Curfory Reflections upon a Book call'd An Effay concerning Human Understanding.

SIR,

YOU

OU obliged me fo highly by acquainting me with the Publication of fo rare a Curiofity as Mr. Lock's Book, that should I difpute your Commands when you defire my Opinion of it, I fhould hazard the Credit of my Gratitude, as much as by my ill discharging them I am like to do that of my Judgment. This, Sir, already reduces me to an even Poife. But to this the juft Authority you have over me, and the Right your other Obligations give you to all the Service I can do, being added, and thrown into the Scale, do quite weigh it down, and leave no room for any Deliberation, whether I fhould obey you or no. Without therefore any further Demur or Delay I fhall apply my felf to the Task you fet me, in giving you my Free Cenfure of Mr. Lock's Effay, which I fhall do by reflecting upon what I think most liable to Exception in the fame Order as the things lie before me.

Introduct. Pag. 1. Sect. 1. The Understanding like the Eye, whilst it makes us fee and perceive all other things takes no notice of it felf. What the Ingenious Author intends in this Period, or how to make out any confiftent Sense of it, I do not understand. For if his meaning be, That the Understanding while it is intent upon other things, cannot at that time take notice of it felf; this comes to no more, than that when 'tis intent upon one thing it cannot attend to another, which is too easily and obviously true of all Finite Powers to be any great Discovery. But if his meaning be (as it rather feems, because of the Particle (All) and the Comparison here used) that the Understanding like the Eye, tho it makes us fee all other things, yet it takes no notice of it felf, then 'tis a Contradiction to his whole following Work, which upon this Suppofition must needs be very unaccountably undertaken.

Introduct. Pag. 2. Sect. 3. First Ifball enquire into the Original of thofe Ideas which a Man obferves, &c. But fure by all the Laws of Method in the World, he ought first to have Defined what he meant by Ideas, and to have acquainted us with their Nature, before he proceeded to account for their Origi nation. For how can any Proposition be form'd with any certainty concerning an Idea, that it is or is not Innate, that it does or does

not

not come in at the Senfes, before the mean ing of the Word Idea be stated, and the nature of the thing, at leaft in general, be understood? If the Nature of Ideas were but once made known, our Difputes would quickly be at an end concerning their Original, whether from the Senfes or not: But till that be done, all further Difcourfe about them is but to talk in the Dark. This therefore ought to have been his firft, and indeed main Bufiness to have given us an account of the Na ture of Ideas. And yet this is not only neglected in its proper place, but wholly omitted and paffed over in deep filence; which I cannot but remark, as a Fundamental defect› in this Work.

In the Three following Chapters our Au thor fets himself to prove that there are no Innate Principles. But before I confider whether there be or no, I premife. this double Remarque. First, That a thing may be false in it felf, and yet not fo because, or in vertue of fuch an Argument. Secondly, That tho a thing be really falfe, yet it may not become fuch a Man to deny the Exiftence of it, who by fome other Principles of his may be oblig ed to hold the contrary. The first of these. argues the Writer guilty of Inconfequence. The Second of Inconfiftency. Upon both which Accounts this otherwife very ingenious Writer seems in this part to be chargeaP 2 ble.

ble. Which from the Sequel I leave to be collected.

His First Argument against Innate Prin ciples is taken from the want of Universal Confent. There are, (fays he,) Pag. 5. Sect. 4. No Principles to which all Mankind give an univerfal Affent. But in the first place how can this Author fay fo, fince in feveral places afterwards he refolves that ready and prone Affent which is given to certain Propofitions upon the first Proposal, into the Self-evidence of them? There are then even according to him Self-evident Propofitions. And will he fay that Self-evident Propofitions are not univerfally affented to ? How then are they Self-evident? There must be therefore, according to him, fome Principles to which all Mankind do give an univerfal Confent. I do not fay that this proves them Innate, but only that there are fuch Propofi

tions.

Well, but how does he prove there are no fuch? Why, he inftances in fome of the most Celebrated, and fays Pag. 5. Sect. 5. that All. Children and Ideots have not the leaft apprehenfion or thought of them; and the want of that is enough to destroy univerfal confent. Now Ialways thought that Univerfality of Consent had been fufficiently fecured by the Confent of all, and the Diffent of none that were capable of either. And what then have we todo

with Ideots and Children? Do any or all of thefe Diffent or think otherwife? No, that he will not fay, because they think not at all, having (as he says) not the leaft Apprehenfi on or Thought of them. And how then does the want of their Suffrage deftroy univerfal Confent, when all Perfons that think at all about fuch Propofitions, think after one and the fame way?

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The most therefore that this Author can mean by want of Univerfal Confent, is that every individual Perfon does not actually Af fent. This perhaps may be granted him from the Inftance of Ideots and Children. But then the Question will be about the Confequence of his Argument, whether Actual Affent from every Individual be neceffary to the Suppofition of Innate Principles ? Or,in other Words, whether from there not being any Propofitions to which every individual Man gives an actual Affent, it follows that there are no Innate Truths. The Author is of Opinion that it does. For, fays he, Pag. 5. Sect. 5. It seems to me near a Contradiction to say, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or understands not. And again in the fame place, To imprint any thing on the Mind without the Mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. And again, Pag. 12. Sect. 24. That a Truth fhould be Innate, and yet not affented to, is to me as unintelligible as P 3

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