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nuations of Phanfie; which could not be, if there were nothing but corporeal Subftance, or the animal Life in Man; because Matter, Senfe, Paffion and Phanfie make up the whole Animal; and it is not poffible that the fame numerical Matter, Senfe, Paffion or Phanfie should have at the fame time quite contrary Motions, Inclinations, or Impulfes, croffing, oppofing and controlling one another, and therefore it must be fome other Power refiding in Man, which refifts and mafters their Motions, Inclinations and Impulfes.

2. There is then in Man fomething befides corporeal Substance, and confequently fomething which is not fubject to Corruption, but is of an indiffolubie and immortal Nature. For fince Corruption is the diffolution of a thing compounded, and diffolution is feparation, and feparation divifion, which cannot be made but in fomething that is di vifible, or may be divided into feparate parts, it is apparent, in regard nothing is divifible into feparate parts but what is corporeal, and that Man has a Principle of Nature in him which is not fo (par. 1.) that there is fomething belonging to human Being which is incorruptible and immortal, viz. the active Power of Principle in Man, which

we call the Soul, fince befides it and the Body, there is nothing elfe conceivable that constitutes the whole Subftantial Frame of Man.

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3. Man's Soul then is of an immortal Nature. And seeing we experience within our felves, that it has a Faculty to frame Notions of things conceived, to it by the Senses; and from Notions put together, to make Judgments; and from thofe Judgments orderly difpofed, to infer, or find out fome Truth whereof it was ignorant before; the Soul is faid to be Rational, or endued with Reason, for by Reason is meant a Power in the Mind of Man which enables him to proceed from the knowledg of one thing to the knowledg of another, by due Confequences made to that intent and purpofe. The Soul then has a rational Faculty or Ability whereby it difcovers the Truth of things, and this Faculty we ufually call the Intellect or Underftanding.

4. And forafmuch as the End and Benefit defigned by Nature to accrue to Man by the knowledg of things, is to difcern what is convenient or inconvenient, or good or evil for him; and that it would be to fmall purpofe nevertheless to attain thereunto, if he had not a Faculty or Power enabling him

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to apply himself to that which is good, for the obtaining of it; and to decline that which is evil, for the avoiding of it; 'tis clear, that, fince God and Nature make nothing in vain, there is in Man a Faculty by which the Soul is impower'd to defire good for the acquiring of it; and to have an averfion to evil, for the avoiding of it; which Faculty is called the Will or rational Appetite, because framed by the nature given it by God, to follow the Dictate of Reafon.

5. Wherefore feeing the all-wife and allgood God was the Creator of Man, who confifts of Soul and Body, 'tis manifest that he had by Creation not only an Understanding and Will, whereby he was capacitated to apprehend and defire what was truly good for him; but had likewife a Body duly qualified to contribute its affistance towards the fruition of the fame.

6. And fince nothing is good to Man as Man, but either that which of all things is most convenient for him, or which will do him moft good (and is therefore called his chief Good) or elfe fomething that is useful and beneficial to him for procuring the fame; 'tis plain, that Man in the state wherein he was created, understood what was his chief

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Good, and what the proper Means whereby to procure it were, and made ufe likewife of the fame, feeing his Intellect was clear, his Will upright, and his Body in a frame duly fubfervient to the fame (par.5.)

7. Which chief good of Man, in regard he is compofed of Soul and Body, must be fomething that is beft, either for the Soul alone, or the Body alone, or for both together. That Man's chief good cannot confift in what is best for the Body alone, is evident from this, that the Soul is undoubtedly the more excellent part of Man; so that what is beft for the Body (be it what it will) muft of neceffity be fome good which is confiftent with the good that is best for the Soul.

8. And what is beft for the Soul, the fame must give the greatest and highest Perfection to it which it is capable of. And the greateft and highest Perfection which the Soul is capable of, muft needs confift in that which will most of all perfect the prime Faculties thereof, which beiug the Intellect and the Will (par. 3, 4.) 'tis manifeft that that which will moft perfect thofe two Faculties, is best for the Soul.

9. And fince the Intellect is a Faculty of Knowing, and the Will of Defire; the utmoft

moft Perfection of the one will be the lar geft and highest Knowledg; and of the other the greatest and noblest good which they are refpectively capable of.

10. Wherefore seeing the Object of the Intellect or knowing Faculty is Truth; and that the more a Man knows, he is both the more defirous and more capable still of farther and higher Knowledg; 'tis apparent that the Intellect could not be perfected to its utmost Capacity by the Knowledg of all created Beings, if really poffeffed thereof, because there would be a more excellent Object than all that, ftill unknown, to wit, the prime independent Being, which is the Origin and Cause of all created Being. The Knowledg therefore of the prime independent Being, fo far as is attainable by Man, will alone be the utmost Perfection of the Intellect.

11. And forafmuch as the Will is a rational Appetite defirous of good, and confequently, if it follow the Courfe of Nature imprinted in it first by God (par. 4.) will certainly defire above all things that which the Rational Faculty of Knowing, the Intellect, directs unto as the greatest and nobleft good; it must needs be (feeing the Intellect, if it judge according to right Rea D 4

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