the same, which passes upon all; so nothing prevents the guilt of Adam's sin being one and equal, which passes on all men."-P. 690. The guilt of Adam passes, therefore, as the righteousness of Christ does, and as the guilt of those parental sins which are imputed to their children. Now, if any sane man will maintain that the righteousness of Christ, according to Turrettin, is rendered morally ours; or, more monstrous still, that the moral turpitude of parents is transferred to their children-then we shall leave him in undisturbed possession of his opinion. Again, to the same effect, p. 689. "It is inconsistent with divine justice that any should be punished for a sin foreign to him, foreign in every sense of the word; but not for a sin, which, although it be foreign ratione personae, is yet common in virtue of representation or some bond of union, by which its guilt may involve many-for, that this may justly happen, the threatenings of the law, and the judgments by which they are executed, and the example of Christ, to whom our sins were truly imputed, demonstrate." Here, then, notice, first, in what sense Adam's sin is a common sin, viz., in virtue of union with him as our representative and parent; and secondly, that as his guilt involves us, so the guilt of parents involves their children (when their sins are imputed to them), and so our guilt involves Christ. Now will not the Spectator frankly admit that the guilt, the demerit, the ill-desert of which Turrettin speaks as being transferred -is not moral character or turpitude-but legal responsibilitysuch as exists between a sponsor and him for whom he acts-a surety and debtor-Christ and his people-an obligation to suffera dignitas poenae arising out of the legal relations, and not out of the moral character of those concerned? Will they, or can they, charge the greatest and holiest men of the church with holding the blasphemous doctrine, that Christ was rendered morally a sinner, by the transfer of our sins?

We should have to go over the whole ground anew, were we to exhibit all the evidence, which we might adduce, to prove that Turrettin and old Calvinists generally, do not use the words guilt, demerit, ill-desert in a moral sense. If they do, then they held the transfer of moral character; admit the validity of all the objections of their opponents; acknowledge as true, what they pronounce to be as absurd and impossible, as to be wise with another's wisdom, honest with another's integrity, or comely with another's beauty; they maintain the communication of that which they declare to be "as inseparable and incommunicable as any other attribute of a thing or its essence itself." Into such a maze of endless self-contradiction and absurdity do we necessarily involve them, when we insist on interpreting their language, out of its connection, according to our own preconceived notions-insisting upon it, that because we are accustomed to attach the idea of moral pollution to the words guilt, sinner, demerit, they must have done so too. Accordingly the Protestant has nerve enough to say, for the thousandth time—that all these men are travelling a perpetual round

of self-contradiction-affirming and denying, in rapid succession, precisely the same thing. But what, let us ask, is the use of the "new exegesis" (sensus communis redivivus), if all its principles. are to be trampled under foot-if a writer, instead of having his language explained agreeably to the usus loquendi of his age and school-to his own definitions, explanations, and arguments, and in accordance with his own system and the nature of the subject-is to be made, without the slightest necessity, to use terms in the sense in which we may happen to be accustomed to employ them? What kind of reasoning, for example, is this, To be truly a sinner, is to have a sinful moral character. Turrettin says, we are rendered truly sinners by imputation of sin-ergo, Turrettin taught that imputation of sin conveys a sinful moral character. Q. E. D.? Or this To be truly righteous, is to have a righteous moral character (i. e., a moral character conformed to the law). Calvinists. say, we are constituted truly righteous by the imputation of righteousness-ergo, imputation conveys moral character. Q. E. D.? Yet here is the concentrated essence of sixty pages of argumentation. And what does it amount to? To a very ingenious specimen of that kind of syllogism in which the major proposition includes a petitio principii. In assuming that the terms" sinner" and "righteous" are used in a moral sense, the very thing to be proved is taken for granted. Against this assumption old Calvinists constantly protest, and state with tiresome frequency, that they use these words as they occur in the Bible, in courts of law, and a thousand times in common life, not in a moral, but in a legal or forensic sense; that to be legally a sinner is one thing, and morally so, another to be legally righteous is one thing, and morally so, another. If our brethren, however, will have it, that because the terms, in their opinion, should always include the idea of moral character, therefore old Calvinists do in fact so employ them, we venture to predict they will stand very much alone in their opinion.*

"There are

*The passages quoted from Calvin by the Spectator, p. 165, are of a different character, though quite as little to the purpose. When Calvin uses the expression, "acsi nulla nostra culpa periremus," the Spectator understands him as saying that Adam's sin was properly our sin. They ask, "What then was our sin in Adam?" and answer, "They (i. e., old Calvinists) all affirm it was truly sin-as truly so as are any of our personal, i. e., actual transgressions. It is "nostra culpa," "our criminality," says Calvin." Now Calvin says no such thing. He does not say that Adam's sin was our sin: "Sunt qui contendunt," he says, "nos ita peccato Adae perditos esse, acsi nulla nostra culpa periremus, ideo tantum quasi ille nobis peccasset." some who contend that we are so destroyed by the sin of Adam, as that we perish without any criminality of our own-as though he only sinned for us." These "some" were the Catholic divines with whom he was in constant opposition, who taught that original sin consisted in the imputation of Adam's sin solely; that there was no depravity of nature. This it is he denies-we do not perish on account of that sin solely, without being personally depraved. This too he thinks the apostle denies when he says, Rom. v. 12, "Since all have sinned" i. e., all are corrupt. "Istud peccare, est corruptos esse et vitiatos. Illa enim naturalis pravitas quam é matris utero afferimus, peccatum est." Calvin therefore is speaking of one subject, and the Spectator applies his words to another. We have adverted to this point already, and clearly shown that Calvin taught we are condemned, both propter peccatum alienum, and propter improbitatem, which is in our own hearts. So in Ezek. xviii. 20, he

But it is high time to draw this article to a close. There are properly two questions involved in this discussion. The one relates to the nature of imputation: Does it include the ideas of literal oneness and transfer of moral character? The other: Supposing these ideas not to belong to the doctrine, how far is there any real difference of opinion between those who hold the doctrine and those who reject it? The Spectator says the difference is merely verbal: we think it real and important. There is, however, a measure of truth in their assertion. For it has happened here, as it is wont to happen in such cases, men often violently denounce a doctrine in one breath, and in the next assert radically the same idea. Thus Bellarmine denies with singular vehemence the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and yet comes out with the doctrine so fully and plainly, that Tuckney affirms, neither Luther nor Calvin could have presented it with more precision and distinctness. And Turrettin quotes him as stating the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, to his entire satisfaction. Such things still happen. We question whether any man, since the days of Augustine, has stated the latter doctrine in stronger terms than Dr. Hopkins, in the passage quoted above; yet he rejects the doctrine. That Adam is our federal head and representative, and his disobedience is our disobedience, he admits, and this is the whole doctrine. So too our New Haven brethren revolt at the idea of representation, and of our being included in the same covenant with Adam, and yet tell us," Adam was not on trial for himself alone," but also for his posterity. How one man can be on trial for another, without that other standing his probation in him-falling if he fall, and standing if he stand-we cannot conceive, and happily, it is not for us to explain. Though the opposers of such doctrines, driven by the stress of truth, do thus occasionally come out with the admission of what they are denying, still, we cannot thence infer that there is no real difference, even as to these very points, between them and those whom they oppose. We should err very much if we were to conclude from the fact that Bellarmin states so clearly the doctrine of the imputation of righteousness, that he agreed with Luther and Calvin on the subject of justification. The case was far otherwise. He retained his idea of inherent righteousness and moral justification, and sapped the foundation of the cardinal doctrine of the Christian system-justification on the ground of Christ's merits, to the exclusion of everything subjective and personal. And the evils of this theory, notwithstanding his admission, by turning the confidence of men from Christ to themselves, were not the less fatal to truth and holiness. This is no unusual occurrence. It is a common saying, that every Arminian is a Calvinist in prayer, yet we cannot thence infer, he is really a Calvinist in doctrine.

says, "Si quaeratur causa maledictionis, quae incumbit omnibus posteris Adae, dicitur esse alienum peccatum, ET cujusque proprium." The ground of our condemnation is peccatum alienum, as well as peccatum cujusque proprium. Two sins-imputed and inherent.

Though we are ready to admit, therefore, that at times the Spectator comes near admitting all we ask, there is still, we fear, a hiatus valde deflendus which continues to separate us. What the difference is, we distinctly stated in our previous article. They deny the transfer or assumption of legal obligation or responsibility, and therefore maintain that the punishment of one man can never, under any circumstances, come upon another. We use the word punishment precisely as they do; it is evil inflicted on a person by a judge in execution of a sentence, and with a view to support the authority of the law. This is the principle which they reject. A principle which, entering, as it does, into the view of original sin as entertained by all the Reformed churches (for all held that the loss of original righteousness and corruption of nature were penal evils), essential as it is to the doctrine of substitution, and, as we think, to all correct views of atonement and justification, we deem of the highest consequence to the cause of evangelical truth and piety. This is a part of the subject on which we have not time to enter, and which is entirely distinct from the task which we originally assumed; which was to vindicate ourselves from the charge of having abandoned the common Calvinistic doctrine of imputation, by proving that the doctrine was held by old Calvinists precisely as we have presented it. If after this proof and this exhibition, our New Haven brethren can intelligently say they agree with us, we shall heartily rejoice.

ESSAY VIII.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.*

JOSHUA PLACAEUS, Professor of Theology in the celebrated school at Saumur, published, towards the middle of the seventeenth century, the doctrine, that original sin consists merely in the hereditary corruption of our nature, without any direct imputation of the first sin of Adam to his posterity. The case was brought before the National Synod of the French Reformed Churches, which met at Charenton, near Paris, in 1645. The name of Placaeus was not mentioned, but the doctrine which he taught was examined and condemned. The decree of the Synod was as follows:

"Whereas a report has been made to the Synod of certain writings, printed and manuscript, by which the nature of original sin is made to consist solely in the hereditary corruption, originally residing in all men, but the imputation of the first sin of Adam is denied; the Synod condemns the aforesaid doctrine, so far as it restricts the nature of original sin to the mere hereditary corruption of Adam's posterity, excluding the imputation of the first sin by which he fell; and, under the penalty of censures of all kinds, forbids all pastors, professors, and others, who may treat this subject, to depart from the common opinion of all Protestant churches, which, besides corruption, have always acknowledged the aforesaid imputation to the whole posterity of Adam. And (the National Synod) commands all synods and classes, in taking steps for the reception of students into the sacred ministry, to require of them subscription to this statute."-(Act. Syn. Char., c. 19, art. 1.)

Placaeus now contended that he was not touched by this decree, because, he said, he did not absolutely deny imputation of every kind, but only that which was immediate and antecedent. He invented a distinction between mediate and immediate imputation; immediate imputation being that which, in the order of nature, precedes inherent corruption; mediate imputation that which, in the order of nature, is consequent and dependent on corruption. Placaeus, though an able man and learned theologian, had, at

Published in 1839, with some reference to the following work:"Decretum Synodi Nationalis Ecclesiarum Reformatarum Galliae initio Anni 1645, de imputatione primi peccati omnibus Adami posteris, cum Ecclesiarum et Doctorum Protestantium consensu, ex scriptis eorum, ab Andrea Riveto collecto."