part in the controversy. When the opponent pushes hard and gives just and mortal wounds to our own opinion, our passions are very apt to feel the strokes, and to rise in resentment and defence. Self is so mingled with the sentiments which we have chosen, and has such a tender feeling of all the opposition which is made to them, that personal brawls are very ready to come in as seconds, to succeed and finish the dispute of opinions. Then noise and clamour and folly appear in all their shapes, and chase reason and truth out of sight.

How unhappy is the case of frail and wretched mankind, in this dark or dusky state of strong passion and glimmering reason? How ready are we, when our passions are engaged in the dispute, to consider more what loads of nonsense and reproach we can lay upon our opponent, than what reason and truth require in the controversy itself. Dismal are the consequences mankind are too often involved in by this evil principle; it is this common and dangerous practice that carries the heart aside from all that is fair and honest in our search after truth, or the propagation of it in the world. One would wish, from one's very soul, that none of the christian fathers had been guilty of such follies as these.

But St. Jerome fairly confesses this evil principle, in his apology for himself to Pammachius, that he had not so much regarded what was exactly to be spoken in the controversy he had in hand, as what was fit to lay load on Jovinian. And indeed, I fear this was the vile custom of many of the writers, even in the church-affairs of those. times. But it will be a double scandal upon us in our more enlightened age, if we will allow ourselves in a conduet

so criminal and dishonest. Happy souls who keep such a sacred dominion over their inferior and animal powers, and all the influences of pride and secular interest, that the sensitive tumults or these vicious influences never rise to disturb the superior and better operations of the reasoning mind!

XIV. These general directions are necessary, or at least useful in all debates whatsoever, whether they arise in occasional conversation or are appointed at any certain time or place; whether they are managed with or without any formal rules to govern them. But there are three sorts of disputation in which there are some forms and orders observed, and which are distinguished by these three names, viz. Socratic, Forensic and Academic, i. e. the disputes of the schools.

Concerning each of these it may not be improper to discourse a little and give a few particular directions or remarks about them.

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CHAPTER XI.

The Socratical way of disputation.

I. THIS method of dispute derives its name from Socrates, by whom it was practised, and by other philosophers in his age long before Aristotle invented the particular forms of syllogism in mood and figure, which are now used in scholastic disputations.

II. The Socratical way is managed by questions and answers in such a manner as this, viz. If I would lead a person into the belief of a heaven and a hell, or a future state of rewards and punishments, I might begin in some such manner of enquiry, and suppose the most obvious and easy answers:

Ques. Does not God govern the world?

Ans. Surely he that made it governs it.

Ques. Is not God both a good and righteous governor ?

Ans. Both these characters doubtless belong to him.

Ques. What is the true notion of a good and righteous governor ?

Ans. That he punishes the wicked and rewards the good.

Ques. Are the good always rewarded in this life?

Ans. No surely, for many virtuous men are miserable here, and greatly afflicted.

Ques. Are the wicked always punished in this life?

Ans. No certainly, for many of them live without sorrow, and some of the vilest of men are often raised to great riches and honour.

Ques. Wherein then doth God make it appear that he is good and righteous ?

Ans. I own there is but little appearance of it on earth.

Ques. Will there not be a time then when the tables shall be turned, and the scene of things changed, since God governs mankind righteously?

Ans. Doubtless there must be a proper time, wherein God will make that goodness and that righteousness to appear.

Ques. If this be not before their death, how can it be done?

Ans. I can think of no other way but by supposing man to have some existence after this life.

Ques. Are you not convinced then that there must be a state of reward and punishment after death?

Ans. Yes surely, I now see plainly that the goodness and righteousness of God, as governor of the world, necessarily require it.

III. Now the advantages of this method are very considerable.

1. It represents the form of a dialogue or common conversation, which is a much more easy, more pleasant, and a more sprightly way of instruction, and more fit to excite the attention, and sharpen the penetration of the learner, than solitary reading or silent attention to a lecture. Man being a sociable creature, delights more in conversation, and learns better this way, if it could always be wisely and happily practised.

2. This method hath something very obliging in it, and carries a very humble and condescending air, when he that instructs seems to be the enquirer, and seeks information from him who learns,

3. It leads the learner into the knowledge of truth as it were by his own invention, which is a very pleasing thing to human nature; and by questions pertinently and artificially proposed, it does as effectually draw him on to discover his own mistakes, which he is much more easily persuaded to relinquish when he seems to have discovered them himself.

4. It is managed in a great measure in the form of the most easy reasoning, always arising from something asserted or known in the foregoing answer, and so proceeding to enquire something unknown in the following