follows that neither you nor I can be sure whether we are distinguished from other men, and whether we are not at this very moment in the seraglio of Constantinople, in Canada, and in Japan, and in every town of the world, under several circumstances in each place. Would God, who does nothing in vain, create several men, when one man only, created in several places, and clothed with several qualities, may suffice? This doctrine deprives us of the truth we find in numbers, for we know no longer what two or three are; we know not what identity and diversity are. If we judge that John and Peter are two men, it is only because we see them in distinct places, and because the one has not the accidents of the other; but that ground of distinction becomes null from the doctrine of the Eucharist. It may be that there is but one creature in the world, multiplied in several places by production, and by the diversity of qualities: we cast up long accounts in arithmetic, as if there were many things distinct; but this is only a vain imagination. We are not only ignorant whether there are two bodies in the world, but we do not so much as know whether there is a body and a spirit; for if matter is penetrable, it is plain that extension is only an accident of the body, and so the body, according to its essence, is a substance not extended; it is, therefore, capable of all the attributes which we conceive in a spirit, as the understanding, the will, the passions, and the sensations: so that we are left without any rule whereby we may discern whether a substance is spiritual by its nature, or whether it be corporeal. V. It is evident, that the modes of a substance cannot subsist without the substance which they modify; but the mystery of Transubstantiation has taught us that this is false. All our ideas are confounded by it; we can no longer define a substance, for if an accident can subsist without any subject, a substance may in its turn subsist dependantly upon

another substance, as accidents do; a spirit may subsist after the manner of bodies, as in the Eucharist, matter exists after the manner of spirits; the latter may be impenetrable, as matter is penetrable in the Eucharist. Now, if by coming from the darkness of Paganism to the light of the Gospel, we have learned the falsity of so many evident notions, and of so many certain definitions,* what will it be when we shall come from the darkness of this life to the glory of heaven? Is it not very likely that we shall then learn the falsity of a thousand things which appear to us undeniable? Let us make a good use of the rashness of those who lived before the Gospel, and who affirmed that some evident doctrines were true, the falsity whereof has been revealed to us by the mysteries of our theology.

"I come now to morals. I. It is evident that evil ought to be prevented, if it be possible, and that it is a sinful thing to permit it when it can be prevented. Nevertheless, our theology shews us, that this is false: it teaches us that God does nothing but what becomes his perfections, when he permits all the disorders that are in the world, and which he might easily have prevented. II. It is evident that a creature which does not exist, cannot be an accomplice of an ill action. III. And that it is unjust to punish that creature as an accomplice of that action. Nevertheless, our doctrine concerning original sin shews us the falsity of those evidences. IV. It is evident that what is honest ought to be preferred before what is profitable, and that the more holy a being is, the less freedom he has to prefer what is profitable to what is honest. Nevertheless, our Divines tell us, that it being in God's

*Those who hold Transubstantiation place the essence of matter in the faculty of receiving extension, and so with the essence of every thing: nothing is actual; every thing is a passive capacity; but that capacity may consist with a spirit, &c. which confounds all definitions.

choice to make a world perfectly well regulated, and adorned with all virtues, and a world like ours, wherein sin and disorder prevail, preferred the latter to the former, as being more consistent with the interest of his glory. If you tell me that the duties of the Creator ought not to be measured by ours, you will fall into the net of your adversaries. They would have you there; the main thing they aim at is, to prove that the absolute nature of things is unknown to us, and that we know only some relations they have one to another. We know not, say they, whether sugar be sweet in itself; we only know that it seems to us to be sweet when we taste it. We know not whether a certain action be honest in itself and by its nature, we only believe that with respect to such a one, and by reason of certain circumstances, it has the appearance of honesty; but it is another thing in other respects, and under other relations. See, therefore, how you expose yourself, by telling them that the ideas we have of justice and honesty are liable to exception, and are relative. Besides, I would have you to observe, that the more you raise the rights of God to the privilege of acting contrary to our ideas, the more you destroy the only means left you to prove that there are bodies, viz. that God does not deceive us, and that he would do it if the corporeal world did not exist. To shew a people a thing which does not exist out of their minds would be a deceit; but they will answer you, distinguo, I distinguish; if a prince did so, concedo, . . I grant it; if God did it, nego, I deny it; for the rights of God are quite different from those of kings. Besides, if the exceptions you make to the principles of morality are grounded upon the incomprehensible infinity of God, I can never be sure of any thing, for I shall never be able to comprehend the whole extent of the rights of God. I conclude, therefore, that if truth was to be known by any mark,

it would be by evidence; but evidence is no such mark, because it suits with falsities; therefore, my conclusion."

The abbot, to whom this long discourse was directed, had much ado to forbear interrupting him; he heard him with great uneasiness, and when he perceived that every body was silent, he fell into a great passion against the Pyrrhonists, and spared not the abbot for having mentioned the objections which they take from the systems of Divinity. This abbot replied modestly, "that he knew very well those objections were very inconsiderable and mere sophisms; but that it is reasonable, that those who so much despise the Pyrrhonists should not be ignorant of the state of things." He went on and said, " you believed hitherto that a Pyrrhonist could not puzzle you; answer me, therefore: you are forty-five years of age-you do not doubt it, and if there be any thing that you are sure of, it is that you are the same person to whom the abbey of was given two years ago. I am going to shew you that you have no good reason to be sure of it: I argue from the principles of our theology. Your soul has been created; God must, therefore, at every moment renew its existence, for the conservation of creatures is a continued creation. How do you know but that God permitted this morning your soul to relapse into nothing, which he had continued to create till then, ever since the first moment of your life? How do you know but that he has created another soul, modified as yours was? That new soul is that which you have now. Shew me the contrary; let the company judge of my objection." A learned divine who was there, answered and acknowledged "that the creation being once supposed, it was as easy for God to create a new soul at every moment, as to reproduce the same; but that the ideas we have of his wisdom, and especially the light which his word affords us, are sufficient to

assure us that we have the same numerical soul to day, which we had yesterday, the day before, &c. and he concluded that it was needless to dispute with the Pyrrhonists, and that their sophisms could not easily be eluded by the mere force of reason; that before all things they should be made sensible of the weakness of reason, that they may have recourse to a better guide, viz. faith."

"It is

A modern author, who made a more particular study of Pyrrhonism than of any other sect, looks upon it as a party the least contrary to Christianity, and that will receive the mysteries of our religion with the greatest docility. He confirms his opinion by some reasons, and then he speaks thus.* not without reason that we believe the system of the Sceptics, which is grounded upon an ingenuous acknowledgment of human ignorance, to be less contrary to our belief than any other, and the fittest to make one receive the supernatural light of faith. We say nothing herein but what is agreeable to the best theology, seeing that of St Dionysius teaches nothing in more express terms than the weakness of our minds, and their ignorance, especially with respect to divine things. Thus that great doctor explains what God himself said by the mouth of his prophets, that he made his retreat in darkness.' For this being so, we cannot come near him without entering into that mysterious obscurity, whence we draw this important instruction, that he cannot be known but obscurely, covered with enigmas or clouds, and as the schools say, by being ignorant of him. But as those who have always professed humility and ignorance will be better pleased than others with that spiritual obscurity, the Dogmatists, on the contrary, who never feared any thing so much as to appear ignorant, are

* La Mothe le Vayer, de la Vertu des Payens, tom. v. pag. 220.