God not only promises good and threatens evil in his word, but graciously operates within us, and by divine energy renders these motives effectual, which without such an internal operation would produce no effect whatever; for the good contained in the promise is neither apprehended nor desired, much less enjoyed, until the mind is illuminated and excited by divine power. And what else is that which we read in so many perspicuous texts of sacred scripture, where God is said to enlighten those who are spiritually blind? as in Ephes. i. 17, 18-to regenerate and renew those who are carnal, as in John iii. 5, 6; 1 Cor. iv. 15; Peter iii. 7. To quicken the dead in sin, as in Ephes. ii. 1, 5. To soften the hard heart, as in Ezek. xi. 19; xxxvi. 16. To convert us to himself, as in Jer. xxxi. 13, 19. To draw us effectually, as in John vi. 44. To create within us a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within us, as in Psal. li. 12. To open our understanding to understand the scriptures, as in Luke xxiv. 31, 45. To confer upon us saving faith, as in Phil, ii. 9. To excite good thoughts and volitions, as in 2 Cor. iii. 5; Phil. ii. 13. To cause us to walk in his statutes, as in Ezek. xxxvi. 27; and to fear his name, as Jer. xxxii. 39; and to love the Lord, as Deut. xxx. 6. From all these texts, and numerous others which might be added, it is manifest that "divine aid" consists in God's efficient and gracious operation within us, and not in the bare proposition of promises and threatenings. For without a divine agency to illuminate our minds and cause us to understand the promises, so as spiritually to apprehend the good which they contain, the mere exhibition of them will never produce any saving effect. Unless God incline our will to embrace the good revealed in the word, with all our strength, we shall continue to be unaffected by it. "For the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." The writer, while he describes both promises and threatenings under the name of "divine aid," intimates that the former are much more powerful in their operation on the mind than the latter; concerning which, however, we are constrained to doubt, since there are many more who hate and avoid sin through fear of punishment than from love of virtue. Again, that the promises of the New Testament are much more excellent than those of the Old, and that the duties of the new covenant are much more easily performed than those of the old, is asserted, but not proved, by our author. We say, that in substance the promises of the Old and New Testament are the same, namely, Christ and his benefits, together with eternal life; so that, in substance, there is nothing promised in the new covenant which was not also promised in that of the former dispensation. It is true, however, that the blessings promised are much more clearly exhibited under the Gospel than they were under the Law. In regard to clearness and sweetness, it may be said, that the promises of the New Testament are more excellent; but not as it relates to the substance of the things promised.

We are aware, however, that Socinians believe that the Old and New Testaments differ, not merely in circumstances, but in

essence.

Ques. 9. TERNAL ?"

"WHAT IS THAT 6 DIVINE AID' WHICH YOU CALL IN

Ans. "It is this; that God seals on the hearts of those who obey him whatever he has promised."

REFUTATION.-Wonderful Theology! This sealing, which the catechist calls" divine aid" of the internal kind, is produced by a consideration of the divine promises and threatenings; that is to say, the seal of a thing which is sealed, is "aid." But scaling is an act, the object of which is merely to produce a more perfect confirmation. When, therefore, God is said to aid a man by sealing the promises, it is nothing else than for God to certify to a man, running of his own accord in the right way, a prosperous issue to all his efforts. According to this view of the helps of grace, there is not in works of piety any such thing as the preventing, co-operating, or accompanying agency of God; but only a certain sealing of the work consummated by man, to assure him that his labour shall not be in vain. Simply to state the Socinian theology, in relation to this point, is a sufficient refutation. For if there be any truth in the scripture doctrine of grace, it is God who first excites us to works of piety, then co-operates with us in our spiritual exercises, and enables us to persevere in the performance of the good thus commenced.

Ques. 10. "IF THE WILL OF MAN REMAIN FREE [AND UNHURT BY THE FALL], WHY IS IT THAT SO MANY HAVE SET THEMSELVES IN OPPOSITION TO THIS DOCTRINE?"

Ans. "They are induced to do so, from entertaining the opinion that there are certain testimonies of scripture which they are confident teach that man is no longer possessed of free will.

Ques. 11. "BUT WHAT ARE THOSE SCRIPTURE TESTIMONIES WHICH THEY DEPEND?"

ON

Ans. "They are of two kinds. The first are such, as that from them they suppose this doctrine can be fairly inferred; the others are thought to contain express declarations, that free will does not now exist in man."

REFUTATION. It is not with the orthodox a mere matter of conjecture or opinion that the will of man, since the fall, is enslaved to sin; but it is a truth which is capable of being confirmed by the clearest demonstration: and we not only suppose that we have texts of scripture from which it can be deduced that the will of man is entirely indisposed to all spiritual good, but we do actually accomplish what we profess, as will appear when we come to the consideration of the particular passages on which this doctrine rests.

