mand, for a specific offence. It is on the ground of this and similar examples; as the punishment of Canaan for the act of Ham; of the sons of Saul for the conduct of their father, 2 Sam. xxi. 8, 14; of the children of Israel for the sin of David, 2 Sam. xxiv. 15 and 17: that Grotius, the jurist and theologian, says, "Non esse simpliciter injustum aut contra naturam poenae, ut quis puniatur ob aliena peccata."-De Satisfactione, p. 312.

The objection, therefore, of the Spectator, founded on the supposed injustice of one man ever being punished for the sin of another, we consider as answered; first, because it bears with equal, if not with accumulated force against his own doctrine of evil consequences; and secondly, because we think it militates with facts in the providence of God, and if valid, is valid against the divine administration.

We have other reasons, however, for the opinion which we ventured to express, that the Spectator's principle was anti-scriptural. It contradicts the positive assertions of scripture, as we understand them. We can only refer to two instances of this kind. In the fifth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, from the twelfth verse to the twenty-first, we consider the apostle as not only asserting, but arguing on the principle that one man may bear the iniquity of another. His object is to illustrate the method of justification. As we have been condemned for a sin which is not our own, so we are justified for a righteousness which is not our own. That we have been thus brought under condemnation, he proves from the universality of death, the penalty of the law. This penalty was not incurred by the violation of the law of Moses, because it was inflicted long before that law was given; neither is it incurred in all cases by the actual violations of a law which threatens death, because it comes on those who have never actually violated any such law; therefore it is for the one offence of one man that the condemnatory sentence (the pipa èis Karȧkpipa) has passed on all men. The disobedience of one man is no more simply the occasion of all men being sinners, than the obedience of one is merely the occasion of all becoming righteous. But the disobedience of the one is the ground of our being treated as sinners; and the obedience of the other is the ground of our being treated as righteous. This view of the passage, as to its main feature, is adopted by every class of commentators. Knapp, in his Theology, quoted above, sect. 76, in speaking of the doctrine of imputation, says, "That in the Mosaic history of the fall, although the word is not used, the doctrine is involved in the account." In the writings of the Jews, in the paraphrases of the Old Testament, in the Talmuds and rabbinical works, the sentence, "the descendants of Adam suffer the punishment of death on account of his first sin," frequently occurs, in so many words. This doctrine of imputation was very common among them, he says, in the times of the apostles. "Paul teaches it plainly, Rom. v. 12-14, and there brings it into connection with the Christian doctrines. He uses respecting it precisely the same

expressions which we find in the writings of the rabbins." On the following page, in reference to the passage in Rom. v. 12-14, he says that the doctrine of imputation is here more clearly advanced than in any other portion of the New Testament. "The modern philosophers and theologians," he remarks, "found here much that was inconsistent with their philosophical systems. They, therefore, explained and refined so long on the passage, that they at length forced out a sense from which imputation was excluded; as even Doederlein has done in his system of theology. They did not consider, however, that Paul uses precisely the same modes of expression which were current among the Jews of that age respecting imputation; and that his cotemporary readers could not have understood them otherwise than as teaching that doctrine; and that Paul, in another passage, Heb. vii. 9, 10, reasons in the same manner. Paul shows, in substance, that all men are regarded and punished by God as sinners, and that the ground of this lies in the act of one man; as, on the other hand, deliverance from punishment depends on one man, Jesus Christ." He immediately afterwards says, that unless force is done to the apostle's words, it must be acknowledged that he argues to prove that the ground on which men are subject to death, is not their personal sinfulness, but "the imputation of Adam's sin."*

Zachariae, of Goettingen, understands the apostle in the same. manner. In his Biblische Theologie, vol. ii., pp. 394, 395, he says, "Imputation with Paul, is the actual infliction on a person of the punishment of sin; consequently the sin of Adam is imputed to all men, if there is any punishment inflicted on them on account of that sin. His whole reasoning, Rom. v. 13, 14, brings this idea with it. Sin is not imputed according to a law, so long as that law is not et given; yet punishment was inflicted long before the time of Moses. His conclusion, therefore, is, where God punishes sin, there he imputes it; and where there is no punishment of a sin, there it is not imputed." "If God, therefore, allows the punishment which Adam incurred to come on all his descendants, he imputes his sin to them all. And in this sense Paul maintains that the sin of Adam is imputed to all, because the punishment of the one offence of Adam has come upon all." On page 386 he gives the sense of Rom. v. 18, thus, "The judicial sentence of God, condemning all men to death, has passed on all men, on account of the one offence of Adam." This is precisely our doctrine. It matters not, as far as the principle is concerned, how the avaros in this passage is explained.

Whitby has the same view. He insists upon rendering ', "in whom," because, he says, "It is not true that death came upon all

Knapp does not himself admit the doctrine of imputation; at least, not without much qualification. He does not deny the apostle's plain assertion of the doctrine, however, but gets over it by saying that he is not to be interpreted strictly, but as speaking in a general and popular sense.

men, for that, or because, all have sinned. For the apostle directly here asserts the contrary, viz.: That the death and condemnation to it which befell all men, was for the sin of Adam only." "Therefore the apostle doth expressly teach us that this death, this condemnation to it, came not upon us for the sin of all, but only for the sin of one, i. e., of that one Adam, in whom all men die."-1 Cor. xv. 22.

