tory as mythological. Scarcely was this point reached, when they felt themselves under the necessity of giving up the first chapters of Matthew and Luke, with the sincere assurance that these scruples about the early history of Jesus did not at all endanger the remaining portions of his life. Soon, however, besides the beginning, they gave up the end, the account of the ascension of Christ, as fabulous. Even here there was no rest. It was not long before the first three Gospels were yielded to the enemy. They then retired on the Gospel of John, and loudly boasted that there they were safe, not without some secret misgivings, however, that they lived only by the forbearance of the foe. He has already appeared, and availed himself of the same weapons which had already gained so many victories, and the Gospel of John is now no better off than the rest. Now, at last, a stand must be taken; a choice must be made; either men must give up everything, or they must ascend to the point whence they first set out, and through the very same stations through which they descended. To this they will not be able, at once, to make up their minds; they will at first believe that they can escape at a cheaper rate; but let them twist and turn as they may, let them use what arts they please, the matter can have no other issue."* This has a special reference to the state of opinion in Germany. But it is not without its application to us. There are those in our country, even among the orthodox, who talk of a mythology of the Hebrews, and others among the Unitarians, who give up not only the miracles of the Old Testament, but those of the New. All such must either go on or go back. Professor Norton cannot give up the first chapters of Matthew as fabulous, and call him an infidel who gives up the remainder. This new philosophy will break up the old divisions. It will carry some on to Atheism, and drive others back to the unmutilated Bible.

This is not the only effect which this new leaven may be expected to produce. As in Germany it has operated to the destruction of Rationalism, so here it may serve to bring Socinianism and Taylorism into contempt. Even some Unitarian ministers at Boston, we are told, have already discovered that "the religion of the day seemed too cold, too lifeless, too mechanical, for many of their flock." "There are many, I doubt not," says this same authority, "who will welcome its principles (i. e., the principles of the leading school in modern German theology") as soon as they are understood, as the vital, profound, and ennobling theology, which they have earnestly sought for, but hitherto sought in vain."

If

Kirchen-Zeitung, January, 1836. We commend the above passage to the special consideration of Professor Norton.

† Letter to Mr. Norton, p. 12.

Ibid., p. 149. The above passage must not be understood as referring to the principles of the school described in the preceding pages. The Alumnus seems to think that the little set of Schleiermacher's pupils constitute the leading school in Germany. In this, we think, he is greatly mistaken; but we do not wish to be understood to represent him as endorsing the doctrines of the Hegelians. He says he is no Pantheist, though he thinks Pantheism very religious.

this is so, then farewell to Socinianism, and farewell to Taylorism. If only for consistency's sake, those who, with this Alumnus, find in the transcendentalism of Schleiermacher the true philosophy, must feel or affect the contempt which he felt for the Rationalists and Pelagians. The ground on which they stand, however, is too narrow to afford them a footing. Schleiermacher gave up almost everything, except the incarnation of God in Christ. This was the centre of his system. Those whom he brought off from Rationalism, have almost all gone on, with the Hegelians, to Atheism, or turned back to the Bible. And so it will be here. Indeed, the man who can see no harm in Pantheism, who thinks it a most religious system, and venerates its advocates, as is the case with this Alumnus, has but one step to take, and he is himself in the abyss. We should not, therefore, be surprised to see, in the providence of God, this new philosophy, which is in itself infinitely worse than Socinianism or Deism, made the means of breaking up those deadening forms of error, and while it leads many to destruction, of driving others back to the fountain of life.

Though, for the reasons stated above, we think it not unlikely that this system will make a certain degree of progress in our country, we have no fear of its ever prevailing either here or in England, as it does in Germany. Apart from the power of true religion, which is our only real safeguard against the most extravagant forms of error, there are two obstacles to the prevalence of these doctrines among Englishmen or their descendants. They do not suit our national character. A sanity of intellect, an incapacity to see wonders in nonsense, is the leading trait of the English mind. The Germans can believe anything. Animal magnetism is for them as one of the exact sciences. What suits the Germans, therefore, does not suit us. Hence almost all those who, in England or in this country, have professed transcendentalism, have made themselves ridiculous. If it were not for its exorbitant profaneness, what could be more ludicrous than Mr. Emerson's Address? He tells us that religious sentiment is myrrh, and storax, and chlorine, and rosemary; that the time is coming when the law of gravitation and purity of heart will be seen to be identical, that man has an infinite soul, &c. It will not do. Such men were never made for transcendentalists. This is not meant in disparagement of those gentlemen. It is a real compliment to them, though not exactly to their wisdom. Coleridge is the only Englishman whom we know anything about, who took the system naturally. To him it was truth; he was a mystic; he had faith in what he said, for his words were to him the symbols of his own thoughts. It is not so with others. They repeat a difficult lesson by rote, striving hard all the while not to forget.

It is not, however, only or chiefly on this want of adaptation of the German mysticism to the sane English mind, that we would rely to counteract the new philosophy; it is the influence of the Bible on all our modes of thinking. We believe in God the Father,

the maker of heaven and earth. We must have a God who can hear prayer. In Germany, the educated classes, little in the habit of attending church, have for generations felt comparatively little of the power of the Bible. There was no settled idea of a personal God, such as is visible in every page of the scriptures, engraven on their hearts. They were, therefore, prepared for speculations which destroyed his very nature, and were content with a blind instinctive power, productive of all changes, and struggling at last into intelligence in the human race. Such a God may do for a people who have been first steeped in infidelity for generations; but not for those who have been taught, with their first lispings, to say, Our Father who art in heaven. The grand danger is, that this deadly poison will be introduced under false labels; that this Atheism, enveloped in the scarcely intelligible formulas of the new philosophy, may be regarded as profound wisdom, and thus pass from mouth to mouth without being understood, until it becomes familiar and accredited. We feel it to be a solemn duty to warn our readers, and in our measure, the public, against this German Atheism, which the spirit of darkness is employing ministers of the Gospel to smuggle in among us under false pretences. No one will deny that the Hegelian doctrines, as exhibited above, are Atheism in its worst form; and all who will read the works of Cousin may soon satisfy themselves that his system, as far as he has a system, is, as to the main point, identical with that of Hegel.

ESSAY XXIII.

ON CAUSE AND EFFECT.*

THE late Dr. Brown, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, some years ago, published a book entitled "Cause and Effect," in which he revived and defended the opinion of Mr. Hume, on the subject of power. It is due, however, to the ingenious author, to state that he distinctly disavowed Hume's sceptical inferences from this doctrine.

The same opinions, and the same reasonings in support of them, are exhibited in his lectures on the philosophy of the mind, a more recent publication. And as the philosophy of Dr. Brown has many admirers in this country, and has received unqualified recommendations from high authority, it will not, we trust, appear unreasonable or unnecessary, even at this late period, to bring his theory to the test of a fair examination; this is the object of the present article.

The opinion of Dr. B., to which we have referred, is, that in philosophical accuracy there is no such thing as causation or power; that immediate invariable antecedence is all that properly enters into the idea of a cause, and immediate invariable consequence the true idea of effect; and, accordingly, that power is nothing else but the relation between an immediate invariable antecedent and consequent. In plain English, his opinion is that there is no such thing in nature as power: and that when we mean anything more by this word, than merely to express the invariable antecedence of one thing to another, we speak inaccurately and unphilosophically. The words cause, causation, power, energy, efficacy, &c., express nothing, according to his theory, that is intelligible, besides the mere relation of antecedence and sequence.

It is admitted, however, by Dr. B. that almost the whole human race have annexed to these terms, or those which correspond with them in their respective languages, ideas different from what he considers correct. The structure of all languages furnishes irrefragable proof of this fact. The notion of action, causation, energy, &c., is so common among men, that children and savages entertain it as familiarly as any others. It is an idea which is contained in every active verb, and no man can divest himself of

it or speak half a dozen sentences without using words which plainly convey this meaning. This fact is so manifest, that the ingenious author does not call it in question. He admits that the opinion which he maintains is contrary "to the almost universal sense of mankind." Now such a general consent is commonly, and we think justly, considered as a strong proof that the idea or sentiment, in which men so agree, is founded in nature, and accordant with truth. It must be strong reasoning, indeed, which shall demonstrate that an opinion entertained by men of all nations, however different in language, in manners, in education, in government, and religion, is false. If this could be done, then all difference between truth and prejudice would be obliterated. To establish the certainty of the existence of power or causation, the argument derived from universal consent appears to us to be irresistible; for we cannot suppose that all men of all nations, from early childhood to hoary age, could be led to adopt an opinion which had no foundation, without admitting the absurd consequence, that all men are so constituted that they are by necessity led to embrace error instead of truth. And this supposition would not answer the purpose of Dr. Brown, as it would render it impossible for him to establish any opinion as true; for that constitution of human nature which leads men invariably astray, in one case, ought to be suspected in all. The true principles of philosophizing should have led to a directly opposite course of reasoning. He should have assumed the fact, that all men possessed of reason entertain from their earliest years the opinion that there is such a thing as power or causation; and this idea being incorporated inseparably with every language in the world, it is a just conclusion that this is one of those common notices, or self-evident truths, which, from the very constitution of our nature, we are under the necessity of receiving. Let any man attempt to form a language from which all idea of active energy or causation shall be excluded, and he will soon find that this is no vulgar prejudice, but a fundamental truth; an idea, which, if it were removed from the human mind, would leave a vast chasm in all our reasonings and systems of truth, in every branch of science. If a people should ever be discovered who used a language which did not involve, in every sentence, the conception of power and causation, this single fact would go further to prove them to be of another species, than all the diversities which have hitherto been observed among the nations of the earth. But let us see how Dr. B. disposes of this acknowledged fact, of the almost universal existence of the idea of power. He attempts to show that there are analogous cases in which prejudices have, for a long time, had an almost universal prevalence. The instance which he adduces, and to which he often recurs, is the notion of a certain something existing with all bodies, which the schoolmen, after Aristotle, called form, or substantial forms. This notion, it may be admitted, was as extensive, and existed as long, as the Aristotelian logic prevailed. But the case is nowise parallel to