Here we must, for the present, close our extracts from ARNOLD'S REFUTATION of the Racovian Catechism. The writer proceeds in the following questions, in this tenth chapter, De Libero Arbitrio, to treat largely of predestination. We should be pleased, if our space would permit us, to follow this learned and solid theologian through the whole discussion; but what we have extracted may serve as a specimen of the manner in which theological discussion was conducted nearly two centuries ago. One thing must have struck the reader as remarkable, namely, that the modern arguments, by which error attempts to defend her cause, are precisely the same as those employed for centuries past. We know, indeed, that those who now adopt and advocate these opinions, greatly dislike this comparison of modern hypotheses with ancient heresies, and denounce it as invidious. But why should it be so considered? Or why should they be unwilling to acknowledge the conformity of their opinions with those of ancient times, when the agreement is so manifest, not only in the doctrines themselves, but in the arguments and interpretations of scripture by which they attempt to support them? If the "New Divinity" be correct, then certainly many who were formerly condemned by the majority of Christians as heretics, ought to be considered the true church, and their doctrines as orthodox; while those who censured and condemned them, ought to be considered as a set of unreasonable bigots, who by their numbers and influence were able to suppress the cause of true Christianity.

Certainly, then, they who are now so confident that they have received new light, ought not to be ashamed of their brethren who struck out this same light hundreds of years before they were born, and defended their opinions by arguments as ingenious, and by exegesis as learned, as any of those now living have a right to pretend to. It is, however, a fact, that these theologians, who long maintained the character of being orthodox, are very reluctant to be classed with Arminians, Pelagians, and Socinians, even when they are conscious that their opinions coincide with those designated by such denominations. This does not arise from any real abhorrence of the sects so denominated; but from knowing that the Christian public, with which they are connected, entertain strong prejudices against these sects; and it requires no small degree of moral courage to stem the torrent of popular prejudice. There has been, therefore, in our "new light" theologians, an unusual solicitude to persuade the religious community that they were not contemplating innovations upon the ancient creed of the orthodox, but that they had merely adopted a more rational philosophy, by which they were able to explain the knotty points in Calvinism, so as to render doctrines naturally offensive to human reason, if not entirely palatable, yet in a great degree free from objection. These attempts at reconciling the new opinions with the commonly received doctrines of the church have been pushed so far, that even some who have gone far into the "new divinity," have been

ashamed of the want of candour and ingenuousness which has sometimes been manifested. And now, at length, the character and tendency of these modern theories have created alarm even in the largest body of professed Arminians on earth. We mean the Methodist Episcopal church. The tables are strangely turned upon us. Formerly we shrunk from contact with this increasing body of zealous Christians, lest we should receive some taint of Arminianism; but now they are lifting up a warning voice to their widely extended disciples, not against our Calvinism-for against this they have uttered their anathemas long enough-but against our Pelagianism; that is, against the Pelagian character of the "New Divinity;" for they are at no loss to identify the system which is now so zealously maintained and propagated with that of John Taylor of Norwich. But while the affinity of the "New Divinity" with Pelagianism has been well understood by considerate men for some time past, it has not been commonly believed that there is also a striking resemblance in the modern theories to the doctrines of the ancient Socinians. This will, however, be remarkably evident by a perusal of the Racovian Catechism, which contains the acknowledged standard of Socinian doctrine; and even from the extracts here given, the coincidence between the two systems is exceedingly manifest. This, however, ought to be asserted with some exception; for it is true that in several points the Socinian creed stops far short of the "New Divinity." This last makes no scruple to assert the complete ability of man, in all respects, to do the will of God, and that by the exercise of his own free agency; but in the catechism which we have had under consideration it is taught that the strength or ability of man is very small; and it is not pretended that he can do anything without divine aid; and although they fall far short of the truth, yet they admit that there is need, not only of external divine aid, but of that which is internal also.

Whether the "New Divinity" will maintain the consistency of the Socinianism of Poland, remains to be proved; but there is much reason to apprehend, that although the theologians who now advocate it will not have the courage to carry it out in its legitimate consequences, yet their successors will be less timid, and will feel that, in self-defence, it is necessary to go a great deal further in the line of deviation from orthodoxy than has yet been done. Whoever lives to see another generation of men rising to maturity, will see that the "New Divinity" is the stepping-stone to German neology.

ESSAY XI.

THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.

PUBLISHED IN 1840.

THE appearance of a new edition of the standard work of President Edwards on the Freedom of the Will, furnishes an occasion, which we are glad to embrace, of calling the attention of our readers to one particular part of the subject which has of late been a matter of frequent debate.

No attentive and competent observer of the controversies which of late years have harassed the church, will dispute that in a great measure they turn upon the nature and functions of the human will. It is as evident that the chief of these questions, on which all others hinge, is that which relates to the Power of Contrary Choice. It will be agreed that whatever goes to determine concerning the reality, nature and operations of this power, does in that degree determine the controversy itself. In the hope of contributing to this happy result, the ensuing inquiry will be conducted. No valuable progress can be made in it, unless it is pursued with a clear conception of the real point at issue. Our first endeavour, therefore, shall be to ascertain precisely what that point is.

1. The question is not whether the will might have made a choice the contrary of that actually made, had its motives, either internal or external, or both united, been different; i. e. had the state of the agent's mind within, or the outward inducements presented to it, been different. No one disputes that on this supposition there might have been a choice different from, or contrary to, that actually made. No one disputes that should such a change subsequently occur, it might produce a corresponding change of

choice.

2. The question is not whether there is a mere natural power of contrary choice, as the phrase "natural power" has been understood by the best theologians. By this is meant that such a contrary choice would not be extrinsic or contradictory to its nature as will. Such a choice, supposing the requisite influence for its