We refer to these authors merely to make it appear, that even in the opinion of the most liberalized writers, the plain sense of scripture contradicts the principle of the Spectator, that one man can never be punished for the sin of another. This sense, we are persuaded, cannot be gotten rid of, without adopting a principle of interpretation which would enable us to explain away any doctrine of the word of God. The older Calvinists, as we have seen, considered the denial of imputation, or in other words, the assumption of the principle of the Spectator, as leading to the denial of original sin or native depravity. They were, therefore, alarmed when some of their French brethren rejected the former doctrine, though they at that time continued to hold the latter. Their apprehensions were not unfounded. Those who made this first departure from the faith of their fathers, very soon gave up the other doctrine, and before long relapsed into that state from which, after so long a declension, they are now struggling to rise. Without any intention of either casting unmerited odium on any of our brethren, or of exciting unnecessary apprehensions, we would seriously ask, if there is no evidence of a similar tendency in the opinions of some brethren in this country. The doctrine of imputation has long been rejected by many, both within and without the bounds of our own ecclesiastical connection, who still hold, with Dr. Dwight, to native de. pravity, or that men are born "contaminated in their moral nature." How this can be just, or consistent with the divine perfections, if not a penal infliction, it is difficult to perceive. We are, therefore, not surprised to find that some of the most distinguished theologians of this school, now deny that there is any such contamination of nature; or that men are morally depraved before they are moral agents, and have knowingly and voluntarily violated the laws of God. These gentlemen, however, still maintain that it is certain that the first moral act in every case will be sinful. But this seems very hard: that men should be brought up to their probation, under "a divine constitution" which secures the certainty of their sinning. How this is to be reconciled with God's justice and goodness any better than the doctrine of Dr. Dwight, we are unable to discover; and therefore apprehend that it will not long be retained. The further step must, we apprehend, be taken, of denying any such constitution, and any such dire certainty of sinning. And then the universality of sin will be left to be explained by imitation and circumstances. This, as it appears to us, is the natural tendency of these opinions; this has been their actual course in other countries, and to a certain extent, also, among ourselves. If our brethren

will call this arguing ad invidiam, we are sorry for it. They do not hesitate, however, to say, that our opinions make God the author of sin, destroy the sinner's responsibility, weaken the influence of the Gospel, and thus ruin the souls of men.

But if the Spectator's principle, that one man can never suffer the punishment of the sins of another, is correct, what becomes of the doctrine of atonement? According to the scriptural view of this subject, Christ saves us by bearing the punishment of our sins. This, as we understand, is admitted. That is, it is admitted that this is the scriptural mode of representing this subject. Our brethren do not deny that the phrase, "to bear the iniquity of any one," means to bear the punishment of that iniquity, as in the passage in Ezekiel, "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father," and in a multitude of similar cases. Where, therefore, the Bible says, that "Christ bore our sins," it means, that he bore the punishment of our sins; or rather, as Grotius says, it cannot mean anything else. "Peccata ferre patiendo, atque ita ut inde liberentur alii, aliud indicare non potest, quam poenae alienae susceptionem.”—P. 300. And not only the scriptures but even the Greek and Latin authors who use this phrase, he says, "semper imputationem includunt." This, however, on the Spectator's principle, must be explained away; and the ground be assumed, that the scriptures mean to teach us only the fact that Christ's death saves us, but not that it does so by being a punishment of our sins. But if this ground be taken, what shall we have to say to the Socinians who admit the fact as fully as we do? They say, it is by the moral impression it produces on us; our brethren say, it is by the moral impression it produces on the intelligent universe. If we desert the Bible representation, have they not as much right to their theory as we have to ours? This is a subject we cannot now enter upon. Our object is, to show that this is no dispute about words; that the denial of the doctrine of imputation not only renders that of original sin untenable; but involves, either the rejection or serious modification of those of atonement and justification.

ESSAY VII.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.*

The

WE would remind our readers that in the history of Pelagianism, which called forth this discussion, we stated, "That Adam's first transgression was not strictly and properly that of his descendants (for those not yet born could not perform an act), but interpretatively or by imputation;" and secondly, that imputation does not imply "the transfer of moral acts or moral character." mere declaration of our belief of this doctrine, and conviction of its importance, led to the first communication of the Protestant on the subject. He made no objection to the correctness of our exhibition of the subject; his inquiries were directed against the doctrine itself. His article was written, as he now informs us, "to lead the author of that piece (the history of Pelagianism) to see and feel, that one who undertook the office of a corrector with severity, should weigh well whether he had any faux pas of his own to correct." This accounts for the schooling manner so obvious in his communication, and which seems to have escaped his observation. We think it right to turn his attention to this subject, because he is abundant in the expression of his dissatisfaction "with the spirit and manner" of our articles. We acknowledge that we are as blind to the bad spirit of what we have written, as he appears to be to the character of his inquiries. This proves how incompetent a judge a man is in his own case, and should teach him and us how easy it is to slip into the very fault we condemn in others, and to mistake mere dissent from our opinions for disrespect to our persons. We are prepared to make every proper acknowledgment for any impropriety of manner with which Christian brethren may think us chargeable, although our sincere endeavour to avoid an improper spirit, while penning the articles in question, must prevent any other confession than that of sorrow at our want of success.

We were much surprised to find that we had mistaken the main object of the Protestant's first communication. He now says, "The writer in the Repertory has chosen his own ground; and,

The remarks which follow were called forth by two articles in the Christian Spectator of March, 1831.