deist rationally think that the world would do very well without Christianity, without any revelation?

MR. B.

If you put this question with reference to the knowledge of God and of our moral duty, as existing at the present day, which we can deduce from first principles, and which is generally termed natural religion, your objection is unfairly stated; for the advocate for revelation argues, that the very knowledge which we now possess would, in

all probability, never have existed without revelation. You assume the point in dispute, if you take it for granted that all the religious knowledge which we are now enabled to found upon principles of strict reasoning, exclusively of revelation, has been discovered by the mere light of

reason.

"The lights of reason and revelation fall upon our path in rays so blended, that we walk like the summer evening traveller, who, enjoying at the same time the full orb of the moon, and the sun's solstitial twilight, is unable to ascertain the proportion in which he is indebted to each of these heavenly luminaries: and some of us, alas! are such incompetent philosophers, as, because the greater is below our horizon, to attribute all to the less." - NAPLETON's Advice to a Student in Divinity.

EDWARD.

But the advocate for revelation is no more at liberty to assume, that our present knowledge of God and of our duty arises from revelation, than the Deist to affirm, that reason alone is sufficient.

Certainly not.

MR. B.

EDWARD.

But if we may argue from analogy and the powers of the mind, as developed in other pursuits, may we not infer that reason is sufficient without revelation for our guidance?

MR. B.

If the discovery of our duty towards God and man, as founded in religion, were a matter of mere curiosity, perhaps I might partially admit the truth of your supposition; but it is a matter of infinitely too much importance for us to suppose, that the great Creator would leave it to be developed only in a long course of ages, by the slow advance of real knowledge and certain truth.

BEATRICE.

Admitting the possibility of human reason being sufficient to discover the truth, do you not see, brother, that, arguing from analogy, many ages would elapse, in all probability, before the principles of natural religion would be so established as to become binding upon the bulk of mankind?

MR. B.

But we need not argue only from analogy and the probabilities of the case let us refer to facts, and you will find that the common sense of mankind is against you. Almost all nations have some notion of there having been a revelation or communication from the Creator to his creatures. Many have had their laws and civil polity founded in the idea of something of the kind; and the philosophers of old, who were sceptical as to the truth of the popular religions, agreed as to their

want of divine revelation to declare the will of God. Now subsequently to the establishment of Christianity this want of divine aid has no longer been felt, and there is therefore considerable probability that Christianity is a divine revelation from the very argument brought forward by the Deists, as to there now being no necessity for any revelation; nor can this be overthrown, except by shewing, not only that reason possibly might arrive at similar conclusions, as to natural religion and moral obligation, without the aid of revelation, but also that there is a strong probability that it actually did so, and that the results were imputed to revelation, for the sake of giving greater authority to them in the eyes of those who would be little disposed to acquiesce in conclusions, backed only by their intrinsic excellence and the authority of their fellow-men.

EDWARD.

There certainly would be a want of authority to establish the principles of natural religion, which revelation alone could supply. But is there that prima facie NECESSITY of inquiring into the truth of an alleged revelation which is generally supposed? May not a person leave the matter to be discussed by those who are so disposed, without troubling himself about it, provided he invariably obeys the dictates of conscience?

MR. B.

But how can he be said invariably to obey the dictates of conscience, who neglects to inform himself upon this subject? In order to establish your point, you should shew, that mankind are under no obligation to endeavour to obey the will of God; for if they are, they must be under a necessity of inquiring into that will; and if not, there is an end of all religion, whether revealed or natural. The advocate for revelation argues thus, and I do not see how his reasoning can be overthrown: that, from whatever sources our knowledge may have been obtained, it is certain there is a God, the Creator of all things, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, and consequently a moral governor: that, from the relation in which man is placed to him, and the course of providence, it is probable he may have made a revelation of his will; and therefore no one is at liberty to reject, without inquiry, that which professes to be a divine revelation, unless it involves such evident absurdity that inquiry becomes needless.

BEATRICE.

The Christian would also insist further, that there is not any such evident absurdity in the supposition that Christianity is of divine origin, and hence would infer, that no one could be justified in neglecting